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Abstract 
The purpose of this transcendental phenomenological qualitative study was to investigate how IS 
professionals working in U.S. businesses make sense of their lives and experiences as they 
address and prevent vulnerabilities to social engineering attacks.  This larger problem was 
explored through an in-depth study of social engineering and its effect on IS professionals 
working in U.S. businesses operating within healthcare, financial services, and educational 
industries across the central and northwest regions of Louisiana.  Through its use of a 
phenomenological research design, the study bridged a gap in the social engineering literature, 
which was primarily comprised of studies that utilized a quantitative methodology.  The use of a 
qualitative approach allowed participants to give voice to their beliefs, thoughts, and motivations 
about the work they do.  The findings, consisting of ten themes and two subthemes, present the 
essence of experience of six IS professionals addressing and preventing social engineering 
vulnerabilities in their workplace.  The findings revealed that the lived experience of protecting 
an organization from social engineering attacks involves the unification of people across the 
enterprise to develop a strong security-minded culture.  Additionally, participants shared two 
primary beliefs, (1) that social engineering attacks would never be eradicated and (2) that IS 
professionals depend on everyone in the organization to protect the organization from social 
engineering attacks.  The study offers recommendations to IS professionals, business leadership, 
HR professionals, educators, consultants, vendors, and researchers.   
Key words:  social engineering, vulnerability, weak human link, IS professional beliefs, security 
culture.  
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study 
What good is a lock, if someone leaves the door open?  What good is a password, if the 
password is shared with the wrong person?  When a company invests millions of dollars in the 
most secure, state-of-the-art technology to protect itself, but fails to equip the people interacting 
with the technology, the business and its assets remain vulnerable to social engineering attacks 
(Manske, 2000).  As of the current study, research has not paid attention to what the experience 
is like for cybersecurity professionals as they address social engineering-related risks.  Instead, a 
considerable amount of research has focused on the defensive tactics that should be employed if 
a business hopes to reduce the risk of various cyber threats, including social engineering (Albladi 
& Weir, 2018; Happ, Melzer, & Steffgen, 2016; Indrajit, 2017; Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; 
Nohlberg, 2018; Hinson, 2008).  Indeed, very little has been understood about whether IS 
professionals believe it possible to eliminate the human-related vulnerabilities that are so adeptly 
targeted by social engineers.  This study was designed to address this lack of understanding. 
The purpose of this phenomenological qualitative study was to investigate how IS 
professionals working in U.S. businesses make sense of their lives and experiences as they 
address and prevent vulnerabilities to social engineering attacks.  This study contributes to the 
body of knowledge by discovering commonly shared experiences, attitudes, motivations, and 
beliefs of IS professionals who defend businesses against social engineering threats.  
Understanding the essence of what it means to protect an organization from social engineering 
threats provides insights into other contributors to social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. 
businesses beyond the well-documented weak-human link (Huber, Kowalski, Nohlberg, & Tjoa, 
2009; Indrajit, 2017; Mann, 2017).  Furthermore, the results of this study may be used by 
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business leadership and IS personnel to support greater investment in strengthening the human 
link against social engineering attacks.   
Section 1 includes the background of the problem, problem statement, purpose statement, 
nature of the study, research questions, conceptual framework, definitions of important terms, 
assumptions, limitations, delimitations, the significance of the study, and a review of the 
professional and academic literature. 
Background of the Problem 
While most organizations consider people to be their greatest asset, those working in the 
field of cybersecurity acknowledge that people also represent one of their greatest security 
threats (Dahbur, Bashabsheh, & Bashabsheh, 2017; Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, & 
Ferguson, 2010).  As the sophistication, application, and goals of social engineering attacks have 
advanced over the last decade, cybersecurity professionals have been tasked with fully protecting 
the organization, especially against those threats targeted at its people (Hatfield, 2018).  In 2017, 
Jackson found that IS professionals recognize additional education and training are needed for 
anyone at risk for exploitation; even so, IBM found in its 2016 Cybersecurity Index Report that 
60% of successful cybersecurity incidents originated from an insider human source (IBM, 2016).  
This divergence between the acknowledgement of the demand for education and training and the 
ongoing exploitation of human capital suggests that more research is necessary to help 
businesses understand more about how companies are actively strengthening the human link 
against social engineering attacks.  Indeed, if U.S. businesses cannot address the weakest link in 
the chain of defense against social engineering, costly attacks will continue to leave information 
systems and the data they house open to costly exploitation by offenders with malicious intent 
(Ponemon Institute, 2017).  The current body of literature provides important clues about how 
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and why social engineers target an organization or individuals within an organization in the first 
place (Albladi & Weir, 2018; Happ et al., 2016; Indrajit, 2017).   
Status of social engineering research.  Businesses, IS professionals, and researchers 
have access to a plethora of knowledge across the body of literature in terms of useful techniques 
to help them understand, measure, and guard informational assets against social engineering 
attacks (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Nohlberg, 2018; Hinson, 2008).  As a result of these extensive 
efforts, everyone stands to benefit from the availability of research aimed at helping businesses 
develop greater awareness of the various tactics used by social engineers (Tetri & Vuorinen, 
2013; Mann, 2017; Hasan, Prajapati, & Vohara, 2010).  Researchers have also spent time 
investigating the role and importance of security awareness on individuals across an organization 
(Bauer, Bernroider, & Chudzikowski, 2017; Torten, Reaiche, & Boyle, 2018).  Certainly, the 
study by Dahbur et al. (2017) indicated a concern for the lack of security awareness displayed by 
the people of an organization.  Yet this deficit of exhibited security awareness behavior does not 
necessarily mean security awareness training efforts have not taken place.  In fact, researchers 
recognize that security awareness training may be occurring, but not all security awareness 
training methods are equally effective (Junger, Montoya, & Overink, 2017; Caldwell, 2016).  
Understanding the role of security awareness, the tactics social engineers use to target 
individuals and companies, and the defensive strategies businesses have at their disposal are all 
very useful as organizations develop effective responses to looming social engineering threats.  
Still, as successful social engineering attacks persisted in the workplace, it became even more 
important to identify gaps in body of the literature that have not yet been fully reported on. 
Gaps in the literature.  Most social engineering research studies utilize a quantitative 
design, which is unable to offer the same depth of understanding that qualitative designs allow 
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(Stake, 2010).  The use of a qualitative research design is critical if researchers hope to advance 
the literature towards a deeper understanding about what may be occurring within the business 
that allow risks and vulnerabilities so often targeted in social engineering attacks to persist.  This 
study attempted to bridge the gap in the literature by utilizing a qualitative approach to take a 
closer look at the lived experience of IS professionals who work on the front lines of cyber 
defense across U.S. businesses.  
Shared experiences, challenges, and responses.  In addition to utilizing a qualitative lens 
to bridge the gap in the literature, this study is an essential contribution to the body of literature 
because of its focus on sharing the essence of common experiences of IS professionals as they 
work in different industries to protect the organization against persistent and ever-evolving social 
engineering attacks.  According to He, Devine, and Zhuang (2018), information sharing in 
cybersecurity helps to reduce the damage caused by cyberattacks, to reduce the overall number 
of cybersecurity incidents, to increase the effectiveness of a response due to the greater shared 
understanding, and to reduce the overall cost related to cyber defense by limiting or eliminating 
the duplication of efforts.  The findings of this study can be used inform businesses and 
cybersecurity professionals about shared experiences and challenges, and at the same time reveal 
how different businesses are responding to social engineering challenges in their own way.  
Sharing the essence of what it is like to safeguard an organization against social engineering 
threats can offer valuable insights into how some companies are able to successfully thwart the 
attempts of incoming social engineering attacks, while other companies remain susceptible.  
Shared attitudes and motivations.  Lastly, gaining a greater depth of understanding about 
what it is like to be a cybersecurity professional exposed more about the attitudes and 
motivations held by practitioners.  The current body of literature offers limited information as to 
5 
 
whether practitioners feel they have the necessary support, resources, and training to adequately 
do the job they have been hired to do.  This study attempted to close this gap in the literature by 
highlighting any attitudes or perceptions that may present previously unexplored challenges that 
need to be addressed before U.S. businesses can minimize their susceptibility to socially 
engineered attacks.  
Problem Statement 
The general problem addressed in this study is that U.S. businesses are still vulnerable to 
costly social engineering attacks even though many information systems have advanced enough 
to diminish the loss of data and other proprietary information from cybersecurity threats (Flores 
& Ekstedt, 2016; Applegate, 2009; Shoniregun, Dube, & Mtenzi, 2014; Junger et al., 2017).  The 
specific problem addressed by this study is the deficit of understanding about how IS 
professionals make sense of their lives and experiences as they address and prevent 
vulnerabilities to social engineering attacks while working at businesses operating in the 
healthcare, financial services, and higher education sectors in the central and northwest regions 
of Louisiana.  Researchers and IS professionals readily agree that people are the weakest link in 
the chain of defense against social engineering attacks (Huber et al., 2009; Indrajit, 2017; Mann, 
2017).  Even businesses with the strictest security measures in place remain susceptible to 
incursion, because employees, with their natural tendency to trust other people, are fair game and 
prime targets for manipulation by social engineers (Mouton, Leenen, & Venter, 2016; Granger, 
2001).  To make matters worse, social engineers no longer need to be physically present to 
exploit the human vulnerability of an organization (Fan, Lwakatare, & Rong, 2017).   
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Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this transcendental phenomenological qualitative study was to investigate 
how IS professionals working in U.S. businesses make sense of their lives and experiences as 
they address and prevent vulnerabilities to social engineering attacks.  This larger problem was 
explored through an in-depth study of social engineering and its effect on IS professionals 
working in U.S. businesses operating within healthcare, financial services, and educational 
industries across the central and northwest regions of Louisiana. 
Nature of the Study 
The study was conducted using transcendental, phenomenological qualitative research 
design because the aim of the research is to better understand how IS professionals working in 
U.S. businesses make sense of their lives and experiences related to social engineering attacks.  
Interviews were conducted with IS professionals working in healthcare, financial services, and 
higher education industries within businesses operating in the central and northwest regions of 
Louisiana.  The interview questions concentrated on discovering commonly lived experiences 
and the essence of the lived experiences of the phenomenon of IS professionals defending 
against social engineering vulnerabilities within U.S. businesses.  Response data were analyzed 
by the researcher to formulate themes from participant responses to the questions asked during 
the interview.  Themes were developed for all research questions. 
Discussion of method.  This section provides a brief description of four qualitative 
approaches to inquiry, narrative, case study, grounded theory, and phenomenology.  Following 
the description, a rationale is presented as to why each approach was selected or rejected as 
appropriate for this study.  Ethnographic research is excluded from consideration due to the 
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cultural anthropologic nature of the approach, which lies are outside the expertise of the 
researcher. 
Narrative.  Narrative research centers on the understanding of experiences (Clandinin & 
Caine, 2008), making narrative designs especially beneficial for researchers who wish to delve 
into the particularities of an individual or group experience.  Stories and descriptions are often 
studied and reported as a series of events that took place in a unique contextual situation 
(Pinnegar & Daynes, 2007).  Narrative studies typically report stories of experiences from the 
perspective of a single person or multiple individuals, and within a structured narrative, and 
investigators focus closely on the lives of individuals to extract important meaning from the story 
that is being shared (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Creswell, 2014).  Stories often intimately explore 
the conversations, dialogue, situations and nuanced sensations elicited from interactions between 
study participants and the researcher who interprets and elicits meaning from these interactions.  
Narrative studies place great emphasis on understanding an experience from the perspective of 
individuals, but not every individual experience is relevant and relatable to public audiences 
(Clandinin, 2016).  This study attempted to understand the common meaning of a shared 
experience of IS professionals defending an organization against social engineering attacks.  
Because the focus of this study hinges on the shared perspective of a group of people rather than 
the individual experiences, the narrative approach to inquiry was ruled out.  
Case study.  Often, case studies are used as a way for researchers to describe how the 
chosen case depicts a specific issue (Creswell, 2014).  An investigator selects a case, or multiple 
cases, and illustrates how some identified problem occurs in an existing, real-world scenario 
(Creswell & Poth, 2018).  Case studies are presented and considered within a specific time, 
place, and topic, which creates the context of a bounded system that constrains the research 
8 
 
effort.  The primary goal of the case study approach tends to be a prepared case description and 
themes, and it is most appropriate to use when the researcher holds minimal, and preferably zero, 
power to control or influence behavioral events and outcomes (Yin, 2014).  Additionally, a case 
study is more appropriate when the focus of the study deals with a current phenomenon, rather 
than a historical case.  While case studies are applicable for studies dealing with a unique 
phenomenon, group, or individual, the aim of the current research effort focuses less on the 
context, cause, or reason of the phenomenon than a case study.  For this reason, case study 
research was deemed an inappropriate mode of inquiry for the current study. 
Grounded theory.  Grounded theory research is characterized by its focus on the 
generation or discovery of a theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1997; Stake, 2010).  In grounded theory 
design, the researcher develops theories by grounding them in data elicited from individuals or 
groups that have experienced some process or action (Creswell & Poth, 2018).  As such, in 
grounded theory, the investigator takes the perspectives of many study participants to create 
some abstract or generalized explanation of a chosen process, action or interaction.  Thus, it 
appropriate for a researcher to use the research design of grounded theory when they wish to 
advance or identify a theory.  Because the current study primarily aimed to understand a shared 
experience rather than to develop new and emergent theories about the processes and actions 
taken by IS professionals dealing with social engineering attacks, grounded theory design was 
not appropriate for the research effort.  
Phenomenology.  Phenomenological research is used to uncover what a shared 
experience means for those persons who have experienced a phenomenon (Moustakas, 1994).  
Phenomenological research does not attempt to explain the cause or reason behind the 
phenomenon; rather, it simply endeavors to describe a complete account about the essence of the 
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experience of those who lived the phenomenon.  The phenomenological point of view is often 
used to emphasize the meaning that people assign to the people and things that surround them 
(Krathwohl, 2009).  As follows, if a person’s reality is indeed shaped by social constructs, “to 
reach a full understanding of the purpose of a person’s behavior it is necessary to see the world 
through their eyes” (Krathwohl, 2009, p. 242).  In this study, the phenomenon is the experience 
of IS professionals working to prevent social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses.  The 
phenomenological research methodology was been deemed an appropriate research design, 
because this approach to inquiry is used to ascribe a common meaning to a lived experience of a 
phenomenon for several persons (van Manen, 2016b).   
Hermeneutic phenomenology.  Within the phenomenological approach resides 
hermeneutic phenomenology (van Manen, 2016a) and transcendental phenomenology 
(Moustakas, 1994).  The hermeneutic method considers phenomenology through systematic 
reflection on the lived experience through the perspective of the person living through the 
experience (van Manen, 2016a).  The eventual outcome of using this methodology is a complete 
description or interpretation of the experience.  Additionally, the underlying philosophical 
assumptions of phenomenological research tend to be based on the study of lived experiences of 
individuals and the belief that the persons are consciously aware of these lived experiences (van 
Manen, 2016a).   
Transcendental phenomenology.  In contrast, the transcendental method presents the 
experiences of the study participants, rather than the interpretations of the researcher (Moustakas, 
1994).  In transcendental phenomenology, researchers try to pull out, or bracket, personal 
experiences and notions to gain insight from the fresh perspective of the participants (Creswell & 
Poth, 2018).  The investigator analyzes and codes the data, eventually developing themes that 
10 
 
convey the spirit of the experience shared by participants.  The transcendental methodology 
better captured the purpose of this study as it allowed the researcher to convey the essence of the 
experience of the participants rather than the interpretations of the researcher. 
Discussion of design.  This study employed a qualitative research design.  Qualitative 
research designs differ from quantitative designs in that a qualitative design attempts to discover 
an explanation and understanding (Stake, 2010).  Unlike quantitative studies which lean heavily 
on the use of numbers to predict and control study outcomes and to convey meaning from a 
distinct phenomenon (Krathwohl, 2009), the spirit of qualitative studies differs due to “the 
integrity of its thinking.  There is no one way of qualitative thinking, but a grand collection of 
ways:  it is interpretative, experience based, situational, and personalistic” (Stake, 2010, p. 31).  
Whereas the role of a researcher in quantitative studies is impersonal, the role of the qualitative 
researcher is personal.   
Greater insights.  Qualitative research methods allow an investigator to observe ordinary, 
day-to-day happenings to better understand the meaning underlying this selected phenomenon.  
In qualitative research, the investigator plays a part in the study, as an instrument that observes, 
interviews, and examines the articles and documentation collected during the study.  As it was 
the desire of this research study to emphasize greater insights into the essence of the experience 
of faculty members as they prepare students for the workforce, the qualitative research design 
provided the appropriate means by which this could be accomplished. 
Summary of the nature of the study.  In sum, this study employed a transcendental, 
phenomenological, qualitative design.  The purpose of this study was to develop a greater 
understanding about the common experiences of IS professionals working to prevent social 
engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses, which a qualitative design allows more than a 
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quantitative design.  Of the narrative, case study, grounded theory, and phenomenological 
research methods, phenomenological methods provided the best way for a researcher to 
understand the shared experiences of a group of people working in the same role across different 
industries.  Just as important, phenomenological methods accomplished this task without 
attempting to discover the cause or reason for the problem being addressed by the study, which 
was outside the bounds of the current research effort.  Within the phenomenological design, the 
transcendental design methods enable a researcher to capture the essence of a phenomenon from 
the perspective of study participants, rather than relying on the interpretation of the researcher, as 
seen in the use of hermeneutic research methods.  Thus, the transcendental method was selected 
as most appropriate for this project. 
Research Questions 
The following research questions were investigated: 
RQ1:  What lived experiences do IS professionals have with preventing social engineering 
vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses? 
RQ2:  What is the essence of the shared experience of IS professionals in preventing social 
engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses? 
RQ3:  What common meaning do IS professionals ascribe to the experiences of preventing social 
engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses? 
RQ4:  What role do circumstances play in the methods chosen by IS professionals working in 
U.S. businesses to decrease security vulnerabilities related to human manipulation? 
Conceptual Framework 
The social engineering defensive framework (SEDF), as described by Gardner and 
Thomas (2014), was used as the basis for the conceptual framework of this qualitative, 
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phenomenological research study.  SEDF is grounded in the belief that technology and user 
training alone cannot prevent social engineering attacks.  Furthermore, SEDF outlines a process 
that can be utilized by organizations to determine how well they are currently positioned against 
social engineering attacks, so businesses can prevent such attacks from being successful.  The 
process consists of four phases, including (a) determine exposure, (b) evaluate defenses, (c) 
educate the workforce, and (d) streamline existing technology and policy.  The study was also 
informed by concepts related to anticipatory cybersecurity, behavioral change, and 
organizational behavior.  
Anticipatory cybersecurity.  Unlike the ineffective, response-driven approach to 
cyberattack management, the concept of anticipatory cybersecurity centers on businesses 
strategically using tactical defense measures to anticipate and manage the attack strategies of 
highly trained, persistent adversaries (Rege, 2016).  Businesses that use anticipatory defense 
measures can offset social engineering attacks by applying the same dynamic and adaptive 
tactics that attackers typically use against them (Rege et al., 2017).  Rege (2016) argued that if IS 
professionals expect to design and implement anticipatory cybersecurity measures, they must 
understand who and what they are up against.  By understanding their adversaries, IS 
professionals then can build the requisite, critical infrastructures to effectively defend against 
social engineering incidents.  Still, to accomplish this feat, IS professionals will require 
significant resources and support from their company leadership, which not every business may 
sufficiently provide due to diverse constraints. 
Beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intention.  Research on the social and work behaviors 
of people in various fields of study revealed that human behaviors are influenced by an 
individual’s beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991; 
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Mishra, Akman, & Mishra, 2014; Godin, Bélanger-Gravel, Eccles, & Grimshaw, 2008).  
Furthermore, research has shown that a person’s behavior can be predicted by the attitudes and 
behavioral intentions currently held by that individual (Ajzen, 1991).  Fishbein and Ajzen’s 
(1975) behavioral intention model, the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), has been used by 
researchers to examine and explain the link between attitudes and human behavior.  TRA offered 
support for the current study by establishing the importance of understanding beliefs, attitudes, 
and behavioral intentions of IS professionals, as these factors can help investigators understand 
and predict the behaviors IS professionals engage in to prevent social engineering attacks.  
Occupational stress.  This study was also informed by the idea that occupational stress 
influences worker performance.  Presently, businesses struggle with finding and hiring an 
adequate number of qualified cybersecurity professionals to address the countless threats aimed 
at penetrating the technological and physical defenses of the business (Reagin & Gentry, 2018).  
Additionally, businesses also depend heavily on their IS team to help build sustainable 
competitive advantage in their industry.  The initiatives undertaken to create this advantage tend 
to result in increased job demands and responsibilities for CIS professionals (Messersmith, 
2007).  Occupational stress has been associated with workers who engage in work situations 
where job demands are high, job control is low, and support is low (Johnson & Hall, 1988; 
Karasek, 1979; Karasek & Theorell, 1990; Salanova, Peiró, & Schaufeli, 2002; Moen et al., 
2016).  The resultant emotional exhaustion from dealing with occupational stress has been linked 
to reduced worker productivity (Donald et al., 2005).  
Moore (2000) identified work overload as the greatest contributor to exhaustion in 
technology workers.  Interestingly, the IS professionals in the Moore (2000) study recognized the 
primary reason for work overload and exhaustion emanated from the deficient staff and 
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inadequate resources available for performing assigned job duties.  More recently, Agbonluae, 
Omi-Ujuanbi, and Akpede (2017) argued that once again occupational stress is a concern for 
workers and hindrance to worker productivity in industry.  The present study allowed the 
researcher to examine the role that occupational stress plays in the lives of IS professionals 
attempting to thwart social engineering attacks, thus providing further insight into the situational 
context of the experience.  Additionally, the study also enabled the researcher to scrutinize the 
reasons vulnerabilities related to social engineering continue to persist, which offered insights 
into how organizations might reprioritize strategic resources to address any deficits.   
Discussion of relationships between concepts.  Successfully implementing social 
engineering prevention strategies within organizations involves more than installing technology 
and training users (Gardner & Thomas, 2014).  Following SEDF and proactively anticipating 
cybersecurity and social engineering attacks requires trained IS professionals who have access to 
everything they need to design and implement the critical infrastructures that will effectively 
defend against the countless attacks aimed at the organization they are attempting to defend 
(Rege, 2016).  Presently, there are not enough workers to fill all the cybersecurity jobs openings 
across business and industry (Reagin & Gentry, 2018), and those who are trained and working in 
industry may be experiencing higher occupational stress from the higher job demands and 
stressors (Messersmith, 2007).  Occupational stress has been shown to affect attitudes and 
intentions and to increase worker exhaustion (Moore, 2000), and occupational stress has negative 
implications for job productivity (Agbonluae et al., 2017).  Beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral 
intentions influence individual behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  Hence, to truly understand 
why the human vulnerability to social engineering attacks remains, a closer look at the context 
surrounding the situational circumstances and experiences of IS professionals working to defend 
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their company against adversarial attacks and the beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions of 
these professionals was needed.  The current study attempted to address this need.  The 
conceptual framework delineates how the study concepts interact with one another within the IS 
department, as it is situated within the overall organization, is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework.   
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Summary of the conceptual framework.  The researcher designed the conceptual 
framework in Figure 1 to delineate how the concepts interact with one another within the IS 
department, as it is situated within the overall organization.  Company and leadership priorities, 
environmental factors, work expectations, self-efficacy, and the availability and access to 
resources each have an effect of the organizational stress and work exhaustion experienced by 
individual IS professionals.  The organizational stress and work exhaustion experienced by each 
IS professional shapes the individual attitudes, motivations, beliefs, and behavioral intentions 
towards the work produced by that individual and the IS department.   
In the context of the study, the attitudes, motivations, beliefs, and behavioral intentions of 
IS professionals help determine the quality and quantity of anticipatory cybersecurity utilized 
across a company to strengthen the most vulnerable areas from social engineering attacks.  The 
framework suggests that following the SEDF process leads to fulfillment of the concept of 
anticipatory cybersecurity.  As anticipatory cybersecurity measures infiltrate the organization, it 
influences the factors used by people during spur of the moment decisions—the types of 
decisions often preyed upon during social engineering attacks.  The response given to socially 
engineered attacks by the human front line of defense during that split-second decision-making 
moment of the request is dependent on the confluence of all the factors interplaying during that 
moment.  This study highlights the importance of understanding what goes on in the lives of IS 
professionals, because what happens with these workers eventually determines how well the 
company can stand resolutely against imminent social engineering threats. 
Definition of Terms 
Terms deemed critical to understanding the current study are defined.  Potentially 
unfamiliar or ambiguous terms are also described. 
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Anticipatory cybersecurity:  The use of proactive cyber defense tactics that enable an 
organization to prepare for sophisticated cyber strikes using deliberate attack strategies (Rege, 
2016). 
Business email compromise (BEC):  A sophisticated scam perpetuated by a criminal 
using social engineering techniques via email to pose as a legitimate person (i.e., company 
official, executive, etc.) to seek unauthorized payments or access to confidential employee 
information (FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center [FBI IC3], 2018). 
Computer-based fraud:  An act of deceit typically assisted by technology or the internet 
that is easily committed with minimal cost and considerable anonymity (Dolan, 2004). 
Cyberattack:  A well-planned, coordinated activity to modify, interrupt, mislead, 
damage, or destroy computer networks, systems, or the software or information residing on or 
sent through these networks or systems (National Research Council, 2009). 
Cybersecurity:  The composition, arrangement, and assembly of resources, practices, and 
structures used to protect the computer-related cyber systems from cyberattacks (Craigen, 
Daikum-Thibault, & Purse, 2014). 
Hacking:  Any unauthorized access or intrusion into a computer system or network; any 
crime committed via or against a computer (Pipkin, 2003). 
Incursion:  See cyberattack. 
Malware:  Any software, script or code maliciously added to a computer device, system 
or network that changes its condition or purpose without consent of the owner (Verizon, 2013). 
Occupational stress:  Stress related to the workplace that occurs when a difference exists 
between the demand of the work and a person’s ability to fulfill these demands (Agbonluae et al., 
2017). 
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Phishing:  A commonly used social engineering tactic that utilizes email or the internet 
to solicit and steal restricted information (Luo, Brody, Seazzu, & Burd, 2011).  
Pretexting:  A commonly used social engineering tactic that utilizes a made-up scenario 
to coax a possible victim to volunteer information or carry out an action (Luo et al., 2011). 
Security (Information Security):  An educated determination, awareness and sense of 
assurance that information risks and security controls are stable (Anderson, 2003). 
Security awareness:  The cognizance and recognition of IT security concerns that help a 
person to respond appropriately to security risks or threats (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology [NIST], 1998). 
Security control:  Any safeguard or countermeasure specified for a business or 
information system aimed at protecting the privacy, reliability, integrity, and accessibility of its 
information (FIPS PUB 199 [FIPS], 2004). 
Social engineer:  An individual who employs tactics that appeal to or manipulate human 
emotions to persuade victims to grant them unauthorized access to computer systems or 
networks for illicit purposes (Workman, 2008b). 
Social engineering:  The “clever manipulation of the natural human tendency to trust 
with the intent to obtain information that will allow the unauthorized access to a valued system 
and the information that resides on that system” (Nagy, Hale, & Strouble, 2010, p. 260). 
Social engineering defense framework (SEDF):  A framework conceived to support the 
efforts of businesses to prevent social engineering attacks (Gardner & Thomas, 2014). 
Spear-phishing:  A cyberattack where an attacker performs research to better understand 
an identified target, designs a realistic email and phishing website, and attacks the target with the 
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intent of gaining unauthorized access to computer systems or networks (Caputo, Pfleeger, 
Freeman, & Johnson, 2014). 
Work exhaustion:  Job burnout (Moore, 2000). 
Work overload:  High work demands that exceed the capacity of a worker (Weigl et al., 
2016). 
Assumptions, Limitations, Delimitations 
Assumptions, limitations, and delimitations are important, because each helps to identify 
potential weak points within a research effort.  Assumptions reveal any underlying beliefs held 
by the researcher, limitations clarify constraints of the chosen methodology and study design, 
and delimitations designate the bounds of the study by articulating what the study will include 
and exclude (Simon & Goes, 2013).  All assumptions, limitations, and delimitations have the 
potential to affect study outcomes; therefore, it is important to consider the role each plays within 
the study.  Assumptions, limitations, and delimitations for the present project are described in the 
subsequent paragraphs. 
Assumptions.  Clarification of assumptions supports an effective appraisal of the 
analysis, synthesis, and conclusions of a study (Wolgemuth, Hicks, & Agosto, 2017).  
Accordingly, the following conditions were assumed true for the purposes of this study.  While 
participants were expected to be representatives of their business, they did not necessarily 
represent all their industry or of all organizations/industries in the United States.  It was assumed 
that participants possessed sufficient knowledge and experience with social engineering to 
provide legitimate and meaningful insights about their personal beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions 
related to protecting the business from social engineering threats.  It was also assumed that 
participants gave their best effort to provide honest and accurate responses to all questions during 
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the interview process.  To encourage honest and accurate responses, identifiable information 
about study participants and employers were withheld from publication.  Study participants were 
not forced to answer any questions that made them uncomfortable.  Additionally, study 
participants were given the opportunity to review the transcript of the interview and provide 
feedback and clarification to ensure their responses were accurately captured.   
Limitations.  Study limitations include any systematic bias the investigator could not, or 
chose not, to control in the study (Price & Murnan, 2004).  Limitations have the potential to 
influence study results.  First, as a phenomenological research, study participants were asked to 
articulate thoughts and perceptions about social engineering.  The study was limited by how well 
participants express their personally held thoughts and perceptions.  Second, the study was 
limited by the nature of phenomenological research, where the aim is only to seek to understand 
the phenomenon of IS professionals working to prevent social engineering attacks and 
vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses, meaning the results will not lead to the creation of theories 
about why the phenomenon of social engineering persists.  Third, the background of the 
investigator may have influenced the types of interview and follow-up questions posed to study 
participants and the interpretation of participant responses.  Last, while steps were taken to 
maintain the anonymity of participants, so they feel they are able to provide honest and accurate 
responses to all questions during the interview process, the interviewer had no control over the 
actual responses of participants.  Additionally, like most qualitative studies, the researcher 
interpreted participant responses, leaving the study results susceptible to researcher bias during 
the data investigation and interpretation stages.  
Generalizability.  According to Creswell (2014), good qualitative research is 
characterized by particularity more than generalizability.  Accordingly, the current study limited 
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its focus to the main types of social engineering interactions (i.e., phishing, pretexting) that occur 
within the business environment, making the study results less generalizable to situations outside 
the business context.  Moreover, because study participants were limited to a small geographic 
area, study results may be less generalizable to areas outside the region being explored.  Also, 
the small sample size may not accurately reflect practices and views of other organizations, or 
organizations operating in different industries, in the United States or other countries.  
Furthermore, only human vulnerabilities related to employees at a business were considered.  In 
many industries, social engineers also target other individuals (i.e., students, stakeholders, etc.) 
for access to business systems.  Findings of this study may not be generalizable to non-
employees.   
Delimitations.  Delimitations include any systematic bias the researcher purposefully 
included in the study design to contain the scope of the research effort (Price & Murnan, 2004).  
The group of participants were limited to IS professionals currently working to protect their 
organization from cybersecurity attacks, with preference given to workers with experience 
addressing social engineering issues.  Because U.S. businesses have unique organizational 
structures, the study participants were limited by whether the IS professional is considered a 
‘security’ professional, but the participant must have been actively working in a computer-
related or technology-based profession to be eligible for participation.  Demographic factors, like 
age, ethnicity, or race that have the potential to influences beliefs and attitudes towards social 
engineering were excluded from the study.  
Sector and region.  The study was limited to IS professionals working for healthcare, 
financial services, and higher education businesses in central and northwest regions of Louisiana.  
The findings from these industries may not be applicable to all IS professionals working for 
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businesses operating outside healthcare, financial services and higher education or in other 
regions.  Nor should results be broadly applied to all IS professionals working for any businesses 
within the central and northwestern regions of Louisiana.  While it is expected the three selected 
industries and the geographic region under investigation will influence participant responses, the 
goal of the study is to understand the phenomenon from the perspective of industry 
professionals.  Accordingly, the discovery process primarily focused on the commonly shared 
experiences within the identified industries and region.  Still, the researcher inspected reasons for 
response differences between the sectors within the investigation if they appeared during the 
discovery process.  The scope of the study did not attempt to explore differences between sectors 
or regions outside the current investigation. 
Significance of the Study 
“Social engineering is the lever that fraudsters are using to penetrate organizations and 
commit big dollar crimes—and no amount of anti-virus protection is going to defend against 
these sophisticated targeted attacks” (Field, 2016, p. 2).  According to Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association’s 2016 State of Cybersecurity Survey, social engineering is the 
first method cybercriminals, responsible for most attacks on business, utilize to initiate an attack 
on a company.  Increasingly, the straightforward social engineering tactics are sophisticated 
enough to enable attackers to hide in plain sight (Internet Security Threat Report [ISTR], 2017).  
Furthermore, since all it takes is one click of a malicious email phishing link to gain access to 
confidential business assets or employee credentials, any common employee can be a potential 
target (Verizon, 2018; Positive Technologies, 2018).   
Fraud and business.  In PwC’s 2018 Fraud Survey, cybercrime, the success of which 
often hinges on effective social engineering, was more than twice as likely to be identified as the 
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most disruptive type of fraud to a business (Lavion, 2018).  And attacks are not expected to slow 
down (Information Systems Audit and Control Association [ISACA], 2016).  The digitally 
enabled world has allowed the scale and impact of fraudulent activities, like social engineering, 
to grow considerably, making a lack of awareness and understanding within an organization 
exceedingly dangerous (Lavion, 2018).  Incidents continue to escalate, leading to damaging 
consequences for the brands, reputations, and economic situation of companies who fall prey to 
social engineering schemes.   
Employee credentials.  In the 2016 Email Security Social Engineering Report, 65% of 
surveyed organizations that fell victim to social engineering discovered the attacks started with 
compromised employee credentials (Ponemon Institute, 2017b).  Retrieving employee 
credentials is the first task on the way to the launch of a business email compromise (BEC) strike 
and committing fraud or theft at the company.  The impact of such strikes is felt across the entire 
business (Verizon, 2018b).  BEC reports to the FBI resulted in upwards of $3.1 billion in fraud 
losses between October 2013 and May 2016 (Field, 2016).  According to Verizon’s 2018 Data 
Breach Investigations Report, the cost of cybercrime will reach $2 trillion by 2019, and no 
industry is immune from its impact.  Moreover, being a small or medium sized business does not 
exempt an organization from being targeted (Proof Point, 2018; Ponemon Institute, 2017b).  In 
fact, in 2017, well-known cybercriminal groups have turned their gaze to target smaller 
organizations, which often have fewer security measures for them to overcome (Proof Point, 
2018).   
SMBs and security control measures.  The findings of this study may be especially 
relevant for smaller- and medium-sized businesses (SMBs), which do not have access to the 
same human capital or budgetary resources as larger enterprises.  Ponemon Institute’s 2017 State 
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of Cybersecurity in Small and Medium Businesses Survey reported that SMBs are being attacked 
more than ever, and SMB personnel, budgets, and technologies are insufficient to create the 
necessary stronghold to withstand an attack.  On top of facing more attacks than ever before, 
nearly half (49%) of security leaders responding to the 2016 Email Security Social Engineering 
Report felt the current controls employed by their company were either average or below 
average.  In the same survey, 69% of respondents said the volume of social engineering attacks 
increased over the previous year.  In a time where the sophistication and quantity of social 
engineering attacks are ramping up, average and below average control measures will not keep 
company doors open.  
Executive support.  Cybersecurity and information security are not just problems for the 
IS and operations team to address.  Indeed, 94% of security leaders responding to the 2016 Email 
Security Social Engineering report say concerns surrounding social engineering are warranted, if 
not the most significant threat faced by business (Field, 2016).  The same security leaders agree 
that user awareness efforts tend to be ineffective, leaving the organization vulnerable to attacks.  
IDG’s 2016 Global State of Information Security Survey revealed that nearly half (43%) of 
security leader respondents see CEOs and board members making cybersecurity a top business 
risk.   
Everyone’s problem.  Reports suggest that executive support is the least of their concerns 
(PwC, 2018; ISACA, 2016; Verizon, 2018b; Field, 2016), implying that executive teams realize 
cybersecurity involves every part of business, not just the IT-related areas of business.  Because 
anyone at an organization may be targeted using social engineering tactics, and the impact of a 
breach can be detrimental to the entire organization, social engineering is a problem that must be 
dealt with across the entire enterprise.  The following sections show how the current study 
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addresses the identified gaps in the literature, offers implications for biblical practice, and relates 
to the field of CIS. 
Reduction of gaps.  This study attempted to reduce the gap in the literature by 
concentrating on the dearth of understanding about what it is truly like for an IS professional 
working to protect a business from social engineering attacks.  The existing body of literature 
lacked information about whether IS workers feel they have the necessary support, resources, 
and training to effectively do the job they have been hired to do.  The current study is important 
because it provided greater insight into the readiness, willingness, and ability of an IS department 
to utilize SEDF, or other continuous improvement techniques, to design, implement, and 
maintain anticipatory cybersecurity defense measures to sufficiently offset social engineering 
attacks.  Looking at the same problem from a different perspective can open opportunities for 
new ways to understand the same situation (Sandberg, 2000).  The design of this study facilitated 
a different way of looking at and learning from a phenomenon than how it was already 
understood throughout the current body of literature.  The investigation offered a rich description 
of the experience so that meaning could be derived from any commonly shared beliefs, attitudes, 
and behavioral intentions of IS security professionals, given their existing company and 
leadership priorities, environmental factors, work expectations, self-efficacy, and the availability 
and access to resources.   
Implications for biblical integration.  Social engineering, at its core, is a lie being 
targeted at the vulnerable areas of a business (Airehrour, Nisha, & Madanian, 2018).  Lying is a 
sin (Deuteronomy 20:16. New International Version), and sin not only separates people from 
God (Isaiah 59:2), but sin also has negative implications for work (Keller & Alsdorf, 2012).  
This study attempted to highlight the valiant efforts of IS professionals fighting to defend an 
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organization against the frailties of human character that leaves an organization open to attack by 
nefarious actors, even while these defenders struggle against situational constraints and 
occupational stressors.  By eliciting the voices of IS professionals, much was learned about the 
vulnerabilities experienced by IS professionals daily.  In the book of 2 Corinthians, the apostle 
Paul shares some of his own vulnerabilities related to the pressures of his role in the church: 
I have labored and toiled and have often gone without sleep; I have known hunger and 
thirst and have often gone without food; I have been cold and naked.  And apart from 
other things, there is the daily pressure on me of my anxiety for all the churches.  (2 
Corinthians 11:27-30, New International Version) 
When faced with mounting pressures and deadlines that are so often associated with the 
work done by IS professionals (Messersmith, 2007), it can be difficult to maintain a positive and 
productive attitude as Christians are encouraged to do in Galatians 6:9, “Let us not become 
weary in doing good, for at the proper time we will reap a harvest if we do not give up.”  Just as 
God has supplied each of his children with unique spiritual gifts to be used to serve one another, 
he also supplies the strength to use these gifts for his glory (1 Peter 4:10-11).  The results of this 
study act as gentle reminder that God’s grace is enough, because his power is made perfect as it 
shines through the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of people (2 Corinthians 12: 9-10).   
Relationship to CIS.  Social engineering exploitations persist even though 
improvements in technology and systems now have the potential to put an end to successful 
cyberattacks, if the human vulnerability is minimized (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Applegate, 2009; 
Shoniregun et al., 2014; Junger et al., 2017).  Because social engineers take advantage of the 
human tendency to trust others, businesses remain open to the risks that accompany any 
misplaced trust (Mouton et al., 2016; Granger, 2001).  Consequently, people remain one of the 
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greatest security threats to an organization’s assets.  It is the responsibility of the IS security team 
to ensure the appropriate measures are taken to strengthen the parts of the company most 
susceptible to attack.   
Goal achievement.  Understanding the essence about what it means for IS professionals 
working to prevent social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses is significant to the field 
of CIS because social engineers continue to exploit human vulnerabilities, resulting in substantial 
consequences for businesses and customers (Ponemon Institute, 2017).  Knowing what happens 
behind the scenes of IS departments offered insights into why social engineering vulnerabilities 
persist even though IS professionals have recognized the need for better training for those at risk 
for exploitation (Jackson, 2017).  Identifying commonly held beliefs and attitudes of IS security 
professionals revealed mindsets that may influence the productivity of these workers towards 
achieving their goal of minimizing social engineering threats to business (Agbonluae et al., 
2017).   
Summary of the significance of the study.  Most successful cybercrime attacks begin 
with a simple, straightforward social engineering tactic (ISTR, 2017).  Email phishing tactics can 
easily be sent to every person across a business, and all it takes is one wrong click or one 
unaware, trusting employee to break down and technological defenses that have been put in 
place (Proof Point, 2018).  Criminals are acutely aware of this vulnerability, leading them to 
employ even more social engineering campaigns to achieve their end goals (Lavion, 2018).  If 
tactics are not immediately shut down, businesses of all sizes face serious and costly threats to 
their economic welfare, brand, and reputation (ISACA, 2016).  The tenacity of cybersecurity 
threats has garnered the attention and support of business executives and leadership, changing 
the classification of security problems from an IS issue to a business issue—a critical business 
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issue (IDG, 2016).  The task of protecting a company against the evermore-sophisticated 
attempts to breach enterprise defenses seems nearly impossible, making it a crucial area to 
examine more closely in literature.  
There is power to be found in exploring and understanding the exposed areas of a 
business.  Security professionals are placed in vulnerable positions with great pressures and 
expectations to keep assets secure from unauthorized users.  Understanding the phenomenon of 
IS security professionals working to defend an organization against social engineering threats is 
essential because it allows those living the experience to respond to activities and directives that 
security professionals are expected to perform to protect the organization.  Hearing the point of 
view of IS security professionals had the potential to expose commonly held misconceptions 
about what may be contributing to the failed attempts at thwarting social engineering attacks at 
U.S. businesses.  Hearing this perspective can also help businesses learn what may be standing in 
the way of successfully ending social engineering attacks, so a more appropriate response may 
be built for addressing the situation.  The findings of this phenomenological study may also lead 
to the development of new theories, changes to expectations or policies, or inspire action to 
address or challenge the issues voiced by study participants.   
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
The review of professional and academic literatures begins with an overview of how 
cyberattacks affect the overall business landscape.  From there, social engineering, one of the 
most commonly used methods used by cybercriminals to perpetrate an attack and the focus of 
this research effort, is explored.  Following the examination of social engineering as a whole, the 
focus of the literature narrows down to reveal how social engineering and cyberattacks are being 
targeted at specific industries.  After the analysis of how and why cybercriminals aim social 
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engineering and cyberattacks against specific industries, the scope of the literature begins to 
concentrate on the role of the IS professional, both overall and as a security professional 
defending the organization against attacks.  Last, the scope of the literature review is constrained 
to look even more closely at the role occupational stress plays in terms of the IS professional 
responding to the high work demands, changes, and expectations.  The review concludes with 
themes, perceptions, and a summary of the discoveries from the literature.  The researcher 
designed Figure 2 below to provide a visual road map of the structure used to narrow the focus of 
the literature review. 
 
Figure 2. Literature review road map structure. 
Cyberattacks.  Cyberattacks are more common than ever (Amsden & Chen, 2012).  In 
fact, Ilves (2016) posited that the more digitized a country, the more vulnerable the country is to 
cyberattacks.  Still, digitization is the where the future leads, which makes building a powerful 
security information infrastructure extremely relevant.  Considering the day-to-day activities that 
have already started to shift online in the U.S. and abroad, activities such as banking 
transactions, tax returns, bill pay, prescription orders, and even elections, the truth is the digital 
age increasingly opens opportunities for each of these systems to come under attack by malicious 
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actors.  Furthermore, the power grid, financial markets, hospitals, traffic control systems, banks, 
credit cards, and any other civilian or commercial networks that utilize technology can all be 
targeted for an attack, which can have ruinous effects for the economy, businesses, and 
individuals involved.  Still, Ilves (2016) reminded of the importance of recognizing that the risk 
does not come from the use of technology itself, rather the risks arise from the malicious, 
unintended use of technology.   
The threat cyberattacks pose to national and organizational security have governments, 
executives, and IS professionals across the globe paying close attention to which organization or 
systems will be targeted next (Hathaway et al., 2012).  Yet, even as many are on high alert, 
Hagel (2014) pointed out that many businesses still underestimate cyber threats.  This mindset 
can be seen when companies do not adequately budget for and manage the budget-related 
information security decisions (Brown, 2018).  Contributing to the underestimation of 
cyberattacks as a threat may be the fact that the meaning of the term cyberattack is fairly obscure 
(Kadivar, 2014).  In fact, Hathaway et al. (2012) submitted that the absence of a shared definition 
for identifying incidents as a cyberattack, cybercrime, or cyber-warfare creates problems for the 
countries and governments attempting to come together to develop coordinated policy 
recommendations and coordinated action that address the cyberattack issue.  
Nevertheless, even while an agreed-upon definition of cyberattack is still up for debate, 
the literature includes many characteristics of a cyberattack.  Most attacks possess similar 
characteristics that can be classified into three main categories: attack intent, attack impact, and 
attack path.  For an event to be classified as a cyberattack, Kadivar (2014) explained there must 
be at least two actors—the owner of the asset and an adversary.  Next, there must exist assets that 
are targeted by the adversary.  Then, some motivation for an attack, financial, political, or 
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otherwise, must be strong enough to make perpetrating an attack worthwhile for a criminal or 
criminal group.  Fourth, something must impact the targeted assets, and fifth, each attack lasts 
for some length of time.  Additionally, cyberattacks are also characterized as having an attack 
vector, taking advantage of some vulnerability, as well as starting at some origin and ending at a 
given destination.   
Threat.  Cyberattacks have fundamental differences from previous conflicts, in that 
cyberattacks operate on its own medium under its own set of rules (Libicki, 2009).  Cyberattacks 
can occur, because every system has flaws that can be exploited by malicious actors.  
Cyberattacks do not attempt to force entry, more often they take advantage of existing 
vulnerabilities in the system to launch an attack.  While some breaches may go undetected for a 
time (Hagel, 2014), other attacks can disrupt the operations of organizations across an entire 
value chain (O’Dowd, 2017).  When unprecedented levels of disruption hit a company, 
operations can be postponed, appointments cancelled, and staff required to work extra hours 
while the business responds with contingency plans (O’Dowd, 2017).   
It can take a while for a new normal to be established and depending on the breadth and 
scope of the attacked organization, the reach of a cyberattack can be enormous.  Because of this, 
it remains critical for companies never to underestimate the severity of the threat of a cyberattack 
(Hagel, 2014).  In truth, not only is it important to be aware of emerging cyber threats, but old 
threats should never be ignored either, as any threat might be reused by an adversary awaiting 
the opportunity to strike when a potential victim lets their guard down.   
Security measures designed to protect sensitive information become more effective every 
day (Mouton et al., 2016).  Even so, threat actors are cognizant of the methods businesses use to 
respond to the digitization of the overall economy (Airehrour et al., 2018).  How businesses 
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collaborate commercially and socially, as well as how digitization of various business functions 
have transformed the way training, communication, and data sharing activities are conducted 
between employees, customers, and partners.  Unfortunately, even with these transformational 
changes, the people of an organizations remain predisposed to manipulation by attackers 
(Mouton et al., 2016).  Adding support to this assertion, Lineberry (2007) maintained that few 
companies properly address the human element related to information security, because many 
information security managers and administrators do not adequately understand the topic 
themselves.  Using their understanding of the current trends used in industry, cybercriminals 
create opportunities to exploit weaknesses that result when businesses allow employees and other 
insiders to engage in online activities (Airehrour et al., 2018). 
Trends.  Cybercriminals are becoming more organized, which makes them even greater 
adversaries than ever before (Huang, Siegel, & Madnick, 2018).  In some instances, the network 
surrounding cybercriminal activities has evolved to the point it now includes a completely 
integrated supply chain constructed around value-added processes.  Moreover, Anderson (2017) 
recognized a problematic broader trend in cyberattacks, such that the cybercriminal, rarely 
receives consequences for perpetrating an attack.  Case in point, when consumers are targeted, 
the company is held accountable for the breach because the consumer will often sue the 
organization for not protecting their information better (Anderson, 2017).  Moreover, when a 
company is targeted for a cyberattack, again it falls to the company to bear the weight of 
responsibility of the situation, because law enforcement has not proven able to address the 
perpetrator in any meaningful way.  Without a doubt, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to accurately identify the offender given information about the offending party is classified, 
government information, and because of this, businesses regularly choose not to report when a 
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cyberattack has occurred (Anderson, 2017).  To make matters worse for businesses, even when 
hackers can be identified, if they hail from foreign territories, the legal system does not currently 
allow organizations enforceable, legal recourse. 
Technology.  Not only are hundreds of free, ready-to-use software easily available to 
attackers for use in an exploit (Indrajit, 2017), but also, demand for hacking products, tools, and 
services exist to the point that markets have been created to connect buyers and sellers of 
hacking tools and services (Ablon, Libicki, & Golay, 2014).  The size and complexity of black 
markets is growing, making it the perfect place for financially motivated, highly organized 
groups to meet anonymously for nefarious purposes (Ablon et al., 2014).  The anonymity of the 
hacker market presents both a challenge and threat to the organizations, governments, and 
persons attempting to operate in the digital economy. 
Emerging technologies.  The Internet of Things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI) has 
caught the eye of both organizations and attackers.  As IoT ushers in a proliferation of smart, 
autonomously acting devices, companies and security professionals are becoming increasingly 
aware of how each new device extends the attack surface of the organization (O’Halloran, 
Robinson, & Brock, 2017).  Understanding how the physical hardware and systems are targeted 
for a cyberattack requires companies to prioritize finding ways to enable efficient, yet secure 
workflows for each new tool brought into the mix.  Furthermore, Advanced Persistent Threats, or 
APTs, are a growing security concern because they are designed to focus an attack on a specific 
target (Bere, Bhunu-Shava, Gamundani, & Nhamu, 2015).  Most recently, the smart grid has 
entered the scene as a next-generation power system to revolutionize and improve upon the 
security of the traditional grid (Rana, Li, & Su, 2018).  The smart grid offers greater efficiency, 
sustainability, security, and connectivity than the traditional grid, but it remains at risk for 
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malicious actors to attack it.  A successful attack on power network operations can lead to 
serious and unprecedented technical, social, economic, and control complications. 
Common-use technologies.  Even with the new technologies drawing the attention of 
cybersecurity professionals, the regular-use technologies, such as email and messaging services 
also remain a primary cause for concern for businesses.  Results of a study by Bakhshi, 
Papadaki, and Furnell (2009) revealed staff members remain susceptible to email-based socially 
engineering attacks.  In the experiment, 152 staff members received an email requesting they 
follow a link to an external website to install a software update.  Even though the experiment 
occurred during a very short window of time, 23% of those receiving the email fell for the attack.  
Given that all it takes is a single incident to create opportunities for an attacker to exploit an 
organization, results like these provide visible evidence of huge vulnerabilities of organizations 
to socially engineered exploits.   
Technological vulnerabilities.  In the modern age of cybersecurity, the offensive and 
defensive sides utilize comparable innovations in the race to overcome the opponent (Huang et 
al., 2018).  Consequently, as systems advance, so do vulnerabilities that must be addressed (Rana 
et al., 2018).  With each new technology brought in to improve some business process or 
function, organizations must consider each way an attacker might turn this tool against them to 
the detriment of the company and its stakeholders.  Critical systems of a business rely on other 
systems, both within the organization and across the value chain (O’Halloran et al., 2017).  
Therefore, because cyberattacks threaten anyone and everyone, companies need to be assured 
that the systems their systems depend on are secure.  This means as cyberattacks continue to 
increase in quantity and severity, privacy, security, resilience, and safety will be at the top of the 
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list of concerns needing to be addressed to ensure security verification and validation methods 
work properly.   
Cost.  Organizations say cybercriminal activity is the biggest threat to enterprise 
resiliency (ISACA, 2016).  In reality, cybercriminals use internet crime schemes to pocket 
millions of dollars from victims each year (FBI, 2018).  The enormity of the consequences of an 
incident on brand reputation and on finances is driving companies to address the risk (ISACA, 
2016).  Not only are businesses are spending a sizeable portion of the IT budget on high tech 
computer security (Lineberry, 2007), they have started to accept that most technical security 
controls are ineffective at protecting the organizational assets against many types of 
cyberattacks, especially social engineering attacks (Berti, 2003).  Companies now recognize even 
if significant investments and efforts are made to improve technical security controls, but 
insiders remain susceptible to ploys that take advantage of human nature within the 
organizational context, then social engineering attacks will continue to succeed at getting around 
this layer of defense.  Given that primary targets of social engineering include help desks, 
administrators, technical support staff, and other common employee positions, all employees of a 
business require an understanding of information security to ensure organizational assets remain 
protected.  Designing effective training and creating a culture of security requires dedicated 
financial commitment by the company. 
Defenses do not come cheap.  There are numerous other costs associated with protecting 
an organization from cyberattacks, responding to attack attempts, and recovering from a 
successful attack.  Adequately protecting organizational assets comes down to the 
implementation of three categories of mechanisms, including physical security, technical 
security, and administrative security (Berti, 2003).  Even as governments and organizations 
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spend millions upon millions on cyber systems to improve security, sometimes cybercriminals 
win the day, because all it takes is finding one weak hole in the multi-million defense system to 
unlock access to the kingdom (O’Dowd, 2017).  Therefore, investments must also be made in 
hiring and training highly skilled cybersecurity professionals who understands how to seek out 
potential security holes and put protective measures in place before a cybercriminal attempts to 
exploit the vulnerability (ISACA, 2016).   
Hefty consequences.  Of course, not every company has the budget to adequately protect 
itself against cyber attackers.  According to Hawkins (2017), while large organizations can invest 
millions of dollars into cyber-security, cyberattacks can be much more devastating to the small- 
or medium-sized enterprises or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  Even when millions 
invested in cybersecurity that cannot guarantee success, as seen in the high number of recent 
high-profile attacks aimed at large companies across the globe.  Moreover, a system can be 
compromised in a matter of minutes or seconds, but the company may not become aware of a 
successful attack until weeks or months later (Verizon, 2018).  In many instances, law 
enforcement, a partner, or customer find out their information has been compromised before the 
company realizes an attack has occurred.  Once the breach becomes public, situations like this 
can lead to a hefty blow to the reputation of the company that swiftly hurts the brand value and 
confidence of the consumer, putting future money of the organization at risk (Mckoy, 2015; 
ISACA, 2016).   
Following a breach.  While an attack often compromises crucial business services and 
put customers and their information at risk, the aftermath stemming from the breach of consumer 
trust is the force that can eventually compel a business to close its doors (Mckoy, 2015).  State 
and federal laws, including HIPAA, FERPA, SOX, and PCI DCC, have been passed requiring 
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organizations to notify victims of a data breach to grant consumers notice and credit protection 
when their data has been stolen or accidentally shared with an unauthorized party (Gardner & 
Thomas, 2014).  Not only does the company realize additional costs related to communicating 
the breach and providing credit protection those affected, but also, not notifying customers of a 
compromised data situation can results in steep fines to the compromised organization.  
Businesses represented in the 2017 State of Cybersecurity in Small and Medium-Sized 
Businesses (SMB) Keeper Security study disclosed spending an average of upwards of $1 
million in the aftermath of a data breach where customer and employee information were 
compromised due to the IT assets that were damaged or stolen (Ponemon, 2017b).  Also, the 
disruption to normal operations cost SMBs an average of over $1.2 million.  The same study 
found when ransomware was used in an attack, most SMBs paid the ransom unless they had a 
backup, or they did not believe the services would be returned once the ransom was paid.  
According to the Information Systems Audit and Control Association report (ISACA, 2016), 
business and industry should now recognize the rate of incidence occurrences continue to 
intensify, making security breaches a fact of life, rather than a potential risk. 
Business response.  There is no shortage of research when it comes to how businesses 
should respond to this new ‘cyberattacks are a way of life’ reality.  Hagel (2014) offered nine 
practical ways businesses can respond to improve their data security and security awareness.  
First, it is important never to underestimate the severity of the threat.  Second, a breach can 
easily go undetected.  Third, it is important to be aware of emerging cyber threats, but old threats 
should never be ignored.  Any threat might be reused by an adversary.  The opponent is simply 
waiting for an opportunity to strike when the company does not suspect an assault.  Fourth, 
security concerns should be considered at the beginning and throughout every new project.  
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Fifth, leadership must be onboard and supportive of a security culture.  Sixth, it is important for 
all employees to receive training on cybersecurity, not only the IS staff.  Seventh, make sure all 
the technical solutions are properly implemented.  Eighth, identify the most important 
organizational and data assets so additional security layers and protocols can be installed.  Last, 
ask questions.  More recently, the 2018 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Executive Summary 
report recommends businesses respond by being vigilant, making people the initial line of 
defense, controlling data so access is on a need-to-know basis only, patching holes without 
delay, encrypting confidential data, utilizing 2-factor authentication, and remembering physical 
security.   
Security culture.  Lineberry (2007) maintained if information security is to be effective, it 
must be culturally ingrained and supported by processes and procedures that are always being 
taught, tested, measured, and polished.  A study by Ekwall and Rolandsson (2013) addressed the 
importance of establishing a security culture across an enterprise, if not across an entire supply 
chain.  The international trading system depends on effectively transporting goods from Point A 
to Point B, but these transports have become more vulnerable to security threats than ever before.  
To increase the overall security level across the logistical chain, supply-chain security programs 
have started stressing the role each employee plays in reducing cargo theft across the entire 
supply chain.  In highlighting security awareness related to specific issues, like cargo theft, the 
company makes an unwritten statement about its expectation of employee behavior when faced 
with a potential security issue.  This unwritten regulation of behavior defines the company’s 
security culture, which can help standardize the response of an employee during an unpredictable 
encounter with a potentially damaging security decision. 
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Security awareness and training.  Companies investing in various ways to increase 
awareness about security risks throughout an enterprise.  Some are attempting to find ways to use 
data-driven cybersecurity analytics to predict the extent a cyberattack is imminent (Zhan, Xu, & 
Xu, 2015).  Others invest in trying to reduce the susceptibility of its people through awareness 
trainings and interventions (Orgill, Romney, Bailey, & Orgill, 2004).  Even the most trusted 
employees can fall prey to moments of negligence, social pressure, and lack of awareness.  One 
approach recommended for companies to increase security awareness and preparedness is to 
randomly test the human layer of security defense using surprise security audits to simulate an 
actual social engineering attack. 
Strong policies and compliance with policies.  There is no doubt that security awareness 
trainings are important for an organization to reduce susceptibility of human insiders to the cyber 
and socially engineered threats they face (Bauer et al., 2017).  Still, not all security awareness 
programs produce the desired outcomes, making it exceedingly important for information 
security policies to be designed and operationalized carefully to ensure employees comply via 
their information security behaviors.  The compliance of users with information security policies 
is irreplaceable if information security incidents are to be minimized.  An investigation by Bauer 
et al. (2017) revealed that different user groups reported varied perceptions of information 
security risks.  The study showed that some users do not consider their role important for 
ensuring information security and that many users did not perceive coworkers to be potential 
malicious actors.  It was also noted that while most study participants confirmed they knew the 
information security policies, they typically could not cite a specific example of a single policy.  
Following the study analysis, the researchers proposed incorporating a full range of 
informational security awareness interventions throughout the security awareness program has a 
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greater likelihood of resulting in higher levels of behavioral compliance with information 
security.   
Additionally, the results suggested the implementation of a long-term strategy that makes 
room for careful evaluation and defined control mechanisms make it likely for a company to 
achieve the desired level of behavioral compliance from employees.  Differentiating target 
audiences by developing informational security awareness trainings and interventions based on 
the employee group and building feedback interventions into the informational security 
awareness programs are also expected to improve behavioral compliance.  These findings were 
supported in the Campbell (2017) study, where participants stressed the significance of recurrent, 
continuous, steadfast, and personalized training to be the key to the prevention of successful 
social engineering attempts.  In fact, respondents emphasized the importance of implementing a 
balanced set of both technical and behavior controls to incorporate adequate monitoring of both 
the technologies and people across the business.   
Cybersecurity arsenal.  Manske (2000) explained why it is important for organizations to 
understand how hackers use social engineering to the detriment of the business.  Having this 
understanding can help organizations design controls and measures to limit its exposures to 
social engineering-type attacks.  A study by Huang et al. (2018) identified 24 key, value-added 
activities in the cyber-security arena that businesses need to defend against cybercrime.  The 
researchers propose the next step in defending against cybercriminal activities is for businesses 
to build an arsenal of services that specifically target specific vulnerable areas within the 
company.  A sample of the suggested services includes Hacker Training as a Service (HTaaS), 
Value Evaluation as a Service (VEaaS), and Reputation as a Service (RaaS).   
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Controlling access.  Thornburgh (2004) explained that the solution to maintaining the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an organization’s information and information 
system is controlling which people have access to what information.  To accomplish this, a 
business must ensure the requestor of information can first be identified.  Once identity has been 
verified, the requestor must demonstrate they are who they say they are.  Last, the requestor must 
be proven to hold the appropriate credentials or clearance level to gain entry to the desired asset.   
Multi-layered defenses.  According to Amsden and Chen (2012), to maintain system 
integrity, organizations and individuals must find a way to defeat social engineering attacks 
through the employment of a multi-layered defense strategy that incorporates strong policies, 
education, awareness, and common sense.  Multi-layered defense strategies are important, 
because if one layer of defense is penetrated, more layers exist to deny further access to the 
informational assets.  This assertion is support in a study by Conteh and Schmick (2016).  The 
study, designed to appraise how vulnerable an organization’s information technology 
infrastructure was to interference, inspects the role social engineering plays in enabling network 
intrusions and cyber-theft.  Again, multi-layered defense mechanisms are mentioned as useful to 
ensure if an outer layer fails, perhaps one or more inner layers can mitigate the risk, if not keep 
the risk from escalating into a catastrophic event for the organization.  Conteh and Schmick 
(2016) consider security policies, technical procedures, education and training, network 
guidance, physical guidance, and audits and compliance to be critical to ensuring the multi-
layered defenses work together to protect a business against cyberattacks. 
Businesses respond through action.  Less research provides evidence of how businesses 
are successfully responding.  What has been noted is that businesses are finally concerned 
enough the potential fiscal damage that accompanies the risk, they are acting (ISACA, 2016).  
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Board members and executives are both informed and concerned, so much so that enterprises are 
making and enforcing stronger plans to address the ongoing cybersecurity issue.  Not only are 
executives actively supporting security programs, they are aligning cybersecurity with enterprise 
objectives.  Security policies are being enforced, and cybersecurity budgets are increasing so that 
the appropriate amount of funding is in place to support the security needs of the company.  
Additionally, businesses have improved system patching regimens, rolled out new security tools, 
and deployed layered levels of defense throughout their networks and at all end points (Proof 
Point, 2018).  The ISACA (2016) report shows evidence that budgets are expanding to ensure 
skilled security workers are compensated appropriately and to support the skills development 
training, response planning, and awareness program needs of U.S. enterprises. 
Need for defense.  According to the Proof Point’s 2018 Human Factor survey, 
perpetrators have found even the best defenses can be overcome if they can place a well-crafted 
email lure into the inbox of an unsuspecting insider.  All it takes is a single, innocent click of an 
unsuspecting insider to inflict serious damages on an organization (Proof Point, 2018).  In 2015, 
almost 60% of companies experienced a phishing attack, with almost 60% of reporting 
companies stating the phishing attempts happened daily (ISACA, 2016).  Statistics also show 
that four percent of people will click on any given phishing lure (Verizon, 2018).  Only making 
matters worse, companies also contend with insider damage and intellectual property damage on 
a quarterly basis.  It is no wonder that not only do cybersecurity risks continue to plague 
enterprises, but companies expect the frequency and destructive impact of cyberattacks to 
increase (ISACA, 2016; IBM, 2016).   
Threat actors.  ISACA (2016) classifies perpetrating cyber attackers into six categories: 
cybercriminals, hackers, non-malicious insiders, malicious insiders, nation/state, and hacktivists.  
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The most frequent attacks come from cybercriminals, hackers, and non-malicious insiders.  
According to Verizon’s 2018 Data Breach Investigations Report, study participants indicated 
nearly 73% of the cyberattacks came from someone outside the company.  In fact, organized 
crime groups were responsible for half of all breaches.  Still, it is insiders, or anyone trusted 
enough to be provided with access to business systems, who consistently give companies pause 
(Axelos, 2016).  The 2016 IBM Cybersecurity Intelligence Index claims that insider threats pose 
the most significant threat to organizations, because it is more difficult to defend against 
someone who already has inside access to data systems and have insights into company 
weaknesses.  Most insiders pose no danger, but it is nearly impossible for companies to discern 
which insider actors are an endangerment to the enterprise.  In the Verizon (2018) report, 
insiders were involved in 28% of attacks.  Sometimes the insider acted with malicious intent, but 
other times, they simply made costly security mistakes.   
Security defense triad.  Semer (2012) posited that three pieces make up the security triad:  
technology, processes, and people.  Each piece of the triad is essential for supporting an 
organization’s information security program.  Information security research shows much 
emphasis placed on using technology to mitigate the threats against the organization.  The 
employee security awareness program highlights the role of people to mitigate physical and 
information security threats.  Processes, procedures, and audits help the company gauge whether 
the security awareness programs are working as intended, so adjustments may be made.  Each 
has an important part to contribute to the effective security posture of a company. 
Exploiting the unaware.  Scarily, ISACA (2016) reported 24% of cybersecurity 
professional had no idea which group was responsible for carrying out the cyberattack on the 
organization, and many others reported being unaware as to whether the company had 
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experienced a data breach within the previous year.  As the State of Cybersecurity Implications is 
an international survey of cybersecurity professionals, these results suggest a serious and global 
lack of cyber situational awareness among industry professionals that desperately needs to be 
addressed.  Adversaries now recognize information access is not strictly limited to finding holes 
in an information systems’ defense structure, which is growing more difficult to penetrate.  
Often, the easier target for cybercriminals are the unsuspecting human marks.  Truly, attackers 
are proving highly proficient in adapting to new trends, popular interests, and usage patterns to 
wage attacks on the people of an organization, which make the need for fortifying defense even 
more relevant for business and industry.  Researchers continue to seek out ways to improve 
informational security training and defenses against cyberattacks through the review, analysis, 
and critique of best practices, tactics, and techniques (Schaab, Beckers, & Pape, 2017).  Still, not 
every countermeasure is appropriate for the type of attack strategy used, especially since some 
attacks, like social engineering, fall across both the technology and psychology disciplines. 
Influencing attack decisions.  Attackers are experts at leveraging fear and stress of 
unsuspecting employees to gain access to the information they seek (Spinapolice, 2011; Peltier, 
2006).  In an in-depth exploration of social engineering, Spinapolice (2011) found that social 
engineers prey on the social norms related to reciprocation, commitment, friendliness, scarcity, 
social proof, and authority using tactics that take advantage of the helpfulness, comfort zone, 
carelessness, or fear of the person being targeted.  Davis (2014) argued that self-defense efforts 
to deter a cyberattack are rarely, if ever enough.  When an adversary sizes up an identified target, 
they consider only a couple of courses of action, one preferable for the defender, the other 
undesirable.  Companies can influence the decision-making process of an adversary by 
strengthening the perceptions of the attacker that the preferable course of action is better, or by 
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making the undesirable path appear even more disagreeable through the utilization of defenses 
known to defeat attacks or threaten punishment.  Defenders must also recognize the factors that 
contribute to the decision of an adversary that may not be as easily influenced, such as the 
internal politics, rationality, nationalism or pride of the adversary.  Deterrence often fails because 
defenders minimize the significance of these factors on the choices of the attacker (Davis, 2014). 
 Sharing passwords.  Happ et al. (2016) revealed exactly how risky untrained and 
uneducated people can be to an organization’s security.  In a study of 1,208 participants, more 
than 1/3 of the participants were willing to reveal their personal passwords to a perfect stranger.  
Not only that, several participants provided passwords within two minutes of the interview.  
Another 47.4% of study participants gave numerous helpful hints to their password.  In all, 
nearly nine out of ten people revealed some personal information to a person they were entirely 
unfamiliar with.  In fact, analysis of the results revealed that study participants were more likely 
to share their password after a small incentive was received.  Results of the study showed social 
engineering that misuses the norm of reciprocity proved successful. 
Fostering a security culture.  Walko (2013) suggested that not every cyberattack 
countermeasure needs to result in hardship for the organization, because good policies with 
checks in place to ensure follow-through can cover a lot of ground.  According to Haber (2009), 
if users do not practice safe cyber practices, even installation of the latest and greatest security 
hardware and software cannot keep the organization safe.  Still, security is not the primary job of 
most people working for the company, which is why the creation of a security culture across the 
entire enterprise is so important (Haber, 2009).  Even if most will never become security experts, 
system users can be taught to recognize suspicious activity and provided with information about 
who to contact when any security-related questions come up.  Small changes around the 
46 
 
company can foster a security-conscious culture, including displaying banners and posters in 
visible in physical spaces and on the company intranet.  In addition, materials related to security 
awareness and education can be distributed at regular and irregular intervals to, or computer 
awareness days can be designed to reinforce training and awareness efforts, perhaps using mock 
security scenarios that give users hands-on opportunities to apply best practices. 
Lie-detecting—an imperfect science.  Because most lies are imperfectly executed, 
mistakes can be detected by someone trained to detect deception (Ekman, 1996).  Unfortunately, 
the majority of people cannot tell the difference between someone who is telling the truth or 
lying, and even those with a trained eye can easily miss subtle changes in the body, voice or 
facial expressions that take place during a deception (Ekman, 1991).  Because both the 
perpetuation and detection of lies appear to be poorly developed skills, social engineers can still 
successfully employ deception tactics over untrained and unsuspecting targets.   
Social networks.  Rather than targeting IS infrastructure, social engineering targets 
human vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access to information systems (Edwards, Larson, 
Green, Rashid, & Baron, 2017).  By employing compelling schemes, an attacker can con a mark 
into disclosing confidential information or interacting with malware designed to extract 
credentials, install viruses, or interfere with system functions until some ransom is paid.  An 
additional area of concern for businesses is the prevalent use of social networking websites.  
People now reveal greater amounts of personal information on social networks, information that 
can be passively harvested by automated tools and placed into the hands of would-be attackers to 
be used to sway and influence the behaviors of identified targets. 
Persisting security vulnerabilities.  Many reasons contribute to the persistence of 
security vulnerabilities across business and industry.  Many businesses confess not having the 
47 
 
ability to effectively mitigate cyber risks, vulnerabilities, and attacks (Ponemon, 2017b).  
Additionally, not only do businesses not have the ability to effectively mitigate current cyber-
related issues, but they also do not feel confident of their ability to minimize the risks that arise 
as newer technologies, such as the IoT and AI, steadily become adopted for business purposes.  
From not having enough skilled security personnel to adequately manage all the security job 
requirements to lacking sufficient budgets for the technology and cybersecurity training needs of 
IS professionals and non-IS professionals alike, security issues persist for a wide array of 
reasons.  In truth, some threats remain because even though a company might be fully aware the 
dangers a successful cyberattack can have, it is easier to deny the risk and assume a 
cybercriminal would never target them than to put appropriate defense measures in place to 
avoid even the most basic of incidents (Ponemon, 2017b).  The next paragraphs include even 
more reasons security vulnerabilities persist, as found through the body of literature. 
Overconfidence and lack of security skills.  A study by Kessler (2016) demonstrated why 
social engineering threats persist despite an increase in security awareness being provided by 
employers.  Participants in the study felt the anti-virus software, multiple authentication 
methods, and IT department would keep them safe from malicious activities.  Additionally, the 
study found that participants frequently felt assured that the security controls were adequate to 
protect them from malicious technical attacks.  They also felt confident they would be able to 
recognize a potential security issue, such as a phishing attempt, and that they could forward the 
email to the IT department to verify the identity of the sender and the legitimacy of the email.  
However, even with the proclaimed confidents, participants in the Kessler (2016) study failed to 
show actual evidence of that they truly understood what to do or how to detect a potential 
security issue.  Unfortunately, even loyal insiders, who would never purposely aid an attack, can 
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inadvertently do so when their natural human curiosity, trust or desire to help someone is 
manipulated to give an attacker the information needed to move into the next phase of an attack.    
It is easy to perpetrate an attack.  One reason vulnerability persist is because it can be 
very difficult to spot a bad guy masquerading as a good guy.  Some of the most dangerous 
adversaries are insiders who not only know the vulnerable places in the business, but also who 
usually have authorizations granting them access to the very systems and assets the company 
strives to protect (Axelos, 2016).  The concept of information security centers on the 
understanding that knowledge must be available only to those who need the knowledge.  It 
remains hidden from everyone else (Evans, 2009).  To fully secure an organization, efforts must 
be made to find and address every single hole through which knowledge might pass through.  
According to Evans (2009), the attacker only needs to identify a single unsecured entry point to 
perpetrate a successful assault, whereas the defender must actively seek out and fortify all entry 
points, including those created by the people of the organization. 
Security requires extra steps.  Ekwall and Rolandsson (2013) reported on the dilemma 
faced by employees when faced with a potential security threat.  While employees have required 
job tasks to perform on a regular basis, the occurrence of security threats is much more 
unpredictable.  An employee faced with an unexpected potential security threat must decide to 
prioritize company security, which entails following additional policies and procedures, or to 
prioritize their normal job duties.  Considering the prioritization of security tasks which will 
require the employee to expedite their normal duties later at a faster rate than usual to achieve the 
same level of productivity, employees without a cultural security compass may find themselves 
inclined to justify the riskier decision in exchange for maintaining current levels of productivity. 
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Not requiring security awareness training.  Even while more businesses recognize the 
importance of all employees possessing an understanding about their role and responsibility in 
ensuring the security and integrity of systems and data, many companies still do not offer, much 
less require, security awareness training (Caldwell, 2016).  For those companies that do offer 
training, great concern exists surrounding whether the training works.   
Ineffective security awareness training.  The compliance of users with information 
security policies is irreplaceable if information security incidents are to be minimized (Bauer et 
al., 2017).  There is no doubt that security awareness trainings are important for an organization 
to reduce susceptibility of human insiders to the cyber and socially engineered threats they face.  
Yet, not all security awareness programs produce the desired outcomes.  In many cases, it is 
questionable if awareness training is even relevant for the staff taking the training (Axelos, 
2016).  
Knowing-doing gap.  Human insiders and system users are important in that they can 
either help defend the organization or they can open up additional holes in the defense to allow 
malicious actors a foothold.  In a study by Albrechtesen (2007), a pattern indicated that users 
often say they are motivated to do what should be done to keep the information secure, but their 
behavioral follow-through frequently falls short of secure.  The same study found that 
documented requirements of desired information security behavior and general awareness 
campaigns alone tend to be ineffective on influencing changes in the behavior and awareness of 
users.  Without a doubt, user security and compliance with security policies and procedures are 
vital if an organization intends to hold a strong information security posture (Cox, 2012).  
Avoidable risks ensue when a knowing-doing gap, the gap between what information systems 
users know and understand and the actual behaviors they exhibit, develops.  At stake, if users 
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engage in such risky behaviors by not following security policies and procedures, include the 
security and integrity of the organization, the potential exposure of sensitive information, and the 
weakening of the technological perimeter currently acting as a defense.  Besides weakening the 
defense mechanisms, the reputation of the organization and any clients, partners, and customers 
of the organization may also be damaged by the risky behaviors--especially if these risky 
behaviors lead to a breach.  
It is hard to spot a professional liar.  Social engineers are often professional con artists 
who masterfully use communication techniques to get exactly what they want out of their target.  
Communication is based on the presumption that all participants are being truthful (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996), and social engineering exploits this presupposition, to the detriment of victims.  
People engaged in communicative efforts engage in behaviors that Buller, Burgoon, Buslig, and 
Roiger (1996) classify as strategic and nonstrategic.  The nonstrategic behaviors can act as 
indicators when deception occurs.  This means, even while a deceiver attempts to project a 
certain image, often there are subtle clues that exist that can help recipients of a false message to 
know when someone is attempting to deceive them.  
Security 101.  Many companies still fall short on implementing a password policy, a very 
basic security expectation (Ponemon, 2017b).  In fact, according to business representatives who 
responded to the Ponemon Institute’s 2017 State of Cybersecurity in Small & Medium-Sized 
Businesses, if a company happens to have a password policy, companies do not necessarily 
enforce the policy very strictly.  Moreover, many times companies have not implemented 
processes and procedures to validate whether employees are adhering to best practices in relation 
to password security.  Indeed, many have no idea as to whether employees are using strong 
passwords or sharing their password with other people.  
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Size and risk considerations.  Cybersecurity reports agree—every industry and company 
are at risk of being targeted for a cyberattack (Verizon, 2018; Proof Point, 2018; IBM, 2016).  It 
matters not that a target has deep-pockets, in fact, most cybercriminals do not care who they 
exploit.  Instead, adversaries pursue easy payouts from unprepared victims (Verizon, 2018).  
And, while it may require little effort for a company to convince itself they are too big, too small, 
or too specialized to fit the criteria a cybercriminal is looking for, no exceptions exist for those 
who are at risk (IBM, 2016).  With the proliferation of organized cybercriminals, where bigger 
actors are increasing targeting smaller organizations to prey on (Proof Point, 2018), every 
company needs a cybersecurity strategy above and beyond the minimum level of defense to ward 
off potential strikes (IBM, 2016).  Moreover, because cyberattacks can be so much more 
devastating to SMBs and NGOs, having a plan and response in place for dealing with a 
cyberattack is critical if the company intends to stay in business over the long haul. 
Anticipatory cybersecurity.  The attacks used against critical infrastructures by 
cybercriminals are becoming ever more sophisticated and persistent (Rege et al., 2017).  To 
manage incidents, typically defenders await an attempt at intrusion, before responding to the 
attack.  This response-driven approach requires significant financial resources, and it is 
ineffective against dynamic adversaries using adaptive approaches.  The security community has 
started to consider how shifting to a proactive, anticipatory cybersecurity approach, an approach 
that adapts to adversaries at various points of the attack, might be the answer business and 
industry have needed all along.  In learning how adversaries make dynamic decisions, a 
defending organization can anticipate the most effective way to keep successful attacks at bay.   
Think like the enemy.  Taking an anticipatory cybersecurity approach means companies 
need to understand how adversaries make dynamic decisions and adapt to circumstances during 
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an intrusion (Rege et al., 2017).  For anticipatory cybersecurity measures to be designed and 
implemented in the enterprise setting, it is necessary for companies to completely recognize who 
and what they are up against (Rege, 2016).  The critical infrastructures that keep a company safe 
from a sophisticated, targeted attack can only be properly designed if a company has captured a 
depth of knowledge about its adversaries.  Additionally, if an organization hopes to secure itself 
against attacks, dedicated efforts must be made to consider potential attack scenarios from the 
perspective of an adversary (Evans, 2009).  This anticipatory cybersecurity approach allows a 
company to proactively seek out and address each and every possible entry point an adversary 
might use to gain unauthorized access to systems.   
Strengthen all weak points.  Regrettably, protecting organizational assets still primarily 
focuses on building in the necessary technical countermeasures, even though the human 
component of information security continues to be crucial in successful attacks on computer 
systems (Mann, 2017).  In most cases, hacking the people of the organization is enough for a 
social engineer to gather the information needed to crack into a system.  Because of the human 
vulnerability, adversaries rarely need to seek out technical vulnerabilities to begin an attack.  As 
adversaries continue to adapt to the trends, patterns, and interest of the mass populous, it is 
inevitable that a sophisticated attack will eventually take place.  Hence, it remains imperative for 
businesses to commit to reinforcing secure practices by employees and other insiders at every 
opportunity.  IBM (2016) offers four essential steps businesses can take to cultivate of a strategic 
cybersecurity program including (a) prioritize business objectives and determine the level of risk 
tolerance of the company; (b) protect the organization with a proactive, or anticipatory, security 
plan; (c) prepare a response for the inescapable sophisticated cyberattack; and (d) build, promote, 
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and reinforce a security awareness culture across the enterprise.  Following these practices can 
help a company to build anticipatory cybersecurity practices throughout the enterprise. 
SEDF.  After consulting on social engineering assessments with many clients across 
varied industries without a clear-cut resource to provide guidelines for companies to reference 
when trying to kick off a new security awareness program, Gardner and Thomas (2014) created 
the social engineering defensive framework (SEDF) to help companies figure out how to stop 
social engineering attacks.  The framework was developed after Gardner and Thomas (2014) 
realized that social engineering attacks could not be stopped without the right mixture of 
technological defense and security training.  The SEDF captures their belief that building a 
culture of security awareness is a process, and while there may never be a cookie-cutter solution 
that can be implemented at every organization, by following the four basic phases outlined in the 
SEDF, determine exposure, evaluate defenses, educate the workforce, and streamline current 
technologies and policies, a company will find itself more secure with fewer vulnerabilities. 
Determine exposure.  In the determine exposure phase, an assessment is taken of the 
publicly available resources and web exposure of the company as if a social engineering were 
targeting the company for an attack (Gardner & Thomas, 2014).  This phase should attempt to 
answer whether too much information is being exposed that might leave the business vulnerable 
to attack.  Searching on information-sharing websites can reveal leaked documents among other 
things.  The result of the research effort is a report summarizing all the information found, and 
the attack vectors a social engineer could use to meet with probable success. 
Evaluate defenses.  The evaluate defenses phase is used by the organization to take a 
deep look at the effectiveness each layer of defense employed by the organization (Gardner & 
Thomas, 2014).  Typically, an organization will see how well employees resist penetration 
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testing and simulated attacks across various attack vectors.  Detection technologies and physical 
security controls may be appraised to determine how well these defenses are working to protect 
company assets.  The result of this phase can answer to what extent information or access was 
obtained, how many and what types of vulnerabilities left the organization exposed, whether 
response policies and procedures were in place and followed and more.  Every answer in this 
phase can lead to action items that help the company fortify holes in policy, processes and 
procedures, attack responses, technology, and physical security. 
Educate the workforce.  According to Gardner and Thomas (2014), detailing each and 
every step in an attack scenario is critical if social engineering education is to be effective.  
Showcasing how metadata, phishing, social media safety, company email addresses, phone and 
physical attacks can be used by social engineers to launch an attack can lead to an important 
reality check and greater understanding for many employees.  Once employees have seen how a 
successful attack can be perpetrated using one of these methods, it is important to follow-up with 
a discussion about tactics that can be used to resist leaking important information or prevent an 
attack.   
Streamline existing technology and policy.  The last phase in SEDF uses high-level 
scenarios designed to step security teams through an attack scenario in a non-threatening 
environment that supports discussions about how technological configuration changes could lead 
to enhanced prevention, detection, and response capabilities (Gardner & Thomas, 2014).  This 
review walks through existing incident response policies, defensive technology, recognition 
competence, techniques used to lessen the impact after a successful attack and other operational 
plans that keep the company running in a supportive environment.  
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Continuous improvement.  The phases in the SEDF process should be considered 
completely independent of each other (Gardner & Thomas, 2014).  In fact, the order in which the 
phases are executed should align with organizational priorities at the time when the security 
awareness program is being initiated.  Successful implementation of SEDF is seen when the 
discoveries from each phase result in changes to culture, training, technology, policy, or physical 
security measures.  As SEDF is a process cycle, phases in the cycle are repeated on a periodic 
basis to ensure continuous improvement efforts eventually lead to a much stronger security 
position against adversaries. 
Section synthesis.  Cyberattacks are a threat to business and industry, and they usually 
come at a very high cost both for those who becomes victims, as well as everyone scrambling to 
build strong enough defenses to avoid the same fate.  In truth, as the number of cyberattacks 
have increased, businesses have recognized the reality that preparing a response to an imminent 
cyberattacks is no longer an option.  Instead, it is a necessity if the business hopes to keep its 
doors open for any amount of time.  Continuous improvement processes, such as SEDF, can be 
used by organizations to instill as anticipatory cybersecurity culture across any size or 
specialized enterprise to ensure fewer any persisting security vulnerabilities are minimized 
Social engineering.  When considering the three pillars of the security triad (Semer, 
2012), social engineering targets weaknesses in the human element of defense.  Back in 1982, 
Rasmussen compared technology-based and human-based cyberattacks, finding human barriers 
much more unreliable than technical barriers.  This has not changed, as can be seen in the study 
by Hasan et al. (2010) where the researchers had a high success rate using social engineering 
techniques to commit acts of deception on a Linux operating system, an operating system 
presumed to be the most secure operating systems around.  Because the threat of social 
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engineering is so difficult to effectively impede, the menace of social engineering attacks 
continues to expand to increasingly more organizations and individuals (Amsden & Chen, 2012; 
Positive Technologies, 2018; Proof Point, 2018).  Cybersecurity reports provide evidence that 
attackers now use social engineering tactics even more than automated exploits (Proof Point, 
2018).  In fact, cybercriminals, the most prevalent type of attacker, use social engineering more 
often than any other attack vector (ISACA, 2016).   
Definition.  Nagy et al. (2010) described social engineering as the “clever manipulation 
of the natural human tendency to trust with the intent to obtain information that will allow the 
unauthorized access to a valued system and the information that resides on that system” (p. 260).  
Today, the most common term in use for the person perpetrating the manipulation is social 
engineer, but in the past, people attempting to dupe others for personal gain using their wit, 
charm, cunning, or force were labeled grifters, con artists, and confidence men (Thornburgh, 
2004).  While the objectives may have changed, the manipulative tactics employed by social 
engineers have not.  Their goal is to by-pass whatever security measures stand between them and 
their prize, and because social engineering attacks regularly involve person-to-person 
interactions that prey on the targeted individual’s natural curiosity, trust, and desire to help 
others, they can be especially difficult for businesses to block. 
An attack on human psychology.  Social engineering has roots in both disciplines of 
computer science and social psychology (Mouton, Malan, Kimppa & Venter, 2015), but while 
cybersecurity professionals may be able to masterfully design and implement technical defensive 
tactics, many struggle to find the balance between arming the organization with the latest 
technological security advances and equipping company insiders with informational security 
skills that will assist them during a social engineering attack (Cavelty, 2014).  Despite the fact 
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that social engineering attacks can be human-based, computer-based, or both (Maan & Sharma, 
2012), at its essence, social engineering is an attack on human psychology.  Neither technology 
or technical skills are required to commit a social engineering exploit, however, each can be used 
in various schemes to engage or trick an identified mark into providing sensitive information to 
the attacker.  For example, telephone chats, phishing emails, fake mail, and POP-UP window 
attacks have all been used by social engineers to launch an attack on unsuspecting victims.   
Social-technical system.  Shozi and Modise (2015) described social engineering is a 
socio-technical system that recognizes the interaction between people and technology in the 
workplace.  The social subsystem includes the people involved in the social engineering attack, 
specifically the victim and the attacker.  The environmental subsystem is the location or medium 
through with an attack is perpetrated.  The technical subsystem involves the technology used 
during the social engineering attack.  Defining social engineering in this manner shows how 
many factors interplay with one another.  Each piece of the puzzle needs to be acknowledged for 
the part it plays during an attack.  Understanding this interplay of factors can help understand 
why social engineering attacks continue to be successful today. 
Goal.  According to Torten (2018), the primary objective of cyberattacks have not 
changed significantly over time.  Nearly 90% of the time, financial gain and espionage are the 
primary motivation for an attack (Verizon, 2018b), yet, there are many other reasons companies 
are attacked (IBM, 2016).  At times, the goal of a cyberattack is to disrupt operations, other 
times, they want to retrieve data, steal intellectual property, inflict physical damage, or even 
lodge a political protest (O’Dowd, 2017; IBM, 2016; Spinapolice, 2011).  Still other times, a 
cybercriminal simply wishes to have a little fun—all at the expense of the target (O’Dowd, 
2017).   
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Targets.  Social engineering exploits are targeting businesses around the globe (Chitrey, 
Singh, & Singh, 2012), but more than anything, cybercriminals are seeking an easy target 
(Torten, 2018).  According to Positive Technologies 2018 Cybersecurity Survey, in the vast 
majority of cases, the employees who coming into contact with a social engineer are not 
Information Systems workers.  Given that primary targets of social engineering include help 
desks, administrators, technical support staff, and other common employee positions, all 
employees of a business require an understanding of information security to ensure 
organizational assets remain protected (Berti, 2003).  Investments and efforts can be made to 
improve technical security controls, but if insiders remain susceptible to ploys that take 
advantage of human nature within the organizational context, social engineering attacks will 
continue to succeed at getting around this layer of defense.  The literature provides insight into 
the various factors contributing to whether an individual is more or less likely to respond to a 
request made by a social engineer.  Each factor influences whether the individual is a prime 
candidate to be targeted by a social engineer. 
Individual differences.  A study by Rocha Flores, Holm, Svensson, and Ericsson (2014) 
found that certain factors make a person more likely to respond to a social engineering ploy.  
Computer experience at work, gender, and the desire to be helpful were all identified as having a 
significant correlation with the behavior reported by respondents in a corresponding scenario-
based survey.  Rocha Flores et al. (2014) also discovered trust and risk behavior significant 
affect the actual behavior of individuals during the phishing portion of the experiment.  These 
results suggest that techniques used by social engineers to instill trust, encourage helpfulness, 
and increase risky behaviors should be incorporated into security awareness training and 
education programs. 
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Personality traits.  The more organizations and information security experts understand 
the traits of people most susceptible to engineering exploits, the more they can design 
interventions to target the traits that place people most at risk for exploitation and train people to 
use types of behaviors that protect the organizations assets from attack.  Because certain human 
personality traits significantly contribute to the likelihood of a person succumbing to a social 
engineer’s scam (Stewart, 2015), Workman (2007) suggested that to defend against social 
engineering, an understanding of human behavior is needed.  For instance, in cases where social 
engineers target people with high normative commitment personality traits, employees may feel 
obligated to reciprocate social engineering gestures and favors.  For example, after downloading 
free software, an employee may feel committed to sharing sensitive information, something they 
might never have considered before.   
Human predictability.  People possess an inherent desire to develop and maintain 
meaningful social relationships (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).  They also have an intrinsic need to 
uphold a positive self-image.  These natural motivators cause people to act or react in predictable 
ways to situations that appear to threaten these social needs.  Someone who is aware of and 
skilled at manipulating this predictable pattern of behavior has the ability to use social influence 
processes to manipulate someone in subtle, indirect ways.  In truth, after a successful social 
engineer exploit, often the victim is entirely unaware they have been duped into sharing 
information that will eventually threaten their organizational defenses. 
The desire to trust.  Workman (2008) found threat assessment, commitment, trust, and 
obedience to authority to be strong factors that, if targeted by a social engineer, enhance the 
chances that an attack will be successful.  This is a problem, because people too easily trust 
others they do not know with personal, if not sensitive, information that can be used against them 
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in a social engineering exploit.  Junger et al. (2017) used a social engineering intervention to test 
this theory, and found shoppers were willing to disclose their email address (79.1%), bank 
account information (43.5%), the type of product(s) purchased (89.8%), and the name of the 
online shop where the purchase transaction took place (91.4%) to someone they did not know.  
Even more surprising was that providing a warning did not decrease the degree of disclosure, in 
fact, some evidence showed a warning could potentially increase the likelihood of disclosure.   
Lack of relevant security training.  Results from an organizational study showed most 
organizations deliver some format of security awareness training, but there is no customization 
of the training for the distinct groups or roles across the business (Rotvold, 2007).  
Customization of security awareness is important helping users develop a deeper understanding 
of their own role and responsibility for protecting informational assets and resources (Rotvold, 
2008).  They must also know how they can protect information via their response to a potential 
security threat.  Security awareness trainings that fail to prepare employees in this way leave 
gaping security holes in the first line of defense, holes that are easy for a social engineer to 
exploit. 
Lack of awareness training.  Demographics also contributing to type of individual 
targeted for a social engineering scheme.  A study by Carlton (2016) established that non-IT 
professionals joining or leaving the workforce may be at higher risk for succumbing to a cyber-
attack.  In the more recent study, Junger et al. (2017) found high percentage of business schools 
do not offer security awareness programs, which provides additional evidence supporting the 
contention that new graduates entering the workforce are higher risk for the company if they are 
targeted by a social engineer.   
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Lack of security skills in practice.  According to Flores and Ekstedt (2016), organizations 
need to establish expectations that employees are to understand security risks both in theory and 
in practice.  To address the fact that users can still be hooked into responding to a cyberattack 
even with security tools embedded and working properly on systems and devices if they do not 
have the proper level of security awareness, Carlton (2016) designed a study to measure the 
cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals.  This study provides insights into which employees 
may be more at risk for succumbing to social engineering exploits.  The analysis revealed that 
educational level and experience using technology resulted in significant differences between the 
cybersecurity skills level of non-IT professionals.  In fact, higher levels of education increased 
the cybersecurity skills demonstrated by the non-IT professional, and the more experienced a 
non-IT professional was with using technology, the more likely they were to demonstrate 
improved skills on cybersecurity tasks.   
Transformational leadership.  Flores and Ekstedt (2016) also found transformational 
leadership to play a huge part in shaping employee attitudes.  In fact, one mediation test showed 
the information security culture to be fully explained by the effect of transformation leadership 
on employee attitudes towards resisting social engineering.  Even with this important insight into 
the role of transformational leadership on shaping attitudes, figuring out how to shape employee 
behavior still poses a challenge for organizations.   
Success.  Cybercriminals still find success using the tried and true social engineering 
techniques, because people continue to make the same mistakes time and again (Verizon, 2018b; 
Proof Point, 2018).  On some occasions, social engineers launch successful largescale attacks on 
business and industry via blanket dispatches of ransomware and malicious phishing messages 
sent through email or other social network channels (Proof Point, 2018).  Other occasions, the 
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targeted approach enables state-sponsored groups and financially motivated organized crime 
groups to penetrate business systems by manipulating human insiders who are highly prone to 
making security mistakes.  Victims of targeted attacks mistakenly disclose sensitive information, 
click unsafe links, download insecure files, install malware, and transfer funds, all to the 
detriment of their employer. 
Business impact.  Social engineering attacks are on the rise, and when social engineering 
attacks are successful, they can hurt the reputation of the business, put customers and their 
information at risk, and even put prospective capital investment opportunities of the organization 
at risk (Mckoy, 2015).  Sadly, sometimes the success of a social engineering attack can mean an 
organization eventually has to shut down operations for good.  Organizations must figure out 
how to minimize the effects of social engineering by implementing controls that limit access to 
business assets until the identity and security clearance of the requestor has been verified 
(Thornburgh, 2004). 
Social engineering tactics.  Social engineers trick people into getting what they want by 
conveying a sense of urgency, preying on natural curiosities, copying trusted brands, and 
manipulating the circumstances surrounding habitual actions (Proof Point, 2018).  There are two 
fundamental routes used by social engineers to fool a target, the direct route and the indirect 
route.  In the direct route, a social engineer might simply ask the target for the information 
(Peltier, 2006).  While this route may seem too obvious for someone to fall prey to, this route 
often proves to be effective with employees who lack basic security awareness.  Social engineers 
also ascribe to various indirect routes that incite excitement, fear, and other strong emotions to 
move a target towards greater levels of susceptibility.  Depending on the goal of the 
cybercriminal, they may employ single-stage or multiple-stage attacks (Greitzer et al., 2014).   
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Social engineering attack dimensions and delivery.  In 2013, Tetri and Vuorinen (2013) 
reviewed over 40 social engineering texts to extrapolate three dimensions of a social engineering 
attack: persuasion, fabrication, and data gathering.  According to Bere et al. (2015), social 
engineering is the usual means by which the delivery of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) in 
the business computer system is achieved.  APTs tend to follow a six-step process that starts with 
choosing a victim and ends after data collection and exfiltration has been accomplished.  After 
the target has been identified, the perpetrator builds reconnaissance, which leads to the delivery 
of the chosen method of attack.  Furthermore, spear phishing is the number one social 
engineering tactic used in APTs to penetrate the security system, but other tools, such as click 
jacking are used at a high rate as well.  Once the target successfully succumbs to the APT 
delivery, the attacker turns attention towards exploitation and operation.  After these steps have 
been successfully completed, the data are collected, and removed for whatever purpose the 
perpetrator intended.  The literature provides numerous examples where social engineering 
tactics are used to gain access to security-relevant data (Rößling & Müller, 2009).  Descriptions 
of popular tactics used by social engineers follow. 
Phishing.  Phishing, an example of a technology-dependent social engineering tactic, uses 
various approaches that have grown and evolved in creativity, planning, and execution over time 
(Campbell, 2017).  Nearly 60% of companies represented in the State of Cybersecurity 
Implications for 2016 report had experienced a phishing attack in 2015, and 30% experienced 
phishing attacks daily.  These statistics are unsurprising, given phishing is the most successful 
social engineering tactic (Positive Technologies, 2018).  Because it only takes a single person 
across an entire enterprise to fall for a phishing scam and four percent of people are known to 
click any given email lure (Verizon, 2018b), there is always a chance that a phishing campaign 
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will succeed (Greitzer et al., 2014).  Even trained or savvy employees can be fooled, and once 
the social engineer has initial entry, they can enact greater misdeeds against the organization.   
Business email compromise.  Frequently, social engineers persuade recipients to share 
sensitive information or transfer money without ever having to install malware of any kind, and 
email unfailingly persists as the primary attack vector (Proof Point, 2018).  BEC scams targeted 
over 400 businesses every day in the first half of 2016 alone (Symantec, 2017).  Brand theft, 
typo-squatting, and business email compromise (BEC)-- or more simply email fraud—have 
proven able to fool even the savviest of users into falling for a highly sophisticated scheme.  In 
BEC scams, cybercriminals compromise real or spoofed business email accounts using social 
engineering or computer incursion (FBI, 2018).  BEC scams have cost companies billions of 
dollars in the past three years (Symantec, 2017). 
Ransomware.  Even more recently, cyberattacks consist of ransomware that is used by 
adversaries to secretly install malware to encrypt all the files on the victim’s system (Krunal & 
Viral, 2017).  It is typically used to deny the use of data or systems that are critical to the 
organizational operations (FBI, 2018).  Once encrypted, attackers demand a ransom payment, 
usually in bitcoins, in return for a decryption key, which is the only way to open an encrypted 
file (Krunal & Viral, 2017).  Even worse, ransomware has been known to cripple entire 
departments and organizations after only one user machine becomes infected.  No longer are 
cybercriminals required to steal company assets to make a profit (Verizon, 2018b).  Now, all 
they need to do is block a company’s access to their data and assets using ransomware.  Because 
ransomware is easy to install, poses minimal risk or cost, and there is no need to figure out how 
to profit off stolen company assets, such schemes are highly effective for cybercriminals.  In fact, 
ransomware is now the most popular malware in use.  
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Social networking sites.  An additional area of concern for businesses is the prevalent use 
of social networking websites (Edwards et al., 2017).  Social networking sites allow people to 
reveal greater personal information that can increase the success of social engineering during an 
attack on its targeted organization (Mills, 2009), and attackers skillfully use social networks to 
their advantage (Positive Technologies, 2018).  The shared information can be passively 
harvested by automated tools and placed into the hands of would-be attackers to be used to sway 
and influence the behaviors of identified targets (Edwards et al., 2017).  Bolder criminals may 
use social networking channels to build rapport to gather information, develop a bond or send 
malicious links (Positive Technologies, 2018).  Moreover, phishing and malware infections that 
harvest user credentials commonly await bargain-lovers seeking out deals social media channels 
(Proof Point, 2018).  Because employees regularly access external and social networking sites 
from work sites, opening links and files received from these channels could mean a 
cybercriminal has access to the organization’s intranet.  Given these risks, employees should be 
diligently aware of their duty to maintain an additional level of caution during and after work 
hours to avoid being deceived by someone targeting their place of employment. 
Social-engineering common pairings.  Social engineering attacks are regularly paired 
with other tactics to ensure a successful outcome (Positive Technologies, 2018).  In fact, 
phishing has been linked to malware, hacking, social media scams, fraud, ransomware, and more 
(Proof Point, 2018; Poneman, 2017; Verizon, 2018b; Positive Technologies, 2018).  In some 
reports, phishing and social engineering are inextricably paired (Poneman, 2017), because 
pretexting, or some level of dialogue that occurs between an attacker and the victim, usually 
plays a role in most attacks (Verizon, 2018b).  Pretexting is most commonly used for acquiring 
information directly from the target, whereas phishing most often centers on acquiring a foothold 
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within the system.  According to the Verizon’s 2018 Data Breach Investigation’s report, malware 
was present in more than two-thirds of phishing attempts.  Web-based attacks can work in 
tandem with phishing, where an email is received with a link to an external site for someone to 
enter their credentials.  Scarily, according to Proof Point (2018), brand-registered domains are 
outnumbered by suspiciously registered domains 20:1, and successful phishing attempts give 
attackers the credentials needed to instigate the next stage of the attack (Poneman, 2017).   
Section synthesis.  Employees need to be aware of the benefits and risks associated with 
protecting computer systems as well as the various manipulative techniques employed by social 
engineers to trick them into making the wrong security decision (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016).  
Security awareness is only as useful as its ability to instill security employee behaviors that 
circumvent social engineering attacks, therefore once employees are aware of the security 
challenges faced by the organization, employees also need step up to the challenge by changing 
their actual security behaviors.   
Social engineering in industry.  While there are no industries immune to the risk of 
cyberattacks and social engineering (Verizon, 2018; Proof Point, 2018; IBM, 2016), some 
industries are more at risk than others any given year.  In the Verizon’s 2018 Data Breach 
Investigations Report, education, financial services, and healthcare are all found in the top five 
industries affected by social breaches, with healthcare and education in the second and third 
positions and financial services in the fifth position.  According to Proof Point’s 2018 Human 
Factor survey that focuses primarily on people-centered cyber threats, education was the most 
targeted industry for social engineering exploits.  Additionally, in the 2016 IBM Cybersecurity 
Intelligence Index, both healthcare and financial services were included in the top three most 
attacked industries.  Email is one of the main methods used to disrupt operations across business 
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and industry (Symantec, 2017).  Disruptions can include spam, ransomware, or phishing 
campaigns, and while email malware targeted all size and type of business, the SMBs felt the 
brunt of the impact.  This section addresses these three industries and reasons why they are 
currently under siege by cybercriminals. 
Healthcare.  Data privacy and confidentiality breaches in the healthcare industry have 
not relented and securing healthcare information remains one of the most difficult challenges 
facing people working in health-related fields (Shoniregun et al., 2010; IBM, 2016; Verizon, 
2018b).  With privacy and confidentiality at the heart of the need for secure systems in this field 
finding the best ways to protect patient information while staying in step with the latest 
advancements in technology has proven to be a challenge that is not easily resolved.  In 2015 
alone, over 100 million healthcare records were compromised, and the risks have not lessened in 
subsequent years (Symantec, 2017).  Healthcare records fetch major returns for cybercriminals 
(IBM, 2017).  Cybercriminals can monetize records from a successful heist and place them up 
for sale on the Dark Web, where they will be made available to other criminals who are 
interested in using the data to commit fraud, steal medical identities, or launch more targeted 
spear phishing exploits (IBM, 2016).  Because of the amount of sensitive data contained in these 
files, such as social security numbers, credit card information, medical history records, the 
compromised data tends to stay useable for years and decades to come.   
Social attacks.  Phishing, pretexting, and other social attacks appear in roughly 14% of 
healthcare incidents (Verizon, 2018b).  In healthcare, relatives and friends frequently call to find 
out how a patient is doing.  Equipment and services providers consistently drop in and out to 
address issues that arise.  Cunning social engineers can easily conceal the malicious intent by 
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contriving a similar scenario that provides them access to the system where they can gather 
information needed for perpetrating an attack.   
Misuse and error.  Healthcare is the only industry with more internal actors behind data 
breaches than external, primarily due to rampant errors and misuse of data and information 
(Verizon, 2018b).  Financial gain is what motivates 40% of data breaches involving internal 
misuse, but other times, the internal actor is simply curious about something, so they misuse their 
access privileges to access informational assets without having a legitimate business or medical 
reason for doing so.  Because of the nature of healthcare jobs, internal actors may intentionally or 
unintentionally share something intended for one recipient with a different recipient.  This type 
of error, called mis-delivery, occurs in 62% of miscellaneous errors reported.   
Email attacks.  Like most industries, attacks that use email continue to be highly 
problematic for healthcare (Symantec, 2017).  Email is also a means by which ransomware 
penetrates healthcare organizations.  In fact, ransomware accounts for 85% of all malware in 
healthcare (Verizon, 2018b).  In 2016, healthcare services noted an increase from 1 in 396 email 
malware incidents to 1 in 204.  According to Symantic’s 2017 Internet Security Threat Report, 
the healthcare industry was the second sub-sector in the business sector of breaches by the 
number of incidents.   
Financial services.  It makes sense if the primary objective of most cyberattack 
campaigns is financial gain (Verizon, 2018b; IBM, 2016), that the financial services industry 
would be a primary target for those seeking for a big payoff.  Exploitation of vulnerabilities in 
the financial services sector often provides cybercriminals with the ability to read, alter, and 
delete confidential data (IBM, 2017).  The databases of financial services organizations capture 
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and maintain significant quantities of personally identifiable information, the type of data that 
can be held for ransom or sold to the highest bidder on the Dark Web. 
Trends.  While financial services breaches have refined and improved monitoring and 
detection capabilities, breaches still exist due in part to conveniences proffered to customers such 
as ATM service (IBM, 2016).  Finance, real estate, and insurance sectors were found to be 
second most likely to fall prey to a data breach, and the amount of financial information lost in 
data breaches increased from 2015 to 2016 (Symantec, 2017).  External actors were behind 92% 
of data breaches that occurred in the financial and insurance industries (Verizon, 2018b).  
Personal, payment, and banking records were all compromised in the reported incidents.  Again, 
email is the attack vector of choice for most cybercriminals.  Social engineering attacks, 
especially phishing, were involved in more than half of the top category of data breach patterns, 
and ransomware was behind most incidents classified as crimeware. 
Higher education.  Of threats to the industry of education, most are perpetrated by 
someone outside the company (81%), but insiders also play a role in 19% of system 
compromising situations (Verizon, 2018b).  Even though financial gain leads the motivation 
behind the 70% of breaches, cyber-espionage is a significant trend, accounting for 20% of 
breaches.  This followed by 11% of breaches occurring as a result of some person looking for a 
bit of fun.  The type of data compromised in an attack include personal data, secrets, and medical 
information.  Educational websites were the seventh most frequently exploited across industry 
websites (Symantec, 2017). 
Social attacks.  Social incidents are one of the most common type of incident taking place 
across educational industries, and these types of attacks are increased (Proof Point, 2018; 
Verizon, 2018b).  In fact, cyber-espionage, one of the top trends happening in the education 
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sector, is commonly used in conjunction with phishing schemes or other social engineering 
tactics.  Because schools and universities tend to be more transparent than most other industries 
in regard to the disclosure of names, job titles, and other contact information for employees, 
more information is readily available for cybercriminals to use in a targeted attack campaign.  In 
recent years, a prolific social engineering scenario, the W-2 scam, has become a serious issue for 
institutes in the education industry.  The success of this scam may partially be attributed to how 
much information is accessible to adversaries in need of an easy target.   
Section synthesis.  Socially engineered cyberattacks are thriving in all industries, 
especially healthcare, financial services, and education.  Whether an attacker uses spam, 
ransomware, or phishing, email is the one of the most popular and effective vectors used by 
cybercriminals to gain access to a system.  Money is still a primary motivator behind an attack, 
whether the attack originates inside or outside the company.  Still, attacks are successful because 
of errors and misuse by insiders. 
IS professionals.  According the 2018 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOS), CIS professionals perform a variety of 
work depending on their area of specialty.  Still, while positions span across computer support, 
database administration, software development, web development, security analysis, networking, 
and research, problem-solving exists as the central tenet of every position in the field of 
computer information systems.  Because of greater emphasis on big data, cloud computing, and 
information security, demand for workers in this area is expected to grow faster than average for 
all occupations (BLS OOS, 2018).  While the type of work a IS worker is eligible to enter hinges 
on the entry-level education necessary for the work, most require a bachelor’s degree to be 
eligible for entry-level positions.  Some jobs only require an associate degree to qualify them for 
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work in this field.  In May 2017, the BLS OOS (2018) computed the median wage for 
occupations related to computer and information technology, $84,580, as higher than the median 
annual wage for all occupations, $37,690. 
Daily work demands and expectations.  The daily work demands and expectations for 
people working in computer and information technology occupations are high.  From inventing 
and designing new tools or approaches, finding innovative solutions for technology that is 
already in use, or planning and implementing security in an effort to protect systems and 
networks, CIS professionals often have many projects going on at the same time (BLS OOS, 
2018).  The work of CIS professionals does touch on every part of an enterprise, often helping 
bring business and technology together to enable operations to run more efficiently and 
effectively. 
Security workers.  Security workers are responsible for planning and carrying out the 
security functions required to protect the computer systems, networks, and assets from 
exploitation by cybercriminals (BLS OOS, 2018b).  Workers in this area must stay abreast of IT 
security trends, while also keeping a close watch on the most current attack techniques and 
vectors being used to penetrate computer systems.  It is also typical for security workers to play 
an active role in the disaster recovery and response planning of the business, so appropriate 
preventative processes and procedures are implemented.  If performed well, in event of a security 
crisis, business function may remain online or be restored more quickly than if no plan existed.  
Qualified security workers are in high demand, and their job responsibilities continue to grow as 
the quantity and sophistication of attacks increase.  According to BLS OOS (2018), information 
security analyst jobs are expected to grow 28% from 2016 to 2026, a much faster rate than the 
average of all other occupations. 
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Skills and qualifications.  Most employers prefer security workers to have obtained a 
bachelor’s degree or higher in information assurance, programming, computer science or similar 
fields, and experience in the field is often preferred (BLS OOS, 2018b).  Employers have also 
expressed interested in security workers possessing both business and computer expertise, as can 
be seen by those employers who prefer when applicants have earned a Master of Business 
Administration with an Information Systems concentration area.  General certifications, such as 
the Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH), Certified Information Security Manager (CISM), CompTIA 
Security+ and Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), can be helpful in 
setting an applicant apart from others in an applicant pool.  Other important qualifications 
security workers need to be successful include strong analytical and problem-solving skills, a 
detail-oriented nature, and an inventiveness that can be used to come up with creative solutions 
to protect the company from unauthorized network and system access.  
Demand and shortage.  More security positions exist than organizations can find 
qualified security workers to fill them with (ISACA, 2016).  It often takes upwards of three 
months to fill a cybersecurity job opening, if the position can be filled at all.  Even though 
budgets have improved over previous years to ensure security workers are adequately 
compensated for the work they perform, the pool of suitably qualified candidates is insufficient 
for to meet the needs of business and industry.  Still, companies are so desperate for security 
help, they are willing to hire workers lacking in important qualifications—hands-on experience, 
understanding of the business, and technical and communications are often deficient at time of 
hire.  This shortfall of employable security workers makes more frequent and more damaging 
data breaches possible (ISACA, 2016).  The organization lacking a skilled security team hinders 
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its ability to identify, suppress, and alleviate security events, resulting in greater losses related to 
the event.  
Challenges.  While the biggest challenge faced by companies while attempting to enact a 
stronger security posture is the lack of personnel on staff to minimize the threats and 
vulnerabilities, there are many other issues security workers frequently contend with (Ponemon 
Institute, 2017b).  For instance, new policy can be reason for concern for security workers, 
because new policies often necessitate changes to the present security strategy.  At the same 
time, many security budgets still fall short of the necessary funding to ensure a strong security 
stance for the organization.  Skills training is not only important for security workers to stay 
abreast of the latest cybersecurity skills and technologies (OOS BLS, 2018b), but also, security 
awareness training is extremely important to strengthen the security stance of non-IS 
professionals who are regularly targeted for attack by social engineers (Dahbur et al., 2017; 
Bauer et al., 2017; Torten et al., 2018).  Additionally, those organizations that hire security 
workers with deficient skills often find these security workers unable to understand how they 
should be protecting the company (Ponemon Institute, 2018b).  Other challenges faced by IS 
security professionals are highlighted in the following paragraphs. 
Attack surfaces.  The set of entry points, exit points, and data channels in a system make 
up the attack surface of a service (Manadhata & Wing, 2010).  As more attack surfaces are used 
across and enterprise, it becomes exceedingly more difficult to maintain higher levels of security 
across all surfaces.  It is very important for a company to be aware of each and every attack 
surface of the organization, because each attack surface must be secured if the company hopes to 
fortify itself against attacks.   
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Multi-layered defense.  A study by Chitrey et al. (2012) confirmed the importance of 
utilizing a multi-layered approach to thwart the efforts of social engineering-based attacks.  This 
assertion was also supported by Conteh and Schmick (2016) in a study designed to appraise how 
vulnerable an organization’s information technology infrastructure was to interference.  Conteh 
and Schmick (2016) explained the role social engineering plays in enabling network intrusions 
and cyber-theft.  Again, multi-layered defense mechanisms are mentioned as useful to ensure if 
an outer layer fails, perhaps one or more inner layers can mitigate the risk, if not keep the risk 
from escalating into a catastrophic event for the organization.  Conteh and Schmick (2016) 
consider security policies, technical procedures, education and training, network guidance, 
physical guidance, and audits and compliance to be critical to ensuring the multi-layered 
defenses work together to protect a business against cyber-attacks. 
Social engineering prevention.  Peltier (2006) asserted that employee awareness, 
cooperation, and commitment to security safeguards and controls must be the first line of defense 
against social engineering attacks for organizations to be impregnable during an attack.  The only 
way to maintain this line of defense is to regularly test and raise the bar across all areas of the 
business.  According to Nagy et al. (2010), the way to accomplish this monumental task in a 
world of increased information sharing is to require greater information protection and 
verification procedures.  Measures already exist to prevent social engineering within an 
organization, but none fully diminish the human vulnerabilities targeted in social exploits.  Nagy 
et al. (2010) claimed that a culture that demands verification of proper access to information 
prior to trusting the requestor can help to eliminate nearly all social engineering attempts.   
Protection of digital assets.  Enterprises deal with cyberattacks on a daily basis, and 
motivated adversaries are able to dynamically evolve in order to achieve their goals (ISACA, 
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2016).  Protection of digital assets is on the list of growing concerns for businesses (Torten, 
2018).  A successful cyber-attack and data breach has an effect on business performance, 
reputation, and it can compromise intellectual property.  Attackers know how to surf social 
networks to glean information about employees (Positive Technologies, 2018).  To stay in front 
of the next attack, cybersecurity professionals must constantly evaluate the technologies being 
used by the organization and come up with and implement innovative solutions that ward off 
criminals who are always on the prowl, searching for the conquest of an easy target (Torten, 
2018).  
Cycle of cybercrime.  Kshetri (2006) explored the characteristics and relationships 
between cybercriminals, their cybercrime victims, and law enforcement agencies.  The study 
divulges how a lack of confidence from victims towards the capability of law enforcement 
agencies to address their cybercrime concerns reinforces an unfortunate cycle.  Kshetri (2006) 
showed how the victim’s weak defense mechanisms, low reporting rates, and willingness to 
comply with the demand of a cybercriminal increases the success and confidence of attackers, 
thereby encouraging cybercriminals to carry out even more exploitations of vulnerable 
companies in the future. 
Section synthesis.  Jobs in information systems fields, especially security fields, are in 
demand.  Businesses seek to fill security positions from a limited pool of candidates, which 
leaves many companies at greater risk because not enough workers are available to fill the need, 
nor do the available workers have all the necessary qualifications to ensure the enterprise will be 
protected once the person is hired.  The challenges faced by those working in information 
systems and security fields are varied and complex, and while some budgets have increased to 
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adequately face the security challenges of the organization, many security teams lack the funding 
needed to ensure a strong, multi-layered defense against cyberattacks and social engineers. 
Occupational stress and the IS professional.  According to Rajeswari and 
Anantharaman (2005), the work performed by IS professionals spans across the various 
departmental boundaries of a business.  This means IS professionals often experience additional 
pressures not only to possess a strong technical background, but also to prove competencies 
related to interpersonal skills and organizational knowledge, all while working in a demanding 
work environment known for unwavering deadlines, extended work hours, and dependencies 
necessitating interactions with clients and team members living across varied time zones around 
the world (Rajeswari & Anantharaman, 2005; Lim & Teo, 1999).  This unique work 
environment contributes to IS professionals feeling higher levels of occupational stress and work 
exhaustion (Shih, Jiang, Klein, & Wang, 2013).  Certain occupations, including CIS occupations, 
tend to suffer higher rates of job burnout.  Cavelty (2014) discussed the dilemma that exists 
between the need to align an organization with its security needs while also removing its 
vulnerabilities.  It is not an easy task to balance the instatement of the company’s technical 
security needs while also ensuring industry professionals are adequately armed with the 
information security skills, skills that may feel outside of the scope of their regular job duties, to 
defend the organization against cyber predators.   
Factors contributing to occupational stress.  Occupational stressors can be classified 
into organizational and individual factors (Lim & Teo, 1999).  Employers often find themselves 
limited in their ability to control the job-related factors related to occupational stress (Armstrong, 
Brooks, & Riemenschneider, 2015).  Still, organizational responses matter as job-related factors 
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play a significant role in the level of career satisfaction and work-life conflict experienced by the 
worker (Jiang, Huang, Klein, & Tsai, 2018; Messersmith, 2007).   
Organizational factors.  A factor analysis of survey responses by Lim and Teo (1999) 
revealed six major dimensions of stress linked to characteristics intrinsic to the work 
environment of the CIS professional.  These dimensions include: (a) work demands, (b) career 
concerns, (c) role ambiguity, (d) relationships with others, (e) systems maintenance, and (f) 
administrative tasks.  Ongori and Agolla (2008) later identified lack of empowerment, high job 
responsibilities, inadequate pay, work overload, staff shortages, and inadequate work resources 
available to perform their job duties as contributing negatively to the work experience.  
According to Salanova et al. (2002), high demand jobs accompanied by low job control trigger 
work exhaustion in technology workers.  Viljoen and Rothmann (2009) found low individual 
commitment to a company could be predicted by work-life balance, job burnout, control, and 
pay. 
Individual factors.  Mourmant, Gallivan, and Kalika (2009) examined various job 
characteristics of jobs in CIS fields.  The results indicated job satisfaction is more often 
contingent with individual motivations rather than related to the organizational circumstances.  
Stress is perceived differently by every individual, even among those working in similar roles 
(Rajeswari & Anantharaman, 2005).  Confidence, self-esteem, technical competence, intrinsic 
motivation, and self-efficacy all factor into how well a CIS professional copes with occupation-
related stress and job burnout (Fu & Chen, 2015; Colomo-Palacios, Casado-Lumbreras, Soto-
Acosta, García-PeñAlvo, & Tovar-Caro, 2013; LeRouge, Nelson, & Blanton, 2006; Rajeswari & 
Anantharaman, 2005; Salanova et al., 2002).  
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Influence of occupational stress on workers.  The study by Salanova et al. (2002) 
showed the how occupational stress caused by organizational factors can adversely affect the 
attitudes and job strain felt by employees.  The study depicts how even if a highly competent 
team of workers who are confident in their ability to deal with the high demands of their job have 
been hired, if the work environment hinders this team of workers from producing their desired 
outcomes, eventually the worker will become tired, pessimistic, and give up.  Occupational stress 
has consequences for the attitudes, beliefs, motivations, and behavioral intentions of employees 
(Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Cox, 2012), and beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions affect 
individual behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
Attitudes and behavioral intention.  The Cox (2012) study is important because it 
establishes the existence of a link between organizational policies, attitudes, compliance 
behaviors, and the resultant business risks.  In the study, information system user attitudes are 
examined for their role and intention towards following information security policies and 
procedures.  The findings supported the role of perceived vulnerability, subjective norms and 
self-efficacy as significant contributors to whether a user followed corporate security policies 
and procedures.  The insights gained from examining the link between user security attitudes, 
risky behaviors, and heightened security risks provide support for the need for a similar study to 
examine and understand the attitudes and behaviors of IS professionals attempting to defend an 
organization from cyber-attacks, including social engineering attacks, as attitudes often 
contribute to the behaviors displayed by an individual. 
Attitude and intent to resist social engineering.  Flores and Ekstedt (2016) conducted an 
empirical study of nearly 4,300 employees to investigate how organizational and individual 
factors interact to complement one another when it comes to shaping employee intent to resist 
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social engineering.  The study revealed that attitudes make a difference in intent and 
subsequently behavior—more so than self-efficacy and normative beliefs.  The results indicated 
that the attitude of the individual towards resisting social engineering has the strongest direct 
association with the intent of the individual to resist social engineering attacks.  Both self-
efficacy and normative beliefs were revealed to have a weak relationship with the intent to resist 
social engineering.  The results of the study indicate that both attitude and normative beliefs play 
a part in directing the relationship between information security culture and the intent of 
employees to resist social engineering. 
Beliefs and motivations.  Tarallo (2015) claimed there is no truly effective way to 
absolutely protect against a social engineering attack.  Moreover, Davis (2014) asserted that self-
defense efforts to deter a cyber-attack are rarely, if ever enough.  A majority of respondents to 
the 2016 State of Cybersecurity survey do not believe their information security staff are 
prepared to address more than the simplest security events.  In the same survey, most 
respondents confirmed a security awareness program existed at their organization, but not nearly 
as many believed the program to be effective.  Perceptions and beliefs matter—both to IS 
professionals and the organizations they defend from cyberattacks and social engineering 
exploits.  Beliefs do not negate the importance of reducing the likelihood of a successful exploit, 
which is the primary function of an information security team (Tarallo, 2015).  Though, they can 
significantly influence how motivated the team is to come up with creative solutions for 
achieving their objective, because, as Moore (2000) pointed out, when workers perceive the 
causes contributing to their high levels of occupational stress and work exhaustion can be 
controlled, they are willing to act, speak up, or change their own behaviors to address their 
situation.   
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Consequences of work exhaustion.  Work exhaustion has been linked to adverse 
consequences for both the individual and the organization.  Greater levels of job strain have been 
linked to compromised health, lowered quality of life at work and at home, as well as 
psychological distress and cardiovascular disease for individual workers (Moen et al., 2016; 
Karasek & Theorell, 1990; Johnson & Hall, 1988).  Organizations also suffer when workers are 
stressed, as work exhaustion leads to poor job performance, absenteeism, diminished work 
quality, and worker turnover, which can often beget the desire of the professional to leave the job 
or the company (Chilton, Hardgrave, & Armstrong, 2010; Viljoen & Rothmann, 2009; Lim & 
Teo, 1999).  Different researchers offer varied solutions to how best to contend with the 
existence of stressors in CIS fields.  Agbonluae et al. (2017) argued the importance of individual 
employees learning to manage occupational stress, while Moen et al. (2016) provided evidence 
that organizations can adequately adjust work conditions that improve well-being and reduce 
stress, even for technology-centric jobs.  Chilton et al. (2010) supported the idea of improving 
individual performance by reducing job strain through actively seeking the optimal balance, or 
job-fit, for the IS professional’s needs.  
Section synthesis.  The job demands of IS professionals and security professionals are 
high.  The field of CIS is in a constant state of change, which requires workers to respond to 
change frequently.  Every individual has a personalized response to the stress these changes 
invoke.  Some workers respond well, while others do not—and even though one worker responds 
well to one change, they may not respond well to another.  Occupational stress can lead to job 
burnout, which can have undesirable consequences for both workers and the organization.  Still, 
ways exist for workers to learn to cope, organizations to modify working conditions to improve 
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worker well-being, and for organizations and employees to work together to find the right job-fit 
that optimally balances the needs of both the organization and employees. 
Themes and perceptions.  Woven throughout the body of literature can be found three 
themes: evolution, skill, and consequences.  Each of these themes may stand alone.  They may 
also be seen interacting with the other themes to tell the story of the interplay between social 
engineering, IS professionals, and the defense against cyberattacks.   
Evolution.  The first theme found across the literature is the theme of evolution.  The 
field of CIS is marked by constant and ever-changing trends and patterns.  Evolving technology 
often requires making changes to the current methods of conducting business.  From changing 
policies, standards, and practices, advances in technologies require IS professionals to modify 
tactics used defend the company.  As the world of business has become more digitized, the types 
of attacks used by cybercriminals have evolved to take advantage of security holes created by 
digitization.  The innovative and dynamic practices of cybercriminals have forced IS 
professionals to develop new ways of thinking about how to protect the company.  This constant 
state of change and evolution produces different responses for different workers, and both 
organizations and IS professionals have been forced to evolve in how they perceive, plan for, 
address, and cope with the occupational stressors that accompany this constant state of change.   
Skill.  A level of skill is expected of people working in IS professionals, especially in the 
area of information security.  It is no small task to balance the high work demands that come 
with the job of defending an organization from cyberattacks.  IS workers often find a need to 
develop both a specialized technical skillset as well as a broader set of business skills such as 
communication and interpersonal skills.  It is probably not a surprise that people possessing this 
unique combination of technical and business skills are lacking, making them a precious, high 
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demand commodity.  Perceptions about one’s skill level can affect beliefs, motivations, and 
behavioral intent, which contribute to the performance and behaviors taken by employees.  
Cybercriminals and social engineers are masterminds in their own right, as it takes a level of 
sophistication first to identify areas of weakness, and then to use this knowledge to successfully 
pull off a complex, multi-dimensional scam.   
Consequences.  Every security action taken or not taken by a company results in a 
stronger or weaker security stance.  The company that fails to think of every new trend or 
technology as a potential security threat, leaves themselves open to serious potential losses 
resulting from a successful data breach, but those who stay abreast of the challenges in the 
industry can develop an anticipatory cybersecurity stance.  Not providing adequate training for 
security professionals or non-IS professionals ensures gaping holes will persist in the company’s 
defense against cyber threats, whereas budgeting for the appropriate levels of security training 
can lead to a security culture across the enterprise.  Last, not considering how excessive work 
demands may be harming IS staff also hurts the company when occupational stress leads to 
lower performance, absence, diminished work quality, and eventually turnover in the on the IS 
team.  Treating IS staff as business assets to be protected and prioritized in terms of their well-
being can improve job satisfaction and employee retention in positions that are difficult to fill 
with skilled human capital. 
Summary of the literature review.  The review of the literature begins with the 
introduction of a current problem faced across the business landscape, cyberattacks.  The 
growing presence of cyberattacks on business and industry has added complexity to the role of 
IS professionals in business, a complexity that cannot be ignored without peril.  Cybercriminals, 
at their core, are people trying to take advantage of others for personal gain.  While the 
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motivations behind an attack are as old as time, generally avarice, the digitization of the 
economy has ushered in technologies that have upped the ante in terms of the methods needed to 
launch a successful strike.  Still, cybercriminals are rising to the challenge, banding together, and 
becoming more dangerous with each successful criminal endeavor.   
Because most cybercriminals seek the biggest payoff for the least amount of effort, any 
and every company can be targeted.  This means SMBs, those without deep pockets that cannot 
afford the same security precautions as their larger counterparts, must diligently seek innovative, 
yet effective solutions to ensure they are less susceptible to the threat of a cyberattack.  Any 
company refusing to acknowledge the risk or to follow through with investments in 
cybersecurity technology, teams, policies, procedures, training, and behavioral monitoring set 
themselves up for significant damages that may come in the form of a service disruption, data 
breach, theft of company secrets, or the loss of customer trust, brand reputation, and future 
business. 
Company defenses are made up of physical, technological, and human barriers.  The 
human layer of defense is consistently less reliable than technical barriers, which makes it an 
easier target for cybercriminals to target.  Social engineering one means by which cybercriminals 
manipulate someone into giving them what they are after, and a successful social engineering 
scheme often means bad news for the unsuspecting target.  Social engineering is used more often 
than other attack vectors to breach the human layer of defense, and it is also used in conjunction 
with other attack vectors like malware, hacking, fraud, ransomware, or social media scams.  
Common social engineering tactics include phishing, ransomware, phone conversations, and 
business email compromise.   
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Cybercriminals target personality traits, human predictability, and the desire to trust and 
engage with others, all to gain unauthorized access to company assets.  If a company has not 
provided the necessary security awareness and skills development training, people will continue 
to succumb to the same ploys they have frequently fallen for time and again.  Cybercriminals 
also target specific industries more than others.  Consistently in the sights of attackers are 
healthcare, financial services, and education industries, because the value of the data and 
information maintained on their customers can produce a sizeable payoff on the black market. 
The IS team tasked with defending the organization against cyberattacks and social 
engineering exploits are busy people, and often security is just one more thing on the long list of 
activities they must keep up with.  As the cyber threat has increased, so has the need for qualified 
security workers, and there simply are not enough trained workers to fill the job openings.  Still, 
while the lack of skilled security personnel has created the greatest challenge for business and 
industry, this is not the only security challenge, much less business challenge, IS professionals 
must overcome.  Indeed, attack surfaces are growing, digital assets must be protected, all aspects 
of the security strategy of the company must be in alignment, and a security cultures must be 
cultivated. 
Responding to the constant change, pressures to prevent security threats, tight deadlines, 
and extended work hours takes its toll on IS professionals, especially when many security 
workers have been hired while they are still underqualified and inexperienced.  Some of the 
factors contributing to occupational stress can be influenced by the organization.  Other factors 
take place at the individual level, but it is the combination of factors contributes to the level 
worker exhaustion and the subsequent, adverse effects on the individual and the organization.  In 
sum, the review of the academic literature has yet to explore what the experience is like for IS 
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professionals working such conditions and what these experiences mean for their ability to 
produce the level of defense required by the ever-threatening landscape in which they operate.  
This study attempts to address this deficiency in the literature. 
Transition and Summary of Section 1 
Thus, concludes Section 1, the Foundation of the Study, in which the background of the 
problem, problem statement, purpose statement, nature of the study, research questions, 
conceptual framework, definitions of important terms, assumptions, limitations, delimitations, 
the significance of the study, and a review of the professional and academic literature were 
examined in great detail.  As discussed, U.S. businesses remain vulnerable to costly social 
engineering attacks, even with technological advances that deter malware and hacking attempts.  
Yet, if a social engineer can hack the human to compromise the credentials of a single individual, 
any business investment made to strengthen technological barriers becomes worthless.  The body 
of literature covers the cost of a successful cyberattacks to business and industry, information 
about how businesses are targeted, the significance of security awareness and training to help 
prevent attacks, and the role of the IS professional in defending the organization from social 
engineering and cyberattacks.  Still, social engineering attacks persist, primarily because they are 
so often met with success, which can be as lucrative for the attacker as it is costly for the 
business.   
The body of literature indicates that the typical working environment for the IS 
professional tends to be made up of many factors that inevitably lead to occupational stress.  
Given the role of occupational stress on worker attitudes and behaviors, questions remain about 
how the levels of occupational stress experienced by IS professionals may come into play in 
terms of the quality and quantity of anticipatory cyber defense tactics employed across an 
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enterprise.  It is not unusual for cybersecurity reports and research studies to direct IS 
professionals and businesses the many techniques they should be using to protect their 
organization from social engineering and other cyber threats, but hardly any studies give 
cybersecurity professionals the opportunity to respond about what may be taking place behind 
the scenes to hinder their efforts.  Even though the primary purpose of the study was to 
investigate how IS professionals working in U.S. businesses make sense of their lives and 
experiences while trying to prevent social engineering attacks, the study also (a) presented an 
opportunity for IS professionals to respond to the expectations placed upon them and (b) gave 
voice to the realities experienced by IS professionals on a day-to-day basis that may be 
influencing their ability to successfully do their jobs.  This study utilized a transcendental, 
phenomenological qualitative research design to fill the gap in the literature.  The study now 
transitions into Section 2, the Project, where the investigation into phenomenon of IS 
professionals protecting U.S. businesses from social engineering attacks begins. 
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Section 2: The Project 
Section 2 describes the transcendental qualitative, phenomenological approach used for 
this study.  This section begins with a review of the purpose of the study and the background of 
the problem to help readers recognize why understanding the phenomenon of people working to 
defend businesses against social engineering attacks was an important and relevant issue to be 
addressed.  Next, the section details the central role of the researcher as it relates to the data 
collection, analysis, and reporting activities during the study.  After that, a description of 
characteristics, constraints, and protections for study participants is provided, with additional 
details included about how participants were identified and invited to participate in the study.  
The section then outlines how the chosen research method and design were addressed to ensure 
the overall aim of the research effort was achieved.  From there, the targeted population and 
sample size and its appropriateness for informing the current study is described.  After providing 
insight into the targeted population, the data collection process is illustrated, presenting details 
related to how interviews with participants were conducted, audio-recorded, transcribed, and 
coded to address the lived and common experiences of the study participants in relation to the 
phenomenon of preventing social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses.  The section 
also demarcates how reliability and validity were addressed throughout the duration of the 
project. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this transcendental phenomenological qualitative study was to investigate 
how IS professionals working in U.S. businesses make sense of their lives and experiences as 
they address and prevent vulnerabilities to social engineering attacks.  This larger problem was 
explored through an in-depth study of social engineering and its effect on IS professionals 
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working in U.S. businesses operating within healthcare, financial services, and educational 
industries across the central and northwest regions of Louisiana. 
Problem background.  U.S. businesses, even those with strong control measures in 
place, remain vulnerable to social engineering attacks (Mouton et al., 2016; Granger, 2001).  
Because successfully perpetrated cyberattacks can results in big payoffs, cyber criminals are 
always on the lookout for easy targets (Torten, 2018).  Consequently, it has become vital for 
businesses to proactively seek out vulnerabilities and understand why they persist and how to 
prepare for an attack (Lavion, 2018).  This study was designed to help businesses better 
understand the phenomenon of IS professionals as they defend the company against social 
engineering attacks, thus enabling them to develop a deeper comprehension about what 
continues to impede progress on the security front within this domain.   
Role of the Researcher 
In all research studies, initially, the researcher is responsible for laying out the foundation 
of the study and answering any questions surrounding the basic characteristics of the study 
(Creswell, 2014).  This process may include providing adequate details about what the study is 
about, why the study is significant.  The process should also cover which methods will be used to 
perform the study.  For example, the current study utilizes a qualitative research design to 
investigate how IS professionals working in U.S. businesses make sense of their lives and 
experiences while addressing and preventing the vulnerabilities related to social engineering 
attacks at their place of employment.  Qualitative research procedures are characterized by a 
holistic orientation towards exploration, description, and explanations (Krathwohl, 2009; Stake, 
2010), and the researcher plays an integral role to ensure the complexities of the phenomenon 
under investigation are accurately captured and portrayed in such a way the remains true to the 
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study participant (Stake, 2010).  This section describes the various roles the researcher was 
responsible for in the current study.  These roles include designing the study, protecting the study 
and its participants, collecting and maintaining data, and analyzing, interpreting, and reporting 
the findings. 
Designing the study.  In addition to providing answers to the foundational questions that 
form the basis of the study, the researcher’s role also involved designing the study (Stake, 2010).  
This step consisted of the formulation, planning, organization, and implementation of the step-
by-step processes, procedures and time schedule to be adhered to throughout the course of the 
study.  Stake (2010) explained that during the design process, the researcher’s role is to 
determine which data collection techniques, such as interviews, observation, or journaling, are 
appropriate to achieve the purpose of the study.  Interviews are a popular and useful data 
collection technique to achieve the desired study outcome for many qualitative research designs, 
especially for phenomenological research studies (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Stake, 2010; van 
Manen, 2016a).  Once the data collection techniques are chosen, the researcher’s role includes 
developing criteria for research participants and making decisions about whether interviews 
should be conducted with individuals, groups, or persons with expert knowledge and specific 
experiences (Magnusson & Marecek, 2015).  The researcher was also required to identify the 
best way to conduct the interview (e.g., face-to-face, email, telephone, web conference, etc.) and 
to define how much data needed to be collected to sufficiently answer the questions under 
investigation (Fusch & Ness, 2015).   
Protecting the study and participants.  A very important role of the researcher in this 
study was to protect the integrity and validity of the study, while also safeguarding study 
participants throughout the research process.  This study was determined to require a 
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transcendental phenomenology design, which presents the experiences of study participants 
rather than the interpretations of the researcher (Moustakas, 1994).  As such, the role of the 
researcher was that of an outsider looking in.  Accordingly, to protect the integrity of the study, 
the researcher was responsible for identifying and bracketing out researcher bias and underlying 
assumptions that can affect the study findings (Creswell & Poth, 2018).  Once personal biases 
were extricated, the researcher identified study participants and invited them to join the study, 
taking measures to ensure all were willing and eligible to participate.  Additionally, the 
researcher was responsible for preparing the interview guide and conducting the interview in 
such a way that (a) answered the research questions; (b) elicited open-ended, honest, robust, 
thoughtful responses from participants; and (c) ensured participants felt safe sharing personal 
thoughts and feelings (Magnusson & Marecek, 2015).  To safeguard study participants, the 
researcher guaranteed the anonymity of participants and their employing organizations and the 
confidentiality of data (Krathwohl, 2009).   
Collecting and maintaining data.  More so than quantitative research, qualitative 
research requires that the researcher play an active role in the research process, as the researcher 
virtually acts as the primary data collection instrument (Stake, 2010; Lincoln & Denzin, 1998).  
In this study, the researcher’s role was to interview participants, record, transcribe, and check the 
interview, and capture and report on relevant context occurring during the interview process.  It 
was also imperative to capture and report on relevant contextual clues, such as behaviors, 
impressions and nonverbal signaling (Sutton & Austin, 2015), therefore the researcher’s role also 
included taking field notes and keeping track of elements that cannot easily be captured from 
voice recordings.  Qualitative research often produces a significant amount of data to keep track 
of (Demchenko, Zhao, Grosso, Wibisono, & De Laat, 2012), and the researcher was responsible 
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for creating and following a system that allowed her to collect, store, organize, and maintain data 
throughout the course of the study and to properly dispose of the data once the study concludes. 
Analyzing, interpreting, and reporting the findings.  In a transcendental 
phenomenological research study, the researcher also had a responsibility to hear the various 
voices of study participants and to produce a true, representative interpretation of the essence and 
shared experience (Moustakas, 1994; van Manen, 2016a).  To accomplish this task, the 
researcher developed a coding process and used this coding process to link and connect 
responses of study participants (Sutton & Austin, 2015).  Then, the researcher identified themes 
across interview transcripts until data saturation was reached.  Once themes were drawn, the role 
of the researcher shifted to verifying the extent the findings are generalizable, reliable, and valid 
to ensure the intent of the research effort accomplished what it intended to accomplish.  After 
verifying the findings of the report, the researcher synthesized these findings and presented the 
findings by writing the report (Sutton & Austin, 2015).  To ensure the findings were 
representative of the true meaning that participants ascribe, the researcher was responsible for 
supporting any report conclusions with references to actual quotations from study participants.   
Participants 
 To ensure the purpose of the research is accomplished, study participants must have been 
IS professionals with experience dealing with social engineering threats.  Consequently, selected 
research participants were be employed as information systems professionals at organizations 
that have faced the threat of social engineering attacks within the previous year.  No limitations 
were placed on the job function, age, gender, race or ethnicity of the IS professional.  Rather, the 
identified participants had been employed by their respective organization for a minimum of one 
year to ensure sufficient exposure to the company culture, technologies, training, policies and 
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procedures.  Additionally, participants were required to possess an awareness of the social 
engineering threats faced by the employing organization or specific experiences related to 
defending the organization against social engineering threats.  The participants in the study were 
purposefully selected using professional contacts solicited within the central and northwest 
regions of Louisiana.  As a faculty member of an undergraduate computing program at a 
university operating within the designated region, the researcher had access to a list of 
professional contacts who (a) offer insights into current industry trends and expectations for 
graduates of the computing program, (b) employ current students, or (c) hire graduates from the 
program.   
Identification process.  Initially, the researcher identified any contacts on this list 
working as IS professionals.  Next, the researcher extricated which IS professionals on this list 
are employed by organizations operating within financial, healthcare, and education sectors.  
Employing organizations could be profit or non-profit entities.  Once the list of potential 
participants was narrowed down to only IS professionals working in the designated industries, 
the researcher initiated contact via (a) phone, (b) email correspondence, (c), and/or (d) social 
media messaging services to invite them to participate in the study.   
Additional leads/recommendations.  Once the interviews were underway, the 
researcher ask study participants if they have additional contacts working within the three 
selected industries that might be willing to participate in the study as well, until saturation had 
been attained.  Additionally, the researcher also explored opportunities with colleagues, friends, 
and family that work in the identified industries to determine whether they have contacts that 
could participate.  The researcher accepted and followed-up on any contact information provided 
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by these sources to determine the willingness and eligibility to participate of recommended study 
participants.   
Establishing a working relationship.  To establish a working relationship, the 
researcher contacted each identified candidate via phone, email, or social media (LinkedIn or 
Facebook) messaging services to invite him or her to participate in the study.  During the initial 
contact, the researcher introduced herself and the overall purpose of the research study to the 
identified candidate.  The researcher then requested permission to follow-up with a more detailed 
email that officially invited the participant to participate in the study and requested responses to 
establish whether a participant met all the criteria to be eligible to participate in the study.  For 
those candidates identified through snowball sampling, the researcher contacted candidates via 
the contact information/method provided by the reference.   
A detailed email described the study to the participant and requested a response to help 
the researcher establish whether a participant met all the criteria to be eligible to participate in 
the study.  The email survey asked (a) if the participant is an IS professional who works in the 
healthcare, financial services, or education industry and has worked in their current role for at 
least a year; (b) if they have experienced social engineering threats and/or attacks at their 
company; and (c) if they are 18 years old or older.  Participants were asked to reply to the 
message with a 'Yes' or 'No' response to each of the questions, and they were only allowed to 
participate in the study if they answered 'Yes' to all criteria.  The candidates were asked to 
respond to the email within one week.  When candidates agreed to participate in the study, the 
researcher worked closely with the newly established participant to schedule a time and location 
to conduct the interview.   
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Measures for ethical protection.  The researcher followed Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) policies and procedures established by Liberty University to ensure participant 
involvement in the study was protected.  Throughout the study, candidates, and subsequently 
participants, were assured that any identifying information about the participant and their 
employing organization will not be disclosed.  The researcher limited the data collected about the 
participant to only the information necessary to complete the goal of the study.  While the 
researcher established eligibility to participate based on their job role, experience, industry, and 
region, no additional identifying information or contact information was collected, maintained, 
or reported.  Moreover, during the interview and audio-recording process, the researcher neither 
solicited nor purposefully recorded the name of the participant or the name of the participant’s 
employer.  To ensure confidentiality was maintained, any identifying information was be 
stripped from the transcript and final report and replaced with pseudonyms or non-identifying 
terminology.  
Concluding the study.  At conclusion of the research effort, the researcher followed all 
protocols established by the IRB related to record retention and data destruction to ensure 
participants are exposed to the least amount of risk possible.  Any data or records that the 
researcher was required to hold onto were maintained on password-protected jump drive and 
stored in a safe location only accessible by the researcher.  Any hard copies containing 
identifying information will be shredded and recycled, and records will be maintained 
documenting when files and records were destroyed. 
Research Method and Design 
 Together, the problem, purpose, research questions, conceptual framework, and body of 
literature provided the structure to support and drive the selection of an appropriate methodology 
95 
 
and design for this study.  Each played an important role in guiding the researcher to the 
selection of the most appropriate methodology and design for the current study.  This section 
discusses why a transcendental, phenomenological qualitative study was the apt choice to 
address the problem and purpose of the current study. 
 Discussion of method.  According to Krathwohl (2009), qualitative methods provide 
researchers with a way to examine complex phenomenon that have not yet been studied before or 
where little knowledge currently exists about all the interwoven, multifarious parts of the 
phenomenon.  The problem of the current study dealt with a phenomenon in which not all the 
variables and patterns are quantifiable, which makes a quantitative research method insufficient 
for addressing the needs of the study (Moustakas, 1994).  Although a significant amount of effort 
goes into sharing important factual statistics and quantitative data about what IS professionals in 
annual cybersecurity reports each year (IBM, 2016, 2017; Proof Point, 2018; Verizon, 2018b; 
Symantec, 2017; ISACA, 2016; Ponemon Institute, 2018b), protecting enterprises from social 
engineering threats and other cyberattacks is a complicated issue that businesses and IS 
professionals do not yet have a handle on due to the high number of attack surfaces (Manadhata 
& Wing, 2010), need for security training (OOS BLS, 2018b), the targeting and exploitation of 
non-IS personnel (Dahbur et al., 2017; Bauer et al., 2017; Torten et al., 2018), and the limited 
number of trained security personnel available to fend off an attack (Ponemon Institute, 2017b).  
Additionally, while these annual quantitative reports may be extremely useful in helping 
researchers and IS professionals quantify how widespread and systemic an issue is being faced 
by businesses across the U.S. and to prioritize resources to address the issue internally, such 
quantitative reports cannot fully capture the essence of the experience of working daily to defend 
against these attacks, which is important to understand if businesses ever hope to diminish 
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vulnerabilities related to social engineering threats and cyberattacks (Creswell, 2014; Stake, 
2010).  A qualitative research method, on the other hand, can be used to understand and explore 
the meaning people ascribe to some situation or problem, hence justifying the need to use a 
qualitative method to address the requirements of this study (Krathwohl, 2009; Stake, 2010; 
Creswell, 2014).   
 Discussion of design.  An assortment of qualitative designs exists, including narrative, 
ethnography, grounded theory, case study, and phenomenology.  Because understanding the 
shared, lived experiences of IS professionals in preventing social engineering vulnerabilities in 
U.S. businesses was essential to satisfying the aim of this research effort, phenomenology was 
deemed the most appropriate design for the study.  Moustakas (1994) explained that the purpose 
of phenomenological research is “to determine what an experience means for the persons who 
have had the experiences and are able to provide a comprehensive description of it” (p. 13).  
Phenomenological studies have a specific structure that is devised to produce genuine, reliable 
descriptions from study participants (Moustakas, 1994; van Manen, 2016a).  Furthermore, 
phenomenology is often used to give voice to persons who have experienced a phenomenon 
firsthand, which in turn can provide a deeper understanding of some unique circumstance or 
event as it has been experienced by numerous persons (Creswell & Poth, 2018).  Again, even 
though annual reports continuously provide relevant statistics related to the status of cyberattacks 
and social engineering threats in industry (IBM, 2016, 2017; Proof Point, 2018; Verizon, 2018b; 
Symantec, 2017; ISACA, 2016; Ponemon Institute, 2018b), as of this writing hardly any research 
efforts utilized a phenomenological approach to explore the shared meaning of IS professionals 
working to prevent social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses (Jackson, 2017).  
Decision-makers and policymakers, both internal and external to the company, stand to benefit 
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and make more informed decisions when they become more knowledgeable about common 
experiences of the studied groups.   
 Transcendental phenomenology.  Because the purpose of the study was to investigate 
how IS professionals make sense of their lives and experiences, it was important for the study to 
focus more on what study participants revealed and less on how the researcher perceived the 
experience.  Accordingly, within the phenomenological design, the transcendental approach was 
considered most relevant to the current research effort because of its ability to exhibit the 
experiences of the study participants more than researcher interpretations (Moustakas, 1994).  
Creswell and Poth (2018) provided a narrative of the specific procedures that researchers should 
follow when utilizing a transcendental approach to phenomenology.  Initially, the transcendental 
approach requires the researcher to bracket out personal experiences, biases, and gain fresh 
insights and perspectives from study participants about the investigated phenomenon (Creswell 
& Poth, 2018; Moustakas, 1994).  Once the researcher has bracketed out personal experiences, 
the researcher must collect data from persons who have experienced the identified phenomenon 
(Creswell & Poth, 2018).  Next, the information collected from study participants should be 
reduced to significant statements.  These significant statements are then analyzed and combined 
into themes.  From here, the researcher generates a textural depiction about what participants 
experienced as well as a structural account of how the phenomenon was experienced, making 
sure to include information about the conditions, situations, and context, as described by study 
participants.  The final procedure occurs when the researcher attempts to convey the overall 
essence of the experience by combining the textural and structural descriptions together, 
resulting in a rich detailed account of the phenomenon, as experienced by the study participants 
(Creswell & Poth, 2018).   
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 Summary of research method and design.  This research effort centered on producing a 
greater depth of understanding about an identified phenomenon, a key feature of qualitative 
research methods (Stake, 2010).  Qualitative research methods allow investigators the ability to 
observe the mundane, everyday experiences of people and produce meaning and insights that can 
be shared with relevant stakeholders, often enabling stakeholders to make better decisions and 
policies (Creswell & Poth, 2018).  The purpose of this study was to develop a greater depth of 
understanding about the common experiences of IS professionals dealing with the phenomenon 
of preventing social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses.  Only the phenomenological 
research design was built to meet this need precisely, and the transcendental approach provided 
the structure to ensure the overall aim of the research effort is achieved (Moustakas, 1994; 
Creswell & Poth, 2018; van Manen, 2016a).  For these reasons, the researcher deemed the 
transcendental, phenomenological qualitative research methodology and design the most fitting 
to address both the problem and purpose of this study. 
Population and Sampling 
The initial population investigated in this study included three IS professionals working 
to defend their respective organization against social engineering attacks.  Participants were 
selected from the region and business sectors identified as important to this study.  Purposive 
sampling, often used in qualitative research to select individuals who are able to inform the 
research about the selected phenomenon of preventing social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. 
businesses (Krathwohl, 2009; Creswell & Poth, 2018), was utilized in conjunction with snowball 
sampling to select participants who were able to inform the research about the selected 
phenomenon (Krathwohl, 2009; Creswell & Poth, 2018).  The subsequent paragraphs outline the 
rationale behind the chosen population and sampling for this research effort.  
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Population.  In phenomenological research, it is important for the population to be 
representative of the group being studied (Krathwohl, 2009).  The target population in this study 
focuses on IS professionals working in U.S. businesses in the central and northwest regions of 
Louisiana.  Specifically, the targeted population were presently working in in healthcare, 
financial services, and education industries, because these sectors are regularly targeted by social 
engineers (Proof Point, 2018; Medlin, Cazier, & Foulk, 2008; Randazzo, Keeney, Kowalski, 
Cappelli, & Moore, 2005).  Since it was important for participants to speak about their 
experiences involving the phenomenon (Krathwohl, 2009), it was also important for employees 
to have relevant experience working in an information systems related role for a period and an 
awareness of the phenomenon of defending the organization against social engineering attacks.  
Without such experience, the selected participants could not have adequately informed the study.  
Understanding the corporate culture and the issues and challenges related to information systems 
in the workplace takes time (Gamble, Peteraf, & Thompson, 2015; Mello, 2015).  Consequently, 
to ensure adequate exposure to an employing organization’s culture, policies, and IS-related roles 
and functions, study participants must have been employed by their respective organization in an 
IS role for a minimum of one year.  Study participants were also required to be aware of the 
phenomenon of defending the organization against engineering attacks. 
Persons under 18 years of age, non-IS professionals, and IS professionals with less than 
one year of experience working at their employer were excluded from the study.  Persons 
working outside the healthcare, financial services, and educational sectors were also excluded.  
Lastly, persons with no experiences preventing social engineering at their place of employment 
were not eligible for participation in the study. 
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 Sampling.  Sampling, in many methodologies, relates back to the idea or goal of striving 
for empirical generalization, but according to van Manen (2016a), empirical generalization is 
impossible within phenomenological methodologies.  As such, when considering the term 
sample from a phenomenological perspective, the goal of sample selection referred to a 
population that can provide a representative example of the lived experience being investigated.  
Purposive, or purposeful, sampling, was used to select three participants from the study 
population to participate in this phenomenological research effort, and snowball sampling was be 
used to find additional participants as needed until saturation had been attained.   
Data saturation.  In phenomenological research, data saturation plays an influential role 
in the determination of the sample size.  Like other qualitative research studies, in 
phenomenology, data collection continues until data saturation is reached (Creswell & Poth, 
2018; Stake, 2010).  Still, the meaning of the term data saturation differs between 
phenomenological research and other qualitative inquiries, which can have implications for the 
sample size needed to ensure saturation has been reached (Krathwohl, 2009; Creswell & Poth, 
2018; van Manen, 2016a).  Most commonly seen in qualitative inquiries, data saturation is 
attained when no new information is being gathered from study participants during the data 
collection process (Krathwohl, 2009; Creswell & Poth, 2018; van Manen, 2016a).  At times, 
attaining saturation involved collecting data from 20-30 participants (Creswell, 2014).  Yet, van 
Manen (2016a), a seminal researcher in the area of phenomenology, argues that saturation in 
phenomenological studies differs from saturation in other qualitative studies because it is 
attained when enough information and context has been collected to write a rich description 
about what the essence of the phenomenon is like for those persons who have lived the 
phenomenon.   
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Data saturation and study design.  Even though Creswell (2014) mentioned the typical 
sample size for a qualitative study ranges from 20–30 participants, in the following excerpt, 
Creswell (2014) also supported the notion that the design of the study influences the sample size, 
while also providing additional insights about the most commonly used sample size ranges for 
the different types of qualitative studies: 
I have taken the position that sample size depends on the qualitative design being used…. 
From my review of the many qualitative research studies I have found narrative research 
to include one or two individuals; phenomenology to typically range from three to ten; 
grounded theory, twenty to thirty; ethnography to examine one single culture-sharing 
group with numerous artifacts, interviews and observations; and case studies to include 
about four to five cases.  (p. 189)   
Sample size.  Moustakas (1994) explained that, for phenomenology, the criteria for 
locating and selecting participants in the study is not typically determined in advance.  Instead, 
the researcher is expected to determine, “How many examples of concrete experiential 
descriptions would be appropriate for this study in order to explore the phenomenological 
meanings of this or that phenomenon” (van Manen, 2016a, p. 353).  In fact, to accomplish the 
goal of attaining data saturation in phenomenological research, investigators have performed 
studies with single participants (Padilla, 2003) and upwards of 300 participants (Polkinghorne, 
1989).  In 1984, Dukes offered a recommendation of studying three to ten participants, a 
recommendation supported by Creswell (2014) in the excerpt above.  This was also the 
recommendation that was adhered to for the current study. 
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Data Collection. 
The goal of the phenomenological data collection process is to capture the common, lived 
experiences of study participants and to organize the collected data in such a way it will be ready 
for data analysis (van Manen, 2016a).  This section offers a detailed discussion of the 
phenomenological data collection instruments, techniques, and organization practices used 
throughout this study.  The tools and techniques were chosen with the support of the literature to 
ensure the overall aim of the study was met and questions asked by the study were answered.   
 Instruments.  In phenomenological research, the researcher plays a central role as an 
active participant in the data collection process of a study (Stake, 2010; Lincoln & Denzin, 1998; 
Moustakas, 1994).  The two primary data collection activities the researcher utilized for the 
current study included journaling and interviews.  Interviews were captured using audio-
recording, and contextual details that occurred during the interview process were documented via 
note taking to ensure important non-verbal or behavioral cues were available for reference during 
the data analysis and reporting process.  
Journal.  At the beginning of the data collection process, the researcher maintained a 
journal to collect data about personal assumptions and biases.  An important part of the 
transcendental, phenomenological inquiry requires the researcher to “set aside prejudgments 
regarding the phenomenon being investigated” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 22).  The process of setting 
aside personal experiences to allow the investigator to gain a fresh perspective is the epoche 
process, sometimes called bracketing (Creswell & Poth, 2018).  Moustakas (1994) further 
explained the purpose of the epoche to the transcendental, phenomenological study process: 
In order to launch the study as far as possible free of preconceptions, beliefs, and 
knowledge of the phenomenon from prior experience and professional studies – to be 
103 
 
completely open, receptive, and naïve in listening to and hearing research participants 
describe their experience of the phenomenon being investigated.  (p. 22)   
Interviews and audio-recordings.  Once the researcher extracted personal experiences, 
assumptions, and biases, the data collection process required the researcher to manage all 
activities related to conducting and managing the interview process.  The interview process 
depended on the accurate capture and reporting of participant responses using audio-recording 
and word-for-word transcription.  The long, or in-depth, interview is the typical method used by 
researchers to collect data on the topic and research questions (Moustakas, 1994; Creswell & 
Poth, 2018), as such it was also be employed for the current study.  A phenomenological 
interview is usually informal, therefore the researcher used open-ended comments and questions 
to interact and evoke a comprehensive account of a participant’s experience with the 
phenomenon (Moustakas, 1994).   
Interview guide.  The eventual goal of the interview process was to generate a textual and 
structural description of the experience that shares an understanding of the mutual experiences of 
those who participated in the interview process (Creswell & Poth, 2018).  Appendix A contains 
the initial script to be used during the interviews with IS professionals.  The researcher designed 
a broad first question to evoke a rich description of the participant’s experience of the 
phenomenon, as encouraged by Moustakas (1994).  Each question in the interview guide related 
back to the research questions to ensure the overall problem of the study was addressed.  Still, it 
should be noted that the script used during the interview process may have been modified during 
the interview, depending on the responses elicited from study participants, as it was necessary for 
the researcher to ask follow-up questions to extract additional details or clarification from the 
study participant so the goal of generating a richer description and understanding could be met.  
104 
 
According to Moustakas (1994, p. 114), this is typical of transcendental phenomenological 
research, because “although the researcher may in advance develop a series of questions aimed at 
evoking a comprehensive account of the person’s experience of the phenomenon, these are 
varied, altered, or not used at all,” as the participant discloses their experiences during the 
interview process.   
Note-taking.  The data collection process for this study also involved note taking during 
the various interactions to ensure relevant contextual activities were not overlooked during the 
various interactions between the researcher and participant.  Indeed, it is imperative to capture 
and report on relevant contextual cues, such as behaviors, impressions and nonverbal signaling 
(Sutton & Austin, 2015), therefore the researcher’s role also included taking field notes and 
keeping track of elements that could not easily be captured in recordings.  Notes taken by the 
researcher during the interview process were incorporated into the transcript to ensure the 
context cues are recorded and maintained for analysis.   
 Data collection techniques.  The transcendental, phenomenological approach followed 
specific and systematic steps to ensure the final report focused on the phenomenon under 
investigation from the perspective of participants rather than the interpretation of the researcher 
(Moustakas, 1994).  According to Creswell and Poth (2018), these two main data collection steps 
within the phenomenological procedures include bracketing out the researcher’s own experience 
with the identified phenomenon and collecting data from persons who have experienced the 
phenomenon with in-depth interviews.  This section describes how these data collection 
techniques were accomplished in the current study. 
Journaling personal experiences.  Bracketing out personal thoughts and experiences 
enabled the researchers to set aside the biases and assumptions about the phenomenon of IS 
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professionals working to prevent social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses 
(Moustakas, 1994).  Journal entries became the basis for developing the epoche.  The researcher 
purposefully reflected upon each of the research questions and wrote journal entries to capture 
her personal thoughts and experiences related to the questions being asked in the study.  Findings 
from the epoche process were bracketed out prior to interviewing study participants, so the 
researcher could remain open to hearing the descriptions of the phenomenon of study 
participants, as described by Moustakas (1994).  Once collected, the researcher compiled and 
analyzed the reflections written in the journal to identify what underlying assumptions and biases 
existed that had the potential to affect the data collection, analysis, and reporting.   
Inviting candidates to join the study.  Prior to the interview, a series of questions were 
developed to elicit experiences related to the phenomenon and the aim of the study.  The 
questions were used as a guide throughout the interview process, but as the interaction and 
exchange between the interviewer and participant ensued, questions evolved or were omitted as 
the participant shared their experiences.  Once the initial questions were developed, the 
researcher initiated contact and invited candidates to join the study.  If candidates declined to 
participate, the researcher asked candidates to refer other persons working in the same industry 
and region that the researcher could invite to participate in the study.  Throughout the study, 
candidates, and subsequently participants, were assured that any identifying information about 
the participant and their employing organization would not be disclosed.  To ensure 
confidentiality was maintained, identifying information was extricated from the transcript and 
final report, and was replaced with unidentifiable pseudonyms or non-identifying terminology. 
Interviewing participants.  Once a candidate agreed to participate in the study, the 
researcher asked participants to join in the research process to help determine the most 
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appropriate method (e.g., face-to-face, phone, web conferencing tools, etc.) and location to 
conduct the interview to ensure participants were comfortable enough to speak their truth, while 
also ensuring the aim of the study is met.  Once the details surrounding the interview were 
worked out, the researcher scheduled the interview.  During the interview, audio-recording was 
used to capture responses from the participant.  Once the interview was complete, the researcher 
transcribed the recording into a Microsoft Word document.  After the interviews were 
transcribed, participants were asked to review and check the transcript for accuracy purposes.  
Data organization techniques.  The techniques employed throughout the data 
organization process were essential for ensuring valuable data and insights are not lost due to 
reliance on the researcher’s memory and recollection of the experience (Krathwohl, 2009).  Once 
the interviews were completed, the researcher used a password-protected jump drive to house all 
documents and files relevant to the study.  All files and documents relevant to the study were 
maintained and secured on this password-protected jump drive and stored in a safe location only 
accessible by the researcher.   
Documents to be secured.  The researcher maintained Microsoft Word documents and 
containing raw data, such as transcribed interviews, journal entries, and notes capturing 
contextual cues.  Analyzed data, where the transcriptions were collected, coded, and clustered 
into themes, were also saved and stored in Microsoft Word documents and Microsoft Excel 
workbooks.  Additionally, a Microsoft Excel worksheet was maintained to keep track of any 
items destroyed for the purposes of protecting participant anonymity.   
Audio-recordings.  Once the interview was complete, the researcher kept the recording 
device and audio-recording on her person until she returned to a secure office that requires a key 
to a deadbolt to obtain entry.  Audio-recordings were transcribed by the researcher into a 
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Microsoft Word document and saved to the designated secure file location.  Copies of original 
audio-recordings were maintained on the password-protected jump drive and stored in a safe 
location only accessible by the researcher.  Audio-recordings will be maintained for the period 
required by the Institutional Review Board at Liberty University.   
Journals and notes.  The researcher utilized a journal to reflect on and bracket out 
thoughts and assumptions about her experiences with the investigated phenomenon.  Journal 
entries and other contextual cues captured in the note-taking process were input into Microsoft 
Word documents.  These documents were maintained with transcription files and coded 
documents on the password-protected jump drive. 
Data security.  The researcher followed protocols established by the IRB at Liberty 
University related to record retention and data destruction.  Research data and records will be 
stored securely on a password-protected zip drive for three years following the study, and 
credentials of the researcher will be required to access or retrieve the files.  When the zip drive is 
not in use, the drive will be stored in a safe that can only be accessed by the researcher.  After 
three years, all electronic records will be deleted.   
Once interviews were completed, the researcher kept the recording device and audio-
recording on her person until she returned to a secure office that requires a key to a deadbolt to 
obtain entry.  Audio-recordings were transcribed into a Microsoft Word document and saved to 
the password protected zip drive, and all identifying information was removed from transcribed 
files to protect the confidentiality of the participants.  Raw data from the audio-recordings were 
saved to the password-protected zip drive following the transcription process, and the original 
recordings were erased from the recording device.  After three years, all audio-recordings will be 
destroyed.  Any hard copies of notes were shredded and recycled once electronic copies were 
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created and saved to the secure file location.  Any other exchanges between participants that 
leave a documentation trail, such as email messages, require secure credentials to access and will 
not be disclosed or shared with anyone outside the study.   
 Summary of data collection.  A transcendental phenomenological research effort 
follows systematic steps to ensure the collected data meets the goals of the study (Creswell & 
Poth, 2018).  Two specific data collection activities the researcher engaged in included 
bracketing out their own experiences with the phenomenon and collecting data from people who 
have experienced the phenomenon (Moustakas, 1994; Creswell & Poth, 2018).  The researcher 
accomplished the first task utilizing journal entries to document her personal experiences with 
the phenomenon of IS professionals defending U.S. businesses against social engineering 
attacks.  Then, the researcher solicited participants to interview who have experienced the 
phenomenon.  Interviews were scheduled, audio-recorded, and transcribed by the researcher, and 
the participants were involved in the process by reviewing and checking the transcription.  The 
researcher also took notes during the various interactions with participants to log important non-
verbal or behavioral cues, which were referenced during the data analysis and reporting process.  
Participant information remained confidential and secure to ensure the study created minimal 
risk to the participant.  Files related to the data collection and analysis process were maintained 
and secured on a password-protected jump drive and stored in a safe location only accessible by 
the researcher.  Protocols established by the IRB related to record retention and data destruction 
were followed to ensure the protection of study participants. 
Data Analysis 
 According to Stake (2010), the data analysis process of a research study deals with taking 
things apart followed by searching for elements and associations between elements.  After taking 
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everything apart, the researcher uses their critical thinking and analysis skills, as well as their 
previous experiences, to pull everything back together (Stake, 2010).  Consequently, the quality 
of the data analysis is dependent on the ability of the researcher to collect data, sort and classify 
the data, and interpret these clusters of data in such a way that extracts meaning (Stake, 2010).   
 Coding process.  The current study utilized coding to sort all the collected data by 
themes and their relevance to the study.  The researcher handled the coding and analysis process 
manually.  Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel were used to support the activities related to 
coding the collected data.  The study followed a systematic data analysis process typically used 
for transcendental, phenomenological studies, as outlined by Moustakas (1994) and Creswell and 
Poth (2018).  According to Moustakas (1994), the data analysis process begins when the 
transcribed interviews are in front of the researcher.  It is at this point the phenomenal analysis of 
the transcriptions begins.  During the phenomenal analysis procedure, the researcher will 
organize the data using a process called horizontalization, whereby every significant statement 
that is considered relevant to the research effort will be listed and given equal weight 
(Moustakas, 1994).  These statements are important for providing the understanding about how 
the subjects experienced the phenomenon (Creswell & Poth, 2018).   
The next step in organizing the data involved clustering statements into themes, or 
clusters of meaning (Moustakas, 1994; Creswell & Poth, 2018).  For this research effort, 
statements were initially clustered together by the research question being addressed.  From this 
point, the synthesis and construction process began, as the researcher used the clusters of 
meaning and themes to write about the description of the experience.  According to Moustakas 
(1994), “From the textural description, structural descriptions, and an integration of textures and 
structures into the meanings and essences of the phenomenon are constructed” (pp. 118-119). 
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 Summary of data analysis.  In sum, the data analysis involved the researcher manually 
breaking apart the data that had been collected using sorting and coding techniques, as described 
by Moustakas (1994) and Creswell and Poth (2018).  The software tools that were used to 
support the sorting and coding activities included Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel.  Once 
coded, the researcher clustered statements together by the research question being addressed.  
The researcher then pulled each of these parts back together to synthesize the meaning and 
essence of the phenomenon into a rich, textural description in the final report.  The richly 
descriptive final report accomplished the purpose of the study by providing insight into how IS 
professionals make sense of their lives and experiences as they address and prevent 
vulnerabilities to social engineering attacks.   
Reliability and Validity 
The validation process in qualitative research studies, according to Creswell and Poth 
(2018), endeavors to measure the accuracy of the results from the viewpoints of the researcher, 
study participants, and readers.  Looking at the topic through these various lenses contributed to 
the validation of the study effort.  Qualitative research offers various strategies to ensure the 
study is reliable and valid, and the use of multiple validation strategies is recommended to build 
credibility for study findings (Creswell & Poth, 2018).  This section explains the role of 
reliability and validity to generate understanding from these various lenses in the current 
phenomenological research study.  
Reliability.  In qualitative research, reliability is synonymous with the term consistency 
(Krathwohl, 2009).  For a qualitative study to be deemed reliable, it is important to seek 
consistency in the methods used for collecting and analyzing the data.  Krathwohl (2009) 
explained that the nature of the study determines where readers will seek out consistent practices.  
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In qualitative research, establishing a clear audit trail of the research process, including crucial 
aspects such as making transparent decision about the method selection, data collection tools and 
procedures, and data analysis process, can provide readers with everything they might need to 
decide about the consistency of research findings (Slevin & Sines, 1999).  According to Creswell 
and Poth (2018), reliability can also be improved in qualitative studies “if the researcher obtains 
detailed field notes by employing good-quality recording devices and by transcribing the digital 
files” (p. 264).  This is echoed by Slevin and Sines (1999) who explained that the use of audio-
recording devices and “subsequent verbatim typing of interviews into transcripts in the study 
assured consistent and accurate recording of data” (p. 86).  Additionally, presenting a 
participant’s unaltered response to an interview question in the final report demonstrates a 
truthful, consistent account of the data to readers (Slevin & Sines, 1999).   
Creswell and Poth (2018) implied that too many coding staff and analysts can complicate 
the analysis process of a research effort.  To address this potential shortcoming in the current 
study, the number of persons engaged in the data collection, coding, and analysis activities were 
limited to a single researcher, rather than splitting project responsibilities among multiple coders 
and analysts.  The same researcher who interviewed and audio-recorded the participants was also 
responsible for taking detailed notes to capture contextual, nonverbal cues and for transcribing 
and coding the interviews.  By limiting the number of researchers to a single person, the 
researcher ensured greater consistency in the assignment of themes and codes (Krathwohl, 2009).   
Validity.  Validity in a qualitative research effort centers on how well the findings 
embody reality (Slevin & Sines, 1999).  According to van Manen (2016a), the nature of the study 
plays an important role in how the validity of a study should be measured.  Indeed, van Manen 
(2016a) argued, “a common problem for phenomenological researchers is to be challenged in 
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defending their research in terms of references that do not belong to the methodology of 
phenomenology” (p. 347).  van Manen further purported that mixing methods from one type of 
study to another can instead cause misinterpretations if researchers do not recognize that 
concepts should adjust and change when the nature of the study changes.  Accordingly, the 
chosen validation and reliability strategies to be employed for the current study were selected 
with the nature of the study, a transcendental phenomenological qualitative research study, in 
mind. 
Triangulation.  According to Stake (2010), the process of triangulation involves 
purposefully, habitually reviewing and considering the gathered evidence from various points of 
views utilizing a range of techniques.  It is the triangulation process that establishes that the 
study is credible (Creswell & Poth, 2018).  In the current study, both the researcher’s point of 
view and the point of view of participants were captured during the data collection process.  The 
self-reflection process engaged in by the researcher allowed evidence to be collected about the 
researcher’s point of view into journal entries that were conveyed to readers in the epoche.  
Documenting the researcher’s personal experiences, beliefs, and biases in this manner may 
provide insights and generate greater understanding to readers about how the data were 
interpreted.  The study also gathered triangulated evidence from study participants through the 
interview process.  Because study participants came from different IS functions and were 
employed across three distinct industries—some known for their more stringent regulations than 
others—the process of triangulation occurred organically as the researcher accepted responses to 
the interview questions and sought insights into common experiences.  Not only were journal 
entries and interview transcripts analyzed, but also triangulation occurred during the comparison 
of themes.  Last, after interviews were transcribed, participants were asked to review and check 
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the transcript for accuracy purposes.  Member-checking is another activity that can reinforce the 
validity of a phenomenological study, as participants can clarify whether the researcher 
accurately captured the essence of the experience (Moustakas, 1994). 
Saturation.  Research suggests that a phenomenologist knows data saturation has been 
reached when no new information is being shared (Krathwohl, 2009; Creswell & Poth, 2018; van 
Manen, 2016a).  Still, according to van Manen (2016a), collecting data for a phenomenological 
research differs from other studies in that an investigator “looks not for sameness or repetitive 
patterns.  Rather, phenomenology aims at what is singular and a singular theme or notion may 
only be seen once in experiential data” (p. 353).  Instead, data saturation in phenomenology 
occurs once enough “experientially rich accounts” (van Manen, 2016a, p. 353) have been 
collected such that the researcher can accurately capture and convey the lived experience to 
readers in a rich textural description.  Accordingly, the researcher recognized that data saturation 
had been reached when adequate information and context has been collected to write a detailed 
account about what the essence of the phenomenon is like for those persons who have lived the 
phenomenon.  The rich description is included in Section 3 of the final report.   
Transferability.  The rich description of the phenomenon was also be considered final 
strategy employed by the current study to address the final leg of triangulation--the point of view 
of readers.  It is the rich, thick description that allows readers to decide whether the findings are 
transferable between the researcher and study participants (Creswell & Poth, 2018).  The rich, 
thick description allows anyone reading the study to decide whether the characteristics of the 
setting and circumstances could happen elsewhere, which in turn allows readers to envision 
whether the findings might also be assigned to other settings and circumstances.  To accomplish 
this strategy in the current study, the researcher not only transcribed the raw data soon after it 
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was captured, but the researcher also revised the transcription to include additional, contextual 
descriptions captured in the notes that aided in the analysis and coding process, to ensure the 
details and interconnected pieces of the experience lived by participants were adequately 
described to readers.  
Summary of reliability and validity.  Following the examples provided in the 
qualitative and phenomenological literature, various strategies were employed to ensure the 
study was both reliable and valid.  Reliability was addressed through the establishment of a 
transparent audit trail of the research process and by following interview best practices.  These 
best practices included using audio-recording devices during the interview process and 
immediately transcribing the interview word-for-word, while also adding contextual cues 
captured from the detailed field notes.  To further enhance consistency and reduce complications 
that occur in the coding and analysis process, only one researcher was responsible for all 
processes related to the data collection, coding, and analysis activities throughout the study.   
With the goal of making sure findings accurately represent reality (Slevin & Sines, 1999), 
validity was addressed by the utilization of triangulation strategies throughout the research 
process.  Journaling was used to bracket out experiences, beliefs, and biases to capture the point 
of view of the researcher.  Interviews and note-taking were used to collect data from the point of 
view of the study participant.  A rich, textual description was written and included in the final 
report, conveying a truthful account of the phenomenon to readers who will decide whether 
findings can be transferred to other situations, thus engaging the reader’s point of view.  Because 
data saturation for phenomenological studies tends to be based off having enough “experientially 
rich accounts” (van Manen, 2016a, p. 353) to accurately convey the essence of the phenomenon 
to readers, the researcher acknowledged that data saturation had been reached when enough data 
115 
 
had been gathered to write a rich, thick description that allowed readers to envision and 
understand the situation.   
Transition and Summary of Section 2 
This section concludes Section 2, the Project, which establishes how the investigation 
into the phenomenon of IS professionals protecting U.S. businesses from social engineering 
attacks was conducted.  The section began with a reexamination of the purpose of the study and 
background of the problem and transitioned into the role of the researcher, who played an 
essential part not only in designing the study, but also in protecting the study and participants, 
collecting, maintaining, and securing the data, and analyzing, interpreting, and reporting the 
findings of the study.  Once the role of the researcher was described, attention shifted to the 
participants of the study.  As it is important for the population to represent the group being 
studied in phenomenological studies (Krathwohl, 2009), to join the study the participant must 
have been both willing and qualified as an IS professional working in healthcare, financial 
services, or education fields who held experiences with protecting their company from social 
engineering within the past year.  The researcher used purposive and snowball sampling to 
identify candidates for the study, and once candidates agreed to participate, the data collection 
process commenced. 
The data collection process for this study primarily consisted of journaling and 
interviews, which was supplemented by note-taking to capture nonverbal signaling or context 
cues that could not be captured by an audio-recording.  An interview guide was used to facilitate 
the interaction between the researcher and participant during the interview process, and audio-
recording was used to capture and record the interview.  Both journaling and interviews were 
used to capture the different the points of view of the researcher and the study participants, 
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which was important to assure readers of validity and triangulation in the qualitative research 
process.  Once an interview was conducted, the audio-recording was transcribed into a Word 
document.  All data records were saved on a password-protected jump drive that will be stored in 
a secure location for three years following the close of the study. 
The study followed the systematic data analysis process typically used for transcendental, 
phenomenological studies, which typically starts when the transcribed interview is in front of the 
researcher (Moustakas, 1994; Creswell & Poth, 2018).  The findings from the data collection 
process were analyzed, coded, and used to write a rich, textual description for the final report.  
The rich description allows readers to decide if findings might be assigned, or transferred, to 
other settings and circumstances, which accomplished the third and final aim of the triangulation 
process—to address the point of view of readers.  The strategies employed throughout the study 
attempted to assure reliability, consistency, validity, triangulation, saturation, and transferability 
so that the findings shared in the final report can be trusted as an accurate representation of the 
reality experienced by IS professionals as they protect their organization from social engineering 
attacks.  The study now transitions into Section 3, Application to Profession Practice and 
Implications for Change.  Section 3 closes out the research effort with a presentation and 
discussion of the findings, applications to professional practice, recommendations for action, 
further study, reflections, and final conclusions. 
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
Section 3 begins with a brief overview of the study.  This overview revisits why the study 
is important and provides a summary about how the study was accomplished.  Next, the findings 
of the study are presented along with an analysis and implications of the findings.  Then, relevant 
applications to professional practice, recommendations for action, and suggestions for further 
study are outlined.  The study closes with reflections of the researcher, a summary of the study 
and findings, and conclusions. 
Overview of the Study 
This transcendental phenomenological qualitative study was conducted to examine how 
IS professionals working in U.S. businesses make sense of their lives and experiences as they 
address and prevent vulnerabilities to social engineering attacks.  The phenomenological process 
outlined by Creswell and Poth (2018) guided the effort, enabling the researcher to formulate the 
description of the investigated phenomenon.  The primary objectives of the research effort were 
to give IS professionals an opportunity to voice their personal lived experiences related to the 
phenomenon, to describe these lived experiences, and to develop an understanding of the 
phenomenon by interpreting and translating their responses into themes and codes that could be 
used to capture the overall essence of the shared experience.   
This study presents the major findings of this phenomenological qualitative inquiry into 
the lived experience of six IS professionals defending their organization against social 
engineering attacks.  Ten common themes were identified across participants, which, when 
combined, capture the overall essence of the experience of the phenomenon.  While several of 
the findings were consistent with previous literature on the topic (Lineberry, 2007; Ekwall & 
Rolandsson, 2013, Zhan et al., 2015; Orgill et al., 2004), a few findings were not previously 
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identified in the body of literature.  The overview opens with the researcher’s epoche and 
concludes with demographic information of participants and a brief description of each study 
participant.  These pieces are provided to help readers (a) better understand the researcher’s 
background and potential biases and (b) more readily envision the responses presented in the 
findings. 
Epoche.  Just a few months ago, I received a phone call from someone who wanted to 
conduct a survey about our organization’s cybersecurity measures, and they were offering $100 
for me to participate.  First, they would ask me some screening questions to see if I were eligible 
to participate based on my knowledge of our systems.  Prior to my investigation into the topic of 
social engineering for my dissertation topic, I probably would have tried to help my fellow 
researcher—whom I had not confirmed their credentials—achieve their research goals.  Instead, 
as their questions became progressively more direct about our information systems and security 
systems, I responded with, “I prefer not to answer.”  This could have been a legitimate survey.  
But the reality is, $100 is not worth the damage that can be done at my workplace, to my 
students, and to my colleagues if it was a social engineer gathering reconnaissance about my 
employer.  When the phone call ended, I felt as if I had been extremely rude to the caller.  I did 
not know, and still do not know whether it was a researcher or someone with harmful intentions.  
While I felt paranoid, I also wondered if I had overdone it.  On the other hand, I felt somewhat 
empowered by my ability to say “No, I’m not going to give you answers that could put us in 
harm’s way.”   
Surprising perspective.  Because of my uncertainty, I went to visit a colleague who is 
considered our resident cybersecurity expert.  I quickly discovered he had received a similar call 
the day before and had agreed to participate in the survey.  He informed me,  
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Hey, if it is a social engineer, they’re going to get the information from someone on this 
campus.  I consider it IT’s job to have a strong enough defense in place.  If they are 
preparing to perpetrate an attack, it doesn’t matter what information I give them, they 
better be prepared for it.   
His response surprised me, because research and cybersecurity reports repeatedly state the 
importance of educating employees and creating a security culture to build a strong defense.  
After reading these reports, I had convinced myself that I, as an employee, am both responsible 
and accountable.   
Nonetheless, after hearing this divergent point of view, I realized that not everyone 
accepts defense against social engineering attacks as part of their responsibility.  And, as seen by 
my colleague, some may simply refuse to accept responsibility for defending the organization 
against cyberattacks as part of their job role and function.  This interaction led me to question 
how an IS professional might deal with the wide spectrum of beliefs about security roles and 
responsibilities across their organization.  I mean, here was a cybersecurity expert who believes 
education will never be enough, and everyday employees won’t be the ones held responsible 
when an attack is successful—the IT team will be accountable.  So, how do IS professionals deal 
with an employee like this one, who considers his/her role as important to pointing out potential 
holes/vulnerabilities in the current system?  Do they ignore them?  Shut them down?  Punish 
them?  Educate them more?  Or do they find ways to use them to their advantage?  Currently, 
many cybersecurity reports focus on what needs to be done, what is being done, what is done 
well or poorly, a lot or very rarely.  Have we looked at the people involved, their attitudes and 
beliefs?  Have we considered how these attitudes and beliefs influence their decisions and 
actions related to creating a strong defense against social engineering attacks?  A look into the 
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research tells us very little about these attitudes and beliefs, much less how these attitudes are 
influencing people.   
Background of the researcher.  I began working as an IS professional at a startup in 
2005 after earning my BBA in CIS.  While I was aware of the need to keep customer data 
confidential, from the perspective of a newbie in the business, I was mostly aware of the 
importance of not sharing one customer’s data with anyone besides the customer and my 
colleagues.  Fast forward six years, and I found myself working in the Office of Institutional 
Research for a regional, four-year public university.  My job at the time included managing and 
reporting on student information to various internal and external entities.  The expectations 
regarding the sharing of student information were much more clearly defined under FERPA than 
I had experienced in my earlier years.   
Still, I would not say I was ever on the lookout for a social engineering attack, and if I 
had received a phishing email during that time, I was unaware of it.  Most data requests were 
reports we did on a regular basis or had been vetted by the director before being assigned to me.  
We had a system in place for requests that fell outside the scope of our ongoing reporting needs, 
which included following a specific protocol to vet whether the request could be sent to the 
requestor.  Beyond initial training and signing the confidentiality agreement, I do not recall ever 
receiving formal training about the dangers of social engineering attacks or the need to be aware 
about the cybersecurity threats.  Now, I am a faculty member responsible for teaching, advising, 
research, and service.  I am still responsible for keeping student information private and 
confidential.  In my time in this capacity, it has only been in the past year that I recollect having 
seen one email from the IT team about cybersecurity threats to universities—and this email came 
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after a successful attack had already been perpetrated across the entire campus—affecting 
students, faculty, and staff alike. 
So truly, it has only been in the past year, while working on my dissertation topic, that I 
have become significantly more aware and enlightened about the dangers of social engineering 
in the workplace, not only for people working as IS professionals, but also for people in all areas 
of business.  As far as my personal experiences with preventing social engineering vulnerabilities 
go, I have always strived to follow protocols regarding maintaining customer confidentiality and 
data.  Integrity and work ethic are key characteristics for data workers.  Yet, as I’ve learned in 
my research learning all the ins-and-outs of social engineering, that might not be enough to 
protect a person or their organization from their own human frailties.  So, while I’ve never been 
contacted by our IT department to learn my credentials have been compromised or have resulted 
in a breach, that doesn’t mean that I have not inadvertently contributed to the reconnaissance or 
advancement of a social engineering exploit--which is scary and confounding all at the same 
time.  Indeed, attacks are so sophisticated now, that a person can help a social engineer and never 
know they were a pawn in an attack.  So, while I do my very best to follow protocols, I have no 
idea if I’ve been the victim of a social engineering exploit.   
Even so, if I’m being completely honest with myself, I probably have.  I know I’ve been 
targeted—be it part of a mass phishing scheme at my workplace or via social media.  And all it 
takes is one wayward click.  One moment of curiosity where I let my guard down and clicked the 
wrong link or responded to an email I shouldn’t have.  Social engineers thrive off natural human 
tendencies of laziness, fear, trust, curiosity, and more, so, again, there is a strong possibility that I 
have contributed to some form of social engineering attack without even knowing it.  Still, I do 
not feel like a victim, and while I do have various biases about the topic, the goal of this research 
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effort is not to make a point from my own personal experiences and biases.  I am doing this 
research to better understand what my sisters and brothers in IS fields are experiencing, in hopes 
that perhaps we can gain some insight about whether we need to do things better and make 
things better for current and future employees in the field. 
Demographic information.  This study included six IS professionals working in U.S. 
businesses across central and northwest regions of Louisiana.  Five participants were acquired 
from a list of professional contacts who responded to the recruitment email.  The final participant 
was attained through the snowball sampling process.  All participants (n = 6) reside and practice 
in the state of Louisiana and identified themselves as being 18 years of age or older.  All 
participants (n = 6) identified themselves as having worked for their current employer for at least 
one year, and all six acknowledged that their employer experienced social engineering threats or 
attacks within the previous year.  Two participants were represented from each of the industries 
included in this study, health care, financial services, and higher education.  Half of the 
participants (n = 3) were male and half were female (n = 3).  All indicated having earned a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, but only half (n = 3) attained their degree in a computer-related 
field.  Most participants (n = 4) worked in security-related positions, while the remaining two 
participants did not consider their primary job function to be security-related.  All six 
participants were full time employees. 
Participant characteristics.  The researcher chose to present each participant with the 
following non-identifiable pseudonyms: Participant 1 (P1), Participant 2 (P2), Participant 3 (P3), 
Participant 4 (P4), Participant 5 (P5), and Participant 6 (P6).  Each participant is presented using 
the selected pseudonym throughout the study, including all transcriptions and interactions.  This 
ensures confidentiality is maintained throughout the entirety of the research process.  The 
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characteristics of each participant were gained from the audio-recordings and interview 
transcriptions, which contained their thoughts and reflections on their experiences about the 
current phenomenon.  While the experiences of each participant varied by their primary role, all 
participants were open to and engaged with the interview process and eager to provide insights 
into their experience of defending their organization from social engineering attacks.  
Accordingly, the exchange during the interview process between the researcher and participants 
were both productive and focused towards achieving the objectives of the study. 
Participant 1 (P1).  P1 is a male IS professional with approximately five years’ 
experience in the field.  He has been working in a security capacity for the last six months.  P1 
joined a startup in the healthcare field after working in the retail sector where his primary 
experiences dealt with hardware and “geeking out on toys.”  When he was approached to join the 
fledgling organization, the company was comprised of less than 10 people, and they needed 
someone who could dabble in a little bit of everything IS-related.  While P1 earned a bachelor’s 
degree, it was not from a computer-related field, so he knew he would be in for new challenges 
and experiences when he joined the team.   
Since his coming on board, the organization ballooned to nearly 60 employees.  The 
responsibilities of his position grew as rapidly as the company did, including his being assigned 
the HIPAA compliance officer for the organization.  This assignment is the reason he first began 
dabbling in a more security-centric capacity.  Yet, even though he added two additional IS 
professionals to the team, P1 remained the sole security personnel.  He works full-time and, until 
recently, worked a substantial number of overtime hours, explaining that security was a 24/7 job, 
and  
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If they [employees] don’t stop working, then you don’t stop working.  So, if they don’t 
learn work-life bounds, then you can’t have any as a security professional.  Cause if the 
vice president’s 24/7, then his account’s 24/7.  If his account’s 24/7, then phishing 
attempts are 24/7.   
Still, even though P1 described the fast pace and grueling hours as “rough” in his first years with 
the company, he also believes “it’s getting better.”  P1 clearly identified his lived experiences 
and the essence of those experiences defending his organization against social engineering 
attacks. 
Participant 2 (P2).  P2 is a director of information systems at a startup in Louisiana that 
operates primarily in the healthcare sector, although the services offered by the organization also 
spans into the financial services industry as well.  P2 earned her Bachelor’s in Computer 
Information Systems degree from a local university and was actively recruited to join the rapidly 
growing company upon her graduation, where she found her skills in systems administration to 
be indispensable to her success.  She was one of the first employees of the company, and she is 
fully “invested in our company, and the well-being of our company, and the well-being of our 
employees.”   
P2 is one of the three female participants in the study and one of only two participants not 
working in a security-related role.  Still, because she is one of the founding members of the 
company, she believes that her biggest contribution to defending the organization against social 
engineering attacks is her role in establishing culture that prevents the negative consequences 
from happening “to my employees or to the company as a whole.”  P1 regularly trains others at 
her company to be more aware of social engineering attacks, but she also feels responsible for 
“helping everybody else in the company and helping report these things to IT” when they 
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happen.  She also openly admitted her role in encouraging another colleague to inadvertently 
succumb to an attack, which allowed her to discuss why she continuously advocates for 
communication, training, and “learning from your experiences” when it comes to dealing with 
the phenomenon. 
Participant 3 (P3).  P3 is the second participant not working in a security-related role, 
instead, she is primarily responsible for responding to data requests for her university.  She 
earned her bachelor’s degree in a computer-related field decades ago, and she has extensive 
experience as an IS professional in her area of expertise.  While she is presently a full-time 
employee and director of her department, she is also currently enrolled in a program to earn a 
master’s degree in a computer-related field.  While P3 did not have the most experience with 
dealing with social engineering attacks of the other participants, claiming, “there's not been a lot 
of incidents that have happened” in her area, her willingness to communicate openly about her 
experiences helped the researcher both confirm the overall essence and discern additional themes 
that might have been overlooked without her unique perspective. 
P3 was the first participant to mention that her university did not have someone 
designated as the security point-person, which she felt was key to moving the idea of a security 
culture from a “concept” to “something people can get behind.”  She also called herself a “mama 
bear” when describing how protective she felt about the data, her customers, and the university 
she serves stating, “I consider it meaningful to the extent that I have saved somebody else from 
having to deal with that.  I'm one of the gatekeepers.”  And even though P3 believed others at her 
university “would probably want to kill me for saying this,” she also felt very strongly about 
following and updating policies and procedures to keep the organization safe because, “Policies 
and procedures, I think, give you a framework to be able to respond consistently.”   
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Participant 4 (P4).  P4 is the second male IS professional to participate in the study.  He 
is the first participant to offer insights from the C-level, as he is the CIO of his institution.  Of all 
participants, P4 held the most extensive IS experience related to the phenomenon under 
investigation.  He also held the greatest amount of experience, over 18 years, working in various 
roles in his chosen industry, banking.  His previous positions ranged from being “teller,” 
followed by taking on a “network security administrator” role.  He spent time as the “information 
security officer and systems officer,” before moving “to the risk department” where his role 
shifted to “audit and information security.”  His unique background gave him a plethora of 
knowledge and experiences to pull from throughout the interview process. 
P4 good-humoredly confessed to being “OCD and paranoid about everything” in terms of 
securing his financial institution from security-related problems, but he was not joking around 
when he shared how he felt when a social engineering vulnerability was exploited in his industry, 
declaring, “Scary!  It’s scary!  Cause you think, [if] this could happen to them….”  Following 
the interviews, it became apparent that, of all the organizations and industries represented in the 
current study, P4’s company was in the best position to anticipate and circumvent social 
engineering attacks.  Whereas the others were primarily in the position to react and remediate.  In 
fact, when asked if he could share one of the times he had to deal with a social engineering at his 
workplace, he could not name a specific incident like those from other industries.  Instead, he 
explained they have been able to avoid them because, “we have layered security” which included 
considerably more training and testing protocols than mentioned by any other participant.  
Whether driven by industry expectations, motivated by P4’s fear of the potential consequences, 
or compelled by his experience, P4 and his team appeared to be doing many things right in terms 
of defending their organization against social engineering attacks. 
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Participant 5 (P5).  P5 is the final female participant in the study and the second 
participant to have a bachelor’s degree in a non-computer-related field.  P5 is the only participant 
who joined via the snowball process when P4 invited her to tag-team with him during his 
interview due to her role as the Information Security and Cybersecurity Officer at their bank.  
Where P4 had been at the company for three years, P5 was in her sixth year.  She previously 
worked in commercial lending before shifting to her information security position two years 
prior.  It was clear that P4 and P5 worked very closely alongside one another to keep their 
company running smoothly.  P5 explained the differences between their roles at the company.  
On my side, as information security officer—I’m more with like, the vendor due 
diligence, the training of employees.  You know, the checks and balances of who’s all 
doing what.  Different logs and stuff like that.  He’s more the…you know, cause he’s 
information officer.  He’s more the technical [side of things] ….  So, I’m the one that 
goes behind and says, ‘Okay, well what are y’all doing.  Make sure you’re not doing 
things you aren’t supposed to be doing…’   
P5 revealed, “The first thing I did when I moved up here was start reading the FFIC 
books” to stay on top her new role and the massive number of regulations they are required to 
address.  She, more than other participants, addressed the role of regulations and regulatory 
agencies in helping them be more successful than other industries in protecting their company 
from social engineering attacks.  She shared, “I think banks are way heavier regulated then even 
health care, and definitely schools….  And [the audits are] frequent.”  And while some might 
consider the regulations and regular audits a hassle, she felt that regulations were instrumental in 
ensuring they “take the measures to be secure.”  P4 agreed, claiming, “regulation protects the 
customer.”   
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Participant 6 (P6).  P6, the second participant from the higher education sector, is the 
also the second of two participants to join the study with a C-level perspective, as he is second in 
command of the IS function at his university.  He is the third participant with a bachelor’s degree 
from a non-computer-related field and the final male participant in the study.  His role at the 
university includes oversight of the technology infrastructure across the entire enterprise and 
leveraging technology and people to achieve the objectives of the university.  In terms of 
protecting the organization from social engineering attacks, his team primarily focuses on 
addressing issues through the implementation of control measures coupled with training and 
communication following an attack.   
Not unlike the participants from the banking sector, P6 placed a lot of emphasis on the 
expectations surrounding institutions operating in the higher educational environment, arguing 
that culture of the industry is partially responsible for how his team responds to and implements 
countermeasures for social engineering attacks.  Furthermore, reminiscent of P3, the other 
participant from higher education, P6 explained that the university he works for does not yet 
designate the responsibility of social engineering or cybersecurity to “a 100% defined security 
individual,” explaining that while “it’s something that we’re talking about” everything always 
returns to the lack of available resources and funds, and “it always, unfortunately, winds up a 
major issue happening before the university says ‘Okay we need to do something.’”  Currently, 
addressing social engineering attacks falls to his staff of “two people who are system 
administrator, data center people” who deal with issues as they arise or are reported.  Still, he 
recognizes “we need someone who is dedicated to those functions and roles that can monitor 
these systems and services and things and be proactive and not reactive when these kinds of 
things happen.”   
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Presentation of the Findings 
Research question 1.  “What lived experiences do IS professionals have with preventing 
social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses?”  From five verbatim transcripts, 129 
significant statements were extracted in relation to addressing RQ1.  Table 1 includes examples 
of significant statements with their derived meaning.   
Table 1   
Selected Examples of Significant Statements for RQ1 
Significant Statement Meaning 
Once you've figured that out, then you’ve got to 
convince the whole culture of people who have 
been here for twenty, thirty years that they need to 
do things different. 
Resistance to change is a very real issue for IS 
professionals. 
So, are there tools to keep us from doing that?  
Yeah, maybe not. <<shakes head no>> I think it's 
more--I think awareness, and just….  Like, well, 
what [CIO] does. Sends out reminders, yeah.  I 
would say, probably, the reminders are out maybe 
once a quarter.  I'm just going on gut feel there.  
Training?  I know we've gotten some after people 
have received links in their emails that were not 
legit, you know.  
Sending reminders is an important aspect of 
training and keeping it on the forefront of 
employee minds. 
That's what I start to, “Okay, let me ask some 
people did you get it?”  A couple of people come 
to me, “Hey, I got this weird text.” And sure 
enough, um… 
IS professionals use communication to stay ahead 
of social engineering attacks, 
Making sure if someone shows up and says, “I’m 
so and so from CenturyLink” and you know 
nothing about it, that 1) you either call your 
manager or 2) you call this department—call 
somebody to say, you know, before letting them 
in, and don’t let them in, you know, unless you get 
confirmation that “Yes, they’re supposed to be 
there.”  We do reiterate that, a lot.   
Training can help an employee make better 
decisions. 
 
Significant statements were then arranged into clusters, resulting in three themes.  Table 
2 contains examples of the theme clusters that emerged from their derived meanings.  
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Table 2 
Theme Clusters with Related Derived Meaning for RQ1 
Security cultivation Train, test, repeat Layers—not just for hair 
IS professionals need other people 
and resources to build a security 
culture. 
Preventing attacks is more 
difficult than reacting. 
Layered security helps 
prevent social engineering 
attacks. 
When people are involved, mistakes 
are going to happen.   
Education and training is the 
heart of preventing SE attacks. 
Training and controls go 
hand-in-hand. 
With the right team and support, 
improving the security culture is 
possible. 
Basic security knowledge is 
important for everyone.   
Software tools and controls 
aid in the social 
engineering prevention 
process. 
Someone needs to lead the culture 
change before other people will get 
on board. 
Everybody, including board 
members, need security training. 
It takes time, sometimes 
years, to build an effective 
security program--including 
all the layers. 
Open communication helps when 
establishing a security culture. 
Layered security controls help, 
but they have limitations. 
Outsourcing security tasks 
helps IS professionals 
strengthen their defenses. 
Resistance to change is a very real 
issue for IS professionals. 
Social engineering training can 
be effective if it's repeated often. 
While resources are 
important, they will always 
be limitations. 
 
Theme 1: Security cultivation.  Participants believed a culture of security must be 
cultivated to ensure social engineering attacks are prevented.  To accomplish the development of 
a stronger security culture, participants discussed the importance of keeping lines of 
communication open, building key relationships, and designating responsibility to a single 
individual or team.  P4 called communication among the various individuals and departments the 
“most important thing” and considered the lack of communication to be “the greatest risk that a 
business face.”  According to one participant, P2, sometimes fostering a culture that embraces 
open communication simple starts with her response to questions, “If I sent an email with an 
attachment and somebody calls in and says, ‘Did you mean to send this?  Did you actually send 
this?’  I'm not gonna be annoyed with them for doing that.”  Thus, for an organization to 
adequately defend itself from social engineering attacks, the organization’s culture must allow 
and encourage its people to ask questions without penalty or chastisement.   
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Subtheme 1: Find a partner, dosey doe.  In addition to keeping lines of communication 
open, participants also noted the need to build strategic relationships as a necessary part of the 
work of changing the culture of an organization.  P1 struggled with this culture shift firsthand as 
his startup began to mature, “culturally, right now, you're coming from a place where people 
didn't have any rules.  And it was very much the Wild West.”  Still, he found ways to enlist the 
help of early adopters, which led those resisting the change to feel like they were falling behind, 
“So then they start using it, and then I don't have to do anything else.  Because now [they] call 
me.”  People often resist changing the way things are done, and making the investment in 
strategic relationships is important to IS professionals hoping to enhance the security culture of 
their organization.   
Subtheme 2: Tag!  You’re it.  Prevalent across the statements of IS professionals in this 
study is the need for a designated person to be responsible for developing a security culture.  A 
few study participants accepted this function as part of their primary role or assigned job 
function, but in other organizations, it was not always clear whether a position such as this exists, 
which may make it more difficult to get the people of the organization on board.  When asked 
who was responsible for addressing the social engineering vulnerabilities at her workplace, P3 
responded, “Somebody that we do not have working here at this university….  I mean, I think the 
culture is gonna come from... the people who take it up as a passion.”  Similarly, P6, the second 
participant from higher education said they also lacked a dedicated person to address security 
and social engineering issues.  Still, he recognizes “We need someone who is dedicated to those 
functions and roles that can monitor these systems and services and things and be proactive and 
not reactive when these kinds of things happen.”  It is essential for an organization to designate 
someone with the responsibility of building and cultivating a stronger security culture.    
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Theme 2:  Train, test, repeat.  The predominant belief of every participant in this study is 
that the word prevention is synonymous with the words training and education.  According to 
the study participants, to prevent social engineering attacks, the people of an organization must 
be aware not only of the danger, but also of their part in recognizing the threat and their expected 
response to the threat.  IS professionals also acknowledge that exposure to security and social 
engineering will not be effective if training only happens once.  For it to be effective, it must be 
iterated repeatedly.  Three of the six participants shared the importance of making sure all 
employees received training upon hire and then annually thereafter.  “It’s once a year is the 
requirement.  It is when you arrive, and then it's again the next year.”  In contrast, P4, a 
participant with access to greater training resources considered the onboarding and annual 
training a minimal requirement.  Instead he tested his people more regularly using penetration 
tests, explaining, “I test every two weeks.”  In addition, IS professionals realize the importance 
of keeping social engineering attacks on the minds of their employees, as such, some use various 
reminders, such as banners across the top of incoming emails or emailing a quarterly newsletter 
to everyone in the company.  Thus, to protect an organization from social engineering attacks, 
the people of the organization must be trained repeatedly to build awareness and withstand 
attacks. 
Theme 3:  Layers—not just for hair.  IS professionals confessed that training works best 
to prevent social engineering attacks when used in conjunction with other electronic security 
controls.  Participants also believed that layering security controls can play a significant role in 
reducing the overall impact of a social engineering attack.  P5 discussed the role of these controls 
in protecting her organization, “We have the secondary controls in places so that, if they did [fall 
prey to an attack]… then we have these layers of security controls to catch it and completely 
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wipe it out before it does any harm.”  Indeed, the more security layers the IS professional had 
implemented across an enterprise, the more the individual exuded a calm, assured demeanor 
about their ability to anticipate and circumvent an attack.  P1 and P6 cited fewer layers and were 
more likely to disclose reacting and remediating rather than anticipating and avoiding.  
Consequently, layered security coupled with training helps IS professionals prevent and 
minimize damage from social engineering attacks, which in turn gives a greater peace of mind 
concerning potential attacks.   
Research question 2.  “What is the essence of the shared experience of IS professionals 
in preventing social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses?”  From five verbatim 
transcripts, 99 significant statements were extracted to address RQ2.  Table 3 includes examples 
of significant statements with their derived meaning.   
Table 3 
Selected Examples of Significant Statements for RQ2 
Significant Statement Meaning 
But you have to look at what you have 
accomplished, and so…. I think getting an 
involved with other IT professionals and getting 
networked--like going to [conference name] was a 
big deal, because you've got very sophisticated 
people wanting to figure out how you did it, right?  
So then it validates what you did.   So, the 
company is never gonna understand, at large, 
what it took to get where you're at.  
It feels good to have my work recognized and 
validated by others. 
 We probably weren’t Tier 2 by then, but 
everybody’s wearing many hats.   
Preventing social engineering attacks is not my 
only job function--far from it! 
There’s gonna be a problem, right?  If they don’t 
stop working, then you don’t stop working.  So if 
they don’t learn work-life bounds, then you can’t 
have any as a security professional.  Cause if the 
vice president’s 24/, then his account’s 24/7.  If 
his account’s 24/7, then phishing attempts are 
24/7… 
Sometimes working in this capacity is a 24/7 job, 
and that's difficult. 
But at the end of the day, I have to play bad cop. 
All the time.  
They want me to handle it rather than taking 
responsibility for their role. 
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Significant statements were then arranged into clusters, resulting in three themes.  Table 
4 contains examples of the theme clusters that emerged from their derived meanings.  
Table 4 
Theme Clusters with Related Derived Meaning for RQ2 
Camping 101 Worker Bees An Invisible Impact 
Most of the time, social engineering 
attacks don't bother me. 
Preventing social 
engineering attacks is not 
my only job function--far 
from it! 
The work IS professionals do is 
hard to quantify. 
IS professionals are frustrated by the 
poor decision-making of the people 
they try to protect. 
IS professionals recognize 
their limitations and try to 
work around them. 
I'm pleased with the security 
changes that have been made! 
It can be difficult dealing with a 
team member. 
Just my day-to-day role. I'm proud of the work I do. 
They want me to handle it rather 
than taking responsibility for their 
role. 
People are the weakest 
link. 
I'm proud of the work other IS 
professionals do. 
Working as an IS professional isn't 
always fulfilling. 
Sometimes other 
businesses and industries 
make it worse for my 
company. 
It feels good to have my work 
recognized and validated by 
others in my industry. 
The misuse of technology bothers 
me. 
 It feels good when my work is 
appreciated by my organization. 
 
Theme 4: Camping 101.  It seemed to be common knowledge among the participants in 
this study, if one hopes to operate a business without falling prey to a social engineering attack, 
an investment must be made to prevent the social engineering nuisance from ruining its chances 
for success.  In truth, when asked to what extent social engineering attacks bothered them, none 
of the IS professionals confessed to spending much time bothered by them.  In fact, both P2 and 
P3 admitted they only think about them “when they pop up.”  The other participants believed 
they had enough secondary security controls in place to neutralize the threat, so they were not 
bothered either.  IS professionals in this study regarded social engineers like many campers treat 
the pesky mosquito—something that deserves enough attention to defend against, but not 
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necessarily something worth worrying about once controls have been put in place to protect the 
organization from an attack.   
Theme 5:  Worker bees.  According to every participant, preventing social engineering 
vulnerabilities at their organization is not their only job function—far from it!  Two participants, 
P2 and P3, estimated spending a minimal amount time (2% or less of their time) preventing 
social engineering vulnerabilities.  The IS professionals working in security roles estimated that 
approximately half their time was spent working on cybersecurity tasks, with the prevention of 
social engineering tasks being lumped in with all other security-related activities.  So what else 
are IS professionals doing?  The participants in banking laughed heartily when posed this 
question, claiming, “Our hands are just about in everything.”  P1 also talked about wearing 
“many hats.”  Preventing social engineering attacks makes up only a fraction of work IS 
professionals do—even less when the role is not security-oriented.   
Theme 6: An invisible impact.  According to most participants in this study, because a 
lot of the work IS professionals do is behind the scenes, it often goes unnoticed by everyone else 
in the organization.  And while they wholeheartedly believe their work is “impactful” to their 
organization, the work is also “hard to quantify.”  P1, a security professional, likened the work IS 
professionals do to “laying sewer pipe,” explaining that “No one cares about the sewer pipe, but 
they do care that the toilet flushes.”  Essentially, the work IS professionals perform to defend 
their organization against social engineering attacks is not easy to measure or report on in terms 
of typical business objectives.  So, even the social engineering or security risks faced by the 
company are considerably reduced, often there is no acknowledgement or reward for this 
significant achievement.   
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Research question 3.  “What common meaning do IS professionals ascribe to the 
experiences of preventing social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses?”  From five 
verbatim transcripts, 85 significant statements were extracted to address RQ3.  Table 5 includes 
examples of significant statements with their derived meaning.   
Table 5 
Selected Examples of Significant Statements for RQ3 
Significant Statement Meaning 
So, in a sense, everyone is responsible for 
preventing it.  Obviously, we go through the 
training, you know, communicate--even if you 
didn't fall for it--we still got to communicate it to 
IT so they can let everybody else know, so 
nobody else falls for it.  So, in a sense everyone. 
Every person in the company is a steward of the 
company's data.  Everybody is responsible for 
preventing SE attacks. 
I believe that the amount of time that we devote to 
the function is--it corresponds to our size and 
complexity.  I think if our size or complexity 
increases, then so will the resources that we--it's a 
direct--it's a proportional relationship. 
Given our situation, the resources we direct 
towards preventing SE attacks is appropriate. 
So I am--I am very pleased.  Obviously, the 
banner was, I think, a genius idea.  That--that's 
played a huge role, and just kind of, at least the 
internal--because that's what we were getting a lot 
of it first more so than the outward coming in type 
of attacks.  It was, you know, someone posing as 
the CEO or someone posing as her husband or, 
you know, or as me or whatever.  So that’s been a 
hundred percent successful, in that case.  And so, 
I'm very, very pleased with that.   
Improving sometimes means making minor 
changes--that sometimes make a big impact! 
 [Policies and Procedures are] the way you live 
and die with security. It’s extremely important. 
The company lives and dies through their policies 
and procedures. 
You’ll never eliminate it. <<shakes head no>> 
You’ll never eliminate it…..  <<continues to 
shake head—direct eye contact>> 
You can never eliminate all the risks. 
 
 
Significant statements were then arranged into clusters, resulting in three themes.  Table 
6 contains examples of the theme clusters that emerged from their derived meanings.  
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Table 6 
Theme Clusters with Related Derived Meaning for RQ3 
To Protect and Serve Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger Risky Business 
Every person in the company 
is a steward of the company's 
data.   
Given our situation, the resources we 
direct towards preventing SE attacks 
is appropriate. 
Training helps, but it's never 
going to be 100% effective.   
Everybody is responsible for 
preventing SE attacks. 
Improving sometimes means making 
minor changes--that sometimes make 
a big impact! 
People are the weakest link 
and the greatest risk. 
Protecting our company from 
SE attacks means protecting 
our reputation. 
I'm proud of the improvements we've 
made to strengthen our company. 
It actually helps a security 
culture when the people of an 
organization are a bit 
skeptical and don't trust. 
Part of defending the 
organization is being an 
ambassador for security. 
There will always be things we can 
improve. 
You can never eliminate all 
the risks. 
Finding ways to keep people 
accountable is an important 
step in keeping the 
organization safe. 
We're continuously finding new ways 
to improve. 
All our defenses cannot 
protect someone who doesn't 
protect themselves. 
The experience/background of 
the IS professional makes a 
difference in how they 
address SE attacks. 
You can never eliminate all the risks; 
you can only keep improving. 
Policies and procedures help 
reduce risk, but they also 
cannot eliminate risk. 
 
Theme 7: To protect and serve.  Every participant in the study shared the belief that their 
role was to protect the organization and its stakeholders in whatever way their position and role 
allowed.  Yet, they also all believed limitations existed on their ability to fully protect the 
company from social engineering attacks on their own.  Each believed that every single person in 
the company is responsible for defending the organization against social engineering attacks, and 
they also shared that it was impossible to protect people who do not protect themselves.  P1 
called his role as an IS professional to be an “ambassador for security,” and P3 called herself a 
“gatekeeper.”  As far as the people of the organization, participants shared the belief that people 
are “imperfect,” the “weakest link,” or the “greatest risk,” but they are also the “stewards” of 
their organization’s data in all their interactions inside and outside the organization.  In sum, IS 
accepts their responsibility for protecting and defending the company from attacks, but they 
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cannot do it alone.  Everyone at the company has a responsibility to defend the organization 
against social engineering attacks.   
Theme 8: Harder, better, faster, stronger.  Every participant in this study also credited 
continuous improvement as critical to successfully preventing social engineering vulnerabilities 
in U.S. businesses.  Participants found intrinsic value in refining and improving the current 
situation at their workplace.  P4 said, “I find value in what I do….  I see constant steps toward 
improvement, and I find reward in a continual process of improvement.  We’re better than we 
were yesterday.  And tomorrow we’ll be better than we are today.”  Likewise, P1, from the 
healthcare sector, after explaining how frustrating and difficult the challenge of improving the 
security defense at his startup had been, repeatedly emphasized, “It’s much better now than it 
was.”  Continuous improvement, even minor advances, is integral to building a stronger defense 
against social engineering attacks.   
Every participant in the study also shared the belief that that they were doing the best 
they could with the resources they had available at their workplace to address social engineering 
attacks.  Multiple participants referenced the expectations of industry and regulatory standards as 
guiding them towards the appropriate levels of defense, stating that the primary goal is for an 
organization to be “doing your best at the size that you are.”  P4 added, “I believe that the 
amount of time that we devote to the function is--it corresponds to our size and complexity.  I 
think if our size or complexity increases, then so will the resources.”  So, while not everyone has 
access to the same level of resources to defend an organization against social engineering 
attacks, most participants believed they are doing the best they can with the resources they have 
at their disposal.  
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Theme 9: Risky business.  When considering the experience of preventing social 
engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses, participants commonly ascribed their belief that 
one can never eliminate the potential risk of a social engineering attack as influencing why they 
continually strived to improve their defenses.  Still, all agreed they still had the power to reduce 
risks.  P4, the participant from banking who had previous experience working in the risk 
department, was most adamant in his assertion,  
The only way to eliminate risk is risk avoidance by not conducting the activity.  <leans 
forward>> And the absence of activity creates no risk.  Which is actually—it does create 
risk, because then you have the risk of not providing a product or service. 
In attempting to reduce risks, participants again referenced the importance of 
communication, training, and education, as helpful, yet limited in that it could never be 100% 
effective.  P3 attributed the existence of strong policies and procedures to forcing them to slow 
down “enough to where you had to think it through some more.”  Similarly, back in banking, P5 
endorsed policies and procedures as “the way you live and die with security.  It’s extremely 
important.”  Because of the nature of social engineering attacks, it is common for IS 
professionals to believe the risk of an attack will never be fully eliminated, only minimized.   
Research question 4.  “What role do circumstances play in the methods chosen by IS 
professionals working in U.S. businesses to decrease security vulnerabilities related to human 
manipulation?”  From five verbatim transcripts, 163 significant statements were extracted to 
address RQ4.  Table 7 includes examples of significant statements with their derived meaning.   
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Table 7 
Selected Examples of Significant Statements for RQ4 
Significant Statement Meaning 
I got kicked in the deep end real quick.  So, there was a lot of 
googling and a lot of calling professionals who … And my degree 
isn’t even IT.  My degree is in New Media and Marketing so--
because I like being on the backend.  I'm more of an introvert, so I 
didn't really want to work with people. I had been in retail.  I was 
sick of people. I wanna go--get me an office or let me play with 
the equipment.  And now you're running the help desk, and guess 
what you're dealing with people.  
The factors and circumstances all 
interact with one another during 
the process of trying to decrease 
security vulnerabilities. 
You know, we don't have escalation procedures, or policies and 
procedures, or committees that are going to review things.   
How well defended an company 
is against attacks is dependent on 
the strength of the policies and 
procedures in place. 
Annual audits—you know they look at that kinda stuff.  And I go 
to all their classes, and they’ll tell you all the different things 
they’re gonna look at.  And so we like to get a jump on that… 
Availability of white papers and 
communication across an industry 
keeps IS professionals aware of 
potential risks and how they 
might be avoided. 
And, that's kind of a common thing too, that I've heard with like 
banks of our size or, you know, smaller and community banks.  
So, they're hiring people, you know, like recruiting people not just 
from their community.  You know, maybe they're outsourcing an 
information security officer….  Like outsourcing it.   
A company's location may 
influence access to resources, 
including trained/experienced 
staff (sophisticated hiring pool). 
Well, I think more heavily regulated, wouldn’t you say? And so, I 
think that's part of it.  Now, obviously, if we weren’t, I mean 
people would still take the measures to be secure.  But I think 
banks are way heavier regulated then even health care, and 
definitely schools! 
The company's industry 
influences how much effort is 
expected by regulators to address 
security vulnerabilities. 
 
Significant statements were then reviewed, resulting in one primary theme.  Table 8 
contains an example of the theme cluster that emerged from their derived meanings.  
Table 8 
Theme Clusters with Related Derived Meaning for RQ4 
It’s Not That Simple 
These factors and circumstances all interact with one another during the process of trying to decrease 
security vulnerabilities. 
As an organization matures, the methods used to decrease vulnerabilities change. 
There are generational differences in employees, which influences how IS professionals communicate 
and train people about risks. 
How well defended an org is against attacks is dependent on the strength of the policies and procedures 
in place. 
The background/experience of an IS professional affects their decisions. 
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Theme 10: It’s not that simple.  It was clearly reported by all participants that 
circumstances made a difference in their ability to address social engineering attacks at their 
organization.  Even so, responses also suggested a complex intermingling of factors rather than 
pointing to a single overriding condition or situation.  For instance, P1 compared his experience 
of being a hired as an IS professional working for a small, rapidly growing startup in small town 
U.S.A. with that of a more mature organization. 
A mature organization--you've got a help desk.  They've got a policy, procedure or, you 
know, you're probably on Enterprise Edition.  You're pushing it all out from the top, you 
know?  We can't spring for Enterprise Edition yet.  We can't deploy things from a central 
location.  We can't use a PXE boot server and create a Windows 10 boot file, right?  
We've got to stand up each machine with a person, and so that requires a person to go 
through their checklist.  So, we're reviewing these all the time.  We're still having to 
manage a staff that handles all the logistics--that hasn't been offloaded to Ops yet.  We're 
doing all the ordering.  All the procurement.  All of that.  Vendor relations so…  I'm the 
only network engineer on staff.  So, standing up a new VPN tunnel, or combine it--we're 
about to drop fiber and combine the networks--so we're doing that.  We're reaching out to 
new security vendors, so vendor management.  All those things are still IT 
management….  So, we have to be VOIP engineers.  We're constantly moving accounts 
around.  We have call center software that sits on top of that cues up calls, right?  We 
have media dashboards that go out to the whole company, and how do you sync all that 
up?  People call us and want to see statistics in real-time, and all of these things.  
Exchange administration--they all have email accounts.  All of these things that other 
companies would be one job.  You would have an exchange administrator.  You would 
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have an Active Directory administrator.  And we have to do it all.  It’s me and two other 
guys.  And so, we do all of that, and then, if there's time, we'll look at security.  Yeah, 
you know, and so we've gotten SIM tools that help to automate, but you still have to have 
a human configure that.   
Similarly, in higher education P3 conceded that being a state-funded institutional often 
meant “scrambling for pencils” due to the ongoing lack of funding, which leads to disputes about 
what the organization should spend those limited resources on.  This, together with the lack of a 
designated person to spearhead the initiative, creates significant barriers to overcome.  In 
contrast, participants from the banking sector believed they have been more successful at 
defending the organization for SE attacks primarily due to being “more heavily regulated” where 
they “have the FDIC or OCC come visit” on a “frequent” basis.  The extensive level of oversight 
joined with being a mature organization with layered security, and ready access to financial 
resources and human capital, creates conditions that allow them to more thoroughly address 
social engineering attacks than experienced by the other participants in the study.  Thus, it can be 
determined that the interaction of various factors creates complex, unique circumstances that 
each organization must operate within as they defend against social engineering attacks, and 
these circumstances can aid or hinder IS professionals as they determine the best way to address 
social engineering attacks given their current means and ability.   
Evaluation of the Findings 
The results of the study were primarily consistent with the body of literature presented in 
Section 1: Foundation of the Study section.  Of the 10 themes derived for the study, seven were 
found to be consistent with the current body of literature.  Three findings did not already appear 
to have been explored in the literature to date, and one of these appeared to be inconsistent with 
143 
 
what has already been written about the subject.  Two subthemes also added new findings to the 
current body of research.   
RQ1 themes.  Three themes were derived for RQ1, “What lived experiences do IS 
professionals have with preventing social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses?”  These 
themes include Theme 1: Security Cultivation, Theme 2: Train, Test, Repeat, and Theme 3: 
Layers, Not Just for Hair.  Theme 1 was further subdivided into two subthemes, Subtheme 1: 
Find a partner, dosey doe and Subtheme 2: Tag!  You’re it.  In the evaluation of each finding, all 
themes were found to be consistent with the body of literature.   
Specifically, for Theme 1, the finding, whereby if an organization hopes to adequately 
defend itself from social engineering attacks its culture must allow and encourage its people to 
ask questions without penalty or chastisement, is consistent with Lineberry (2007) who 
establishes that effective information security is culturally ingrained across an organization.  The 
finding from Theme 2, that to protect an organization from social engineering attacks all 
employees must be trained repeatedly to build awareness and withstand attacks is found strong 
support in studies by Campbell (2017), Peltier (2006), Dahbur et al. (2017), Bauer et al. (2017) 
and Torten et al. (2018).  Last, Theme 3’s finding, that layered security coupled with training 
helps IS professionals prevent and minimize damage from social engineering attacks is in line 
with multi-layered security program literature as discussed by Berti (2003), Chitrey et al. (2012), 
Conteh and Schmick (2016), and Amsden and Chen (2012).   
RQ1 subthemes.  Of the two subthemes for Theme 1, the first subtheme, which suggests 
a need to build strategic relationships is consistent with the study by Hagel (2014), who validated 
the importance of organizational leadership being on board and supporting the security culture.  
This first subtheme somewhat differs from Hagel’s viewpoint, though, in that the participants in 
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the current study also found it necessary to form strategic relationships with people in non-
leadership positions.  Accordingly, this subtheme adds a new construct to the 2014 Hagel study.  
Additionally, the second subtheme for Theme 1, the finding that it is essential for an enterprise to 
designate someone with the responsibility of building and cultivating a stronger security culture 
is unique to the current study.  More often, research designated the responsibility as a function of 
the security team or to information security workers in general (BLS OOS, 2018b), and, as a 
result, this finding builds on the body of literature that focuses on the role, function, and best 
practices of IS professionals attempting to defend their organization against social engineering 
attacks. 
RQ2 themes.  While all ten themes, when combined, capture the overall essence of the 
experience of the phenomenon, three themes were derived from participant interviews to directly 
address RQ2, “What is the essence of the shared experience of IS professionals in preventing 
social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. businesses?”  These themes include Theme 4: Camping 
101, Theme 5: Worker Bees, and Theme 6: An Invisible Impact.  Of the three themes described 
in this section, Theme 5, the finding that preventing social engineering attacks makes up only a 
fraction of work IS professionals do, is supported in the previous research surrounding work 
overload, occupational stress, and the IS worker (Agbonluae et al., 2017; Moore, 2000).   
New findings.  While previous research supports the need for investing in prevention and 
controls to reduce the threat of social engineering attacks (Brown, 2018; ISACA, 2016; 
Ponemon, 2017b), research does not yet appear to have identified the shared perspective of IS 
professionals presented in Themes 4 and 6.  It should be noted that the perspective of IS 
professionals captured in Theme 4 seems to fall in opposition to that expressed in the literature.  
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Additionally, the finding in Theme 6 may offer additional insight into why some IS professionals 
experience higher levels of occupational stress and work exhaustion (Shih et al., 2013). 
RQ3 themes.  Three themes were derived for RQ3, “What common meaning do IS 
professionals ascribe to the experiences of preventing social engineering vulnerabilities in U.S. 
businesses?”  These themes include Theme 7: To Protect and Serve, Theme 8: Harder, Faster, 
Better, Stronger, and Theme 9: Risky Businesses.  Of the three findings for this RQ, Themes 7 
and 8 were found to be consistent with the body of literature that recognized social engineering 
attacks as a problem everyone in the company needs to address (Mouton et al., 2016; Hagel, 
2014; Proof Point, 2018; Huber et al., 2009; Indrajit, 2017; Mann, 2017) and that continuous 
improvement is integral to building a strong defense against social engineering attacks (Gardner 
&Thomas, 2014).  The findings in Theme 8 were also consistent with the conceptual framework 
of the study, which touched on the importance of continuously improving to stay ahead of 
rapidly evolving social engineering attacks.  The shared belief and perspective presented in 
Theme 9, that social engineering attacks can never be fully eliminated, is a finding that has not 
been previously noted in the literature.   
RQ4 themes.  One theme was derived for RQ4, “What role do circumstances play in the 
methods chosen by IS professionals working in U.S. businesses to decrease security 
vulnerabilities related to human manipulation?”  This theme, Theme 10: It’s Not That Simple, 
finds some consistency with the body of literature, which lends support to the added 
complexities encountered by IS professionals surrounded by the growing presence of cybercrime 
directed at the businesses (Amsden & Chen, 2012; Indrajit, 2017; Kshetri, 2006).  Still, current 
research tends to focus on individual factors, like availability of financial resources or human 
capital (Brown, 2018; Moore, 2000; Poneman, 2017; Berti, 2003), and less social engineering 
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research has touched on the intermingling of factors and how these intertwined factors produce 
the decisions made by IS professionals to address social engineering vulnerabilities at their 
company.  Many of the complexities discussed by participants aligned very closely with the 
types of information organizations use to determine the appropriate corporate and competitive 
strategy for their unique situation (Gamble et al., 2015).   
Conceptual framework.  Results of the study were also consistent with the conceptual 
framework presented in Section 1: Foundation of the Study.  The framework consisted of four 
key parts: (a) anticipatory cybersecurity; (b) the social engineering defensive framework 
(SEDF); (c) beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intention; and (d) occupational stress.  The findings 
supported the role of anticipatory cybersecurity in allowing the business to offset social 
engineering attacks (Rege et al., 2017), but participants also recognized their current 
circumstances did not always make this ideal state feasible.  In fact, only the participants from 
the banking sector appeared to have achieved this state.   
SEDF.  Still, while achieving a state of anticipatory cybersecurity was not always 
attainable, all participants utilized some form of continuous improvement, not unlike the SEDF 
continuous improvement cycle described by Gardner and Thomas (2014) to keep finding ways to 
become better.  Although, when considering the four phases of the SEDF in light of the 
responses given by participants, much more emphasis was placed on the third phase, educating 
the workforce, than the other three phases (determine exposure, evaluate defenses, and 
streamline existing technology and policies).  The framework appears to assume that companies 
are mature enough to have established and documented current policies, which was not 
necessarily the case with all participants in the current study.  A few participants emphasized the 
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need to create technology and policies, but less was mentioned about streamlining existing 
technology and policies.   
Beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions.  The findings fully supported the role of 
beliefs and attitudes in motivating the behavior of the participants in this study.  Belief that the 
risk from social engineering attacks were real, scary and dangerous, but still avoidable motivated 
IS professionals to install controls and educate their workforce.  Belief that they needed to 
improve the current situation for their organization led IS professionals to ask for funding, 
change their tactics to better sell the security culture, and push back or find creative solutions to 
the resistance to important security changes.  Possessing an attitude that they were invested in the 
organization and responsible for its outcomes, inspired participants to accept their part in 
protecting the organization, learn from mistakes, and stimulate a stronger security culture.   
Occupational stress.  The findings in the study were also consistent with the research 
surrounding IS professionals and occupational stress, especially as they related to the high level 
of responsibilities and job demands placed upon these workers.  Occupational stress continues to 
be a concern for some IS workers, as indicated by Agbonluae et al. (2017).  Yet, while most 
participants admitted to being involved in “everything” or wearing “many hats,” only one 
discussed feeling emotionally exhausted from the experience.  Just as Moore pointed out in his 
2000 study, this participant believed his work overload partially stemmed from the inadequate 
staff and deficient resources available to him at his workplace. 
Triangulation.  Triangulation was achieved in the research process in three steps.  First, 
the researcher’s point of view was captured during a self-reflection journaling process, whereby 
the researcher used the research questions and interview questions as guided journal prompts, 
responding with her thoughts, personal experiences, beliefs and biases.  Second, the researcher 
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gathered evidence from study participants through the interview process.  As will be seen in the 
following section, study participants came from three distinct industries, across various IS 
functions.  Each had unique backgrounds and lived experiences that were collected and 
transcribed, then analyzed, coded, and compared.  Additionally, verbatim transcriptions were 
shared with participants, and member checking was used to validate the transcript for accuracy.  
The third step of the triangulation process is the presentation of the findings to readers of the 
study.  According to Creswell and Poth (2018), to complete triangulation, the description of the 
phenomenon allows readers of the study to visualize whether the findings might be applied, or 
transferred, to other situations.  Thus, triangulation has been addressed in this study by capturing 
and presenting the points of views of the researcher, participants, and readers. 
Saturation.  According to van Manen (2016), data saturation in phenomenological 
studies depends on having enough “experientially rich accounts” (p. 353) to sufficiently present 
the essence of the phenomenon to readers.  The researcher realized saturation had been reached 
after significant statements had been extracted to enable the researcher to address each RQ and 
write a rich description of the essence of the phenomenon, as experienced by the participants.  In 
all, five interviews were conducted with six participants, where two participants (a male and 
female) from each industry were represented in the study.  The data analysis process was 
completed after five in-depth interviews, which is when the researcher determined the ten themes 
and subthemes fully captured the experiences of IS professionals defending their organization 
against social engineering attacks.   
Analysis and Implications 
This phenomenological study was designed to discover what the shared experience of IS 
professionals defending their organization against social engineering attacks is like.  What has 
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been presented is the experiences of the study participants, rather than the interpretations of the 
researcher.  This section consists of the analysis and implications of the findings, which will 
conclude with a summary of the essence of the phenomenon.  
Analysis of RQ1 findings.  Results of RQ1 were assimilated into an overall framework 
of the lived experience of IS professionals working to prevent social engineering attacks on their 
organization.  The combined themes indicate that, initially, the lived experience begins with 
establishing a security culture by opening lines of communication and building strategic 
relationships inside and outside of the organization.  From there, IS professionals utilize 
whatever resources they have at their disposal to spread awareness of social engineering attacks 
and the role each person plays in preventing these attacks throughout the company.  IS 
professionals accomplish this through regular, repeated testing.  Lastly, IS professionals 
recognize they are operating within certain constraints.  For instance, no matter how often 
employees receive training, humans remain the weakest human link in the security chain.  For 
that reason, they seek to protect the organization using layered controls in hopes that if one or 
more layer of security is penetrated, another layer will catch and eliminate the threat.  Even so, 
the need for stronger controls and situational constraints have pushed IS professionals to 
investigate and leverage outsourcing opportunities to enhance their security layers beyond what 
they could otherwise do themselves.   
Implications of RQ1 findings.  Stakeholders stand to benefit from these findings 
through increased investigations into the differences between those who have created a stronger 
security culture and those who struggle to do so.  The findings also provide guidance IS 
professionals attempting to change or improve their current culture, including taking special care 
to address communication issues, build strategic relationships, and designate a primary person 
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with the responsibility of managing all aspects of information security.  The second finding, 
Theme 2, informs stakeholders of the need for ongoing, consistent, and repetitive training to 
build a stronger defense against social engineering attacks.  This finding presents the opportunity 
for IS professionals and researchers not only to invest in more social engineering-related training 
materials, but also to find ways to more readily disseminate and share materials among all 
businesses and IS professionals.  The third theme and final finding of RQ1 recognizes that while 
training is important, it will never be enough.  This finding lends support to the installation of as 
many layers of controls as within the means of the organization, so that when an attack breaches 
the initial line of defense, the subsequent layers of electronic controls will catch it before it does 
further damage. 
Analysis of RQ2 findings.  The combined themes, Theme 4: Camping 101, Theme 5: 
Worker Bees, and Theme 6: An Invisible Impact, flow together to form the core of the essence of 
the experience of IS professionals working to defend an organization against social engineering 
attacks.  The findings from this section offer key insights into how social engineering attacks are 
viewed by IS professionals operating in U.S. businesses--pesky, yet unavoidable.  Feelings about 
this phenomenon fluctuated between “frustrating,” “annoying,” and “difficult” to feeling “lucky” 
they were in the right place at the right time to quickly remediate an attack.  While not every 
participant claimed to spend a significant amount of time defending their organization against 
social engineering attacks, each accepted that they played some part.  Also, participants admitted 
to wearing “many hats” and having an active role “in every department,” stating “there’s pretty 
much nothing we don’t do.”   
Finally, even though they were actively involved in “just about everything,” often, the 
progress made by IS professionals to secure and protect the organization goes unnoticed or 
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unrecognized by leadership because it can only be quantified when something bad happens.  
Participants in this study acknowledged that validation for their work protecting the organization 
usually comes from a sense of internal pride from looking back over their accomplishments to 
seek how far they have come, knowing that everything is working, or being recognized by 
external peers who understand how “thankless” it can be when “laying sewer pipe.”  While some 
participants in this study were more inclined to avoid the “limelight,” others found themselves 
battling “depression and anxiety” stemming from the working conditions coupled with the fact 
that “nobody cares.”   
Implications of RQ2 findings.  These findings shed light on the fact that IS 
professionals are extremely busy workers who rely on everyone in their company to help with 
the defense against social engineering attacks.  Understanding the need and frustrations that 
result from attempting to have everyone on board may help more stakeholders recognize their 
personal role and contribution to protecting the company, which in turn, could strengthen the 
overall defense of the organization.  These findings are also significant, because they shed light 
on a potential need to find better ways to quantify the work that security professionals do.  
Finding ways to better support IS professionals by recognizing their value and contribution to the 
success of the organization may help to combat some of the negative feelings when experience 
work overload. 
Analysis of RQ3 findings.  IS professionals were clear—they cannot protect the 
organization alone.  And all the training, electronic controls, policies and procedures, resources, 
another other defenses cannot help people who will not help or change themselves.  All 
participants acknowledged that everyone--from the top of the organization to the bottom, across 
to customers and vendors--is responsible for protecting the organization from social engineering 
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attacks.  Each participant felt they were doing the best they can at their current level of resources.  
Still, seeking new ways to improve and get better—to make the lives of everyone around them 
better—is also a way of life for the IS professionals in this study.  Like the use of the SEDF by 
Gardner and Thomas (2014), every participant sought ways to improve their current level of 
defense against social engineering attacks within the scope of there IS role and function.  Indeed, 
some of their frustrations stemmed directly from the resistance they received from the very same 
people they were attempting to make life easier on.  They nearly all agreed that it was impossible 
to eliminate risk, but working together with their various stakeholders, significant progress could 
minimize the threat.  It should be noted that in most cases, it seemed this perspective, that risk 
was impossible to eliminate, drove the need to continuously find better way to improve and 
enhance their defenses as they strived to stay ahead of the curve as the participants responded 
social engineering threats. 
Implications of RQ3 findings.  The findings for RQ3 are important, because it 
recognizes the limitations places on IS professionals in this phenomenon.  IS professionals are 
fully dependent on everyone else being aware of potential attacks in the moment, not sharing 
passwords, and not clicking on questionable links.  They have no control in these areas.  While 
IS workers might install more controls, some may be limited by financial resources or 
manpower.  Understanding it is important to train or guide actions, but not every IS professional 
has time to write the training materials or document their policies and procedures in addition to 
their other ongoing IS duties.  Moreover, even if IS professionals communicate and train, they 
may be limited by resistance to changing the way things have already been done.  There will 
always be limitations for IS professionals striving for a more secure organization.  Still, it is 
important for IS professionals to understand that others have faced similar circumstances and 
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have made their situation better by leaning on the incremental improvement process, rolling out 
changes bit by bit.  If it can happen at one organization, it can happen at another. 
Analysis of RQ4 findings.  In addressing RQ4, it was clear that all participants believed 
the circumstances they found themselves in influenced their ability to defend their organization 
against social engineering attacks, and that these beliefs and attitudes motivated their behaviors, 
as described by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) in the conceptual framework.  It was much less clear 
how much one factor, such as role, resources, background/experience, or industry expectations, 
contributed to their overall ability to defend against such attacks.  As the only theme for RQ4 
suggests, the responses of the participants indicate that multiple, interwoven factors are at play 
when IS professionals consider the best ways to protect their company from social engineering 
attacks, and with so many factors interacting at once, solving one problem may result in a 
dilemma, where other areas are negatively affected even though one issue might be resolved 
(Bergquist & Mura, 2011). 
Implications of RQ4 findings.  These findings are important to stakeholders because not 
every decision related to defending an organization against social engineering attacks is cut and 
dry.  This finding is key to understanding why some IS professionals successfully anticipate and 
plug security vulnerabilities while others struggle to react and remediate fast enough, as 
discussed in the conceptual framework.  Not having a clear cut, easy solution that does not 
negatively affect other parts of the organization makes decision-making more difficult, and 
difficult decisions take time to resolve.  Still research has been shown to help investigators 
understand and predict the behaviors of people, which could provide further insights into the 
phenomenon (Ajzen, 1991).  
154 
 
Summary of the Analysis 
According to participants, the lived experience of protecting an organization against 
social engineering attacks involves unifying all the people of an organization to work together by 
employing open communication, continuous education and testing, and strong policies and 
procedures, coupled with an amalgamation of layered technology and electronic controls.  At the 
heart of the shared experience is the acknowledgement by participants that social engineering 
attacks are unavoidable, the risk of a social engineering attack will never be eliminated and IS 
professionals cannot protect the organization and the people of the organization alone.  
Moreover, participants voiced that entwined factors, including maturity, location, resources, 
manpower, experience, regulations, and industry, also influenced the circumstances and limited 
their ability to address their social engineering vulnerabilities at any given moment.  
Consequently, it is more difficult for some IS professionals to deal with social engineering 
attacks using the more effective anticipatory approach (Rege et al., 2017).  Nonetheless, 
participants also shared the desire and drive to keep improving and making the situation better, 
often finding success in the incremental improvement process, such as the described in Gardner 
and Thomas’ (2014) SEDF. 
Understanding the lived experiences of IS professionals for the current phenomenon is 
important for stakeholders seeking to prepare a stronger, anticipatory defense against social 
engineering attacks at their organization, because establishing a strong defense system is not a 
straightforward task.  The new complications can increase the already existing occupational 
stressors that stem from an already significant level of responsibilities often experienced by IS 
professionals (Messersmith, 2007).  Not considering the significance of the work involved to 
better protect an organization against social engineering vulnerabilities, could potentially lead to 
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overwork and emotional exhaustion, which has been linked to reduced worker productivity 
(Donald et al., 2005).  Furthermore, recognizing what other IS professionals have already 
experienced can help a stakeholder to better prepare for some of the frustrations that have 
already been encountered by others, possibly helping them to avoid potential pitfalls by learning 
from someone else.   
It is also important for stakeholders to consider the beliefs and attitudes in comparison 
with their own beliefs and attitudes, as human behaviors can be predicted by attitudes and 
behavioral intentions (Ajzen, 1991).  For instance, knowing that participants believe that social 
engineering risks will never be eliminated and that IS professionals cannot tackle the issue alone 
is important for stakeholders to understand that defense entails a culture change, which must start 
at the top and trickle down.  Consequently, because shared beliefs and attitudes point to 
predictable actions and patterns (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991), practitioners can seek 
out the actions and patterns of those with similar beliefs and use their results to learn and 
improve upon.   
Finally, it also helps for stakeholders to understand that much of the work that IS 
professionals do is hard to quantify, invisible unless something goes wrong.  Stakeholders who 
understand this quality of IS work can seek better ways to acknowledge, support, and quantify 
the work of IS professionals.  Addressing this issue has the potential to produce positive results 
for the morale of the IS function, which can have positive benefits the organization at large, as 
discussed in the occupational stress research conducted with IS workers (Moore, 2000; Donald et 
al., 2005; Johnson & Hall, 1988; Karasek, 1979; Karasek & Theorell, 1990; Salanova et al., 
2002; Moen et al., 2016).   
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Applications to Professional Practice 
 This last section addresses how the findings of the study are applicable to business and 
industry.  First, the recommendations for action are presented.  Next, the recommendations for 
further study are considered.  Third, reflections on the researcher’s experience throughout the 
research process are discussed.  Finally, the section concludes with a summary and study 
conclusions. 
Recommendations for action.  Primarily, it is expected that the results may offer 
relevant insights and applicable recommendations to IS professionals and organizational 
leadership.  The conclusions may also be applicable to HR professionals, or those responsible for 
the training and education activities of the organization.  Any organizations or industries that 
currently consider themselves to be highly vulnerable to social engineering attacks may also 
benefit from the recommended actions and insights disclosed in this section.  Recommendations 
also address the role of educators, consultants, vendors, and researchers, calling them to action in 
tackling the dearth of widely available training materials.  All these groups, as well as students, 
may be impacted by the results of this study. 
Designated IS security personnel.  The findings indicate a need for every organization to 
designate someone with the responsibility of dealing with information security, which includes 
preventing social engineering attacks building a stronger security culture.  It is recommended 
that business and IS leadership take a closer look at the current situation to determine if it is 
possible to create such a position.  For those unable to create a new position or hire new 
personnel to fill that role for the company, then it is recommended for these persons to determine 
whether outsourcing might help relieve certain duties or to investigate whether current 
responsibilities and staff might be reorganized to fill this need. 
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Incremental improvements.  In terms of things IS professionals are already doing right, 
the findings support the continued use of continuous improvement processes to strengthen the 
defenses of the organizations.  For the most part, the recommendation is for IS professionals 
engaging in these continuous improvement activities to keep doing what they are doing, only to 
focus additional efforts towards reducing areas most vulnerable to social engineering attacks.  
For IS professionals struggling to improve given their current level of resources or situational 
circumstances, it is recommended for them to investigate how other IS professionals in their 
industry are using continuous improvement processes to defend against social engineering 
attacks to determine if some of these activities can be applied to their situation. 
Establish training partnerships.  The findings indicate that prevention of social 
engineering attacks is heavily reliant on training, an activity not all organizations can create 
themselves.  It is recommended that educators, vendors, and consultants seek out and invest in 
opportunities to create and offer training materials and seminars that can be used by any 
company operating in any industry, possibly developing a repository of training materials that 
can help organizations with fewer resources gain access to tools that will help them strengthen 
their defense.  It is also suggested that organizations and IS leadership seek to partner with these 
persons or groups to determine the best and most effective training methods for everyone. 
Spread awareness.  As shown in the Camping 101 theme, it is now understood that 
anyone operating or engaged in business in the U.S. is at risk to be attacked by a social engineer.  
The question is no longer if, but when.  Thus, it is recommended for educators at all levels where 
technology and the Internet are being used to accomplish class-related tasks, to incorporate social 
engineering awareness and prevention throughout the curriculum.  This is especially relevant for 
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educators of business and CIS instructors in postsecondary institutions, as these are the future 
leaders and employees of U.S. businesses.   
Educators might accomplish this through an initial introduction of the topic prior to using 
any new technology or tool with online capabilities.  It is recommended that educators engage 
business practitioners as guest lecturers who can clearly describe the risks that social engineering 
poses to students and their families.  It is also suggested that the educators follow up with 
handouts and hands-on assignments, potentially incorporating a testing component.  For students 
in elementary through secondary school, it is recommended that additional training sessions be 
held with parents to ensure they understand their role in protecting the student and themselves 
from the risks of social engineering attacks that could occur using these devices.  Informational 
handouts discussing the risks and ways to prevent social engineering attacks should be shared 
directly with parents whose children will be using technology during the school year.  
Furthermore, it is recommended that a section be dedicated to the prevention of social 
engineering attacks the policies and procedures handbook for students, parents, and faculty. 
Require minimum social engineering training.  Across all industries, it is recommended 
that new employees receive, at a minimum, an initial introductory course to social engineering 
and the risks they pose to the organization.  The training should be included with typical HR new 
hire training, whereby employees are made aware of the expectations of the organization 
regarding how an employee should be aware of the risk and how to act if they suspect an attack 
attempt.  It is also recommended for organizations to require employees, especially those with 
access to the Internet, social networks, email, and company networks, to participate in an annual 
or biennial refresher course, depending on the role of the employee and the risk they pose to the 
organization, should they be targeted by a social engineer.  While the primary group affected by 
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this recommendation is the HR staff, as they may be required to invest in or create the training 
materials in addition to leading the training sessions, it is also recommended for the IS team to be 
involved in this process to ensure new employees know the process of who to call and how to 
communicate with the IS team in case of an incident.  
Additional testing.  For companies with access to greater resources, additional testing or 
interactive learning opportunities are recommended to cement the learning process for 
employees.  For those with access to fewer resources, finding additional ways to keep the risk in 
the forefront of employee minds, such as quarterly email reminders or lunch and learn 
professional development opportunities, may be more applicable and cost-effective solutions.  A 
final recommendation for those seeking lower-budget solutions to spread more awareness about 
social engineering would be to investigate outside assistance from educators or even students and 
interns attempting to build their skills and proficiencies through experiential or service-learning.  
Allowing them to develop the training materials and lead the training sessions enables both the 
business and student to partner together to achieve their goals. 
Sharing is caring.  Participants in this study believed in the importance of learning and 
growing from their experiences after having experienced a social engineering attack.  
Communication with employees, venders, and other IS professionals was considered key to this 
learning process.  Participants signed up for email newsfeeds related to industry cyberattacks, 
and they used the information shared in these messages to plug holes they were not initially 
aware were an issue.  Others attending meetings or conferences and spoke with vendors, 
customers, and even auditors.  From each encounter, participants gleaned more from other’s 
experiences and close encounters and found new ideas to improve their own circumstances.  To 
this end, it is recommended for IS professionals to seek as many opportunities to talk with one 
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another and share their experiences openly with one another and with the employees across their 
company using various dissemination methods, such as email, lunch and learns, targeted training 
sessions, departmental visitations, Q&A sessions, conferences, and more.   
Stronger policies and procedures.  Participants confirmed that stronger policies and 
procedures was essential to cultivating a strong defensive stance against social engineering 
attacks.  Accordingly, the final recommendation to action is for IS professionals to carefully 
review current policies and procedures related to social engineering across their organization.  IS 
professionals should compare internal policies and procedures against the standards found not 
only within the industry they operate, but also across other industries, giving special notice to the 
policies and procedures required by industries with the highest regulatory requirements.  Once 
the comparison is complete, IS professionals are encouraged to any adopt best practices, policies, 
and procedures that lie within their current level of resources and capability, taking note of any 
out of reach that might be implemented at a future date.  Last, it is advised that IS professionals 
include the review and update of social engineering policies and procedures as part of their 
ongoing continuous improvement processes. 
Recommendations for further study.  In terms of future research opportunities, it is 
important to recognize the limitations of the current study.  The study was centered on three 
industries in a very narrow geographic region, specifically, the central to northwest regions of 
Louisiana.  Participants were primarily from small and medium sized businesses located in rural 
communities.  Consequently, the voices of participants this study may not accurately reflect the 
voices of those persons working at larger companies located in more populated, metropolitan 
regions or states.  Hence, opportunities exist to replicate the study in other regions and states to 
see if the findings are consistent in other industries and for a group of participants not included in 
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the current study.  It would be interesting to see a study targeting larger, more mature enterprises 
with access to greater resources to determine if the findings remain consistent. 
Qualitative phenomenological inquiry.  This study was qualitative in nature, with the 
goal of understanding the experience of IS professionals as they defend their organization from 
social engineering attacks.  Every inquiry style comes with its own limitations.  For instance, the 
current phenomenological study is limited by its inability to determine if relationships exist 
between some of the variables identified in the study.  This could be addressed in future research 
using a quantitative or mixed methods methodology.  Unlike grounded theory studies, which is 
characterized by the generation of a theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1997; Stake, 2010), 
phenomenological studies primarily seek to understand what a shared phenomenon is like.  A 
next logical step following this study might be to use a grounded theory approach to look more 
closely at the data to discover a theory about the shared experience of IS professionals in this 
phenomenon.  Thus, it is recommended that future researchers build on the results of the current 
study by determine which other research lens will offer greater insights to the experience of IS 
professionals defending their organization against social engineering attacks. 
Attitudes are everything.  It is also recommended for researchers to perform a nationwide 
mixed methods survey focused on widespread believes and attitudes of business professionals 
towards social engineering and cyber security attacks at large.  Research could focus solely on IS 
professionals, business professionals, or on comparing the beliefs and attitudes between IS and 
business professionals.  Some of these thoughts, beliefs, and attitudes are currently captured 
across the annual cybersecurity surveys (Ponemon, 2017b; Proof Point, 2018; IBM, 2016; IDG, 
2015), but the further research should determine how common these beliefs and attitudes exist 
and why IS professionals hold these beliefs.  To accomplish this, a researcher would need to 
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develop a synthesized, comprehensive list of beliefs and attitudes from current studies and 
develop a survey to administer to practitioners.  Additionally, because beliefs, attitudes, and 
behavioral intention can predict behavioral actions, it is recommended for researchers to seek out 
links between these beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral patterns.  A study like this may offer 
additional insights to researchers and practitioners trying to better understand the phenomenon. 
Social engineering prevention focus.  Participants in the study indicated that training is 
everything to prevention, and that not every organization had the same level of access to the 
materials needed to prevent an attack.  Indeed, at least one participant was responsible for 
writing their own training material.  To better help businesses with limited resources and access 
to social engineering training materials, it is recommended for researchers to investigate what 
training materials dedicated to social engineering prevention presently exists, and to what extent 
these materials are available across all business and industries.   
Establishing a security culture.  Participants described the difficulties encountered as 
they attempted to transition from a non-security culture to a security-minded culture.  
Understanding what the experience is like as they make this transition may help businesses better 
steer through the potential landmines that have been encountered by their sister enterprises.  To 
accomplish this, a phenomenological study investigating the experience of IS professionals as 
they lead an organization through this transition would be recommended to help capture and 
understand the lived experiences of IS professionals navigating this transition. 
Who is at the helm?  In addition, because the findings indicate the importance of having a 
designated security person leading the transition from insecure to secure against social 
engineering vulnerabilities, a mixed methods study investigating how many organizations 
currently employ a dedicated IS information security lead.  During this investigation, it is 
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recommended for the researcher to examine the differences between companies with and without 
dedicated personnel in terms of the level of defenses in place.  The study should discuss the level 
and quality of training and prevention activities as well as electronic controls. 
Reflections.  In tackling this project, the researcher attempted to extract personal biases 
by bracketing these into an epoche, presented earlier in the study.  To accomplish this task, the 
researcher used the research and interview questions as journal prompts, in which she responded 
with her personal thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and personal experiences.  In doing so, this allowed 
the researcher to approach each interview with an openness and desire to hear to the voices of the 
participants rather than to push forth her own views.  Still, the researcher experienced moments 
during every interview where her personal experiences and viewpoints were either challenged or 
completely unraveled.   
Additionally, the researcher discovered after conducting the first interviews, she had 
unexpectedly adopted some of the attitudes, beliefs, and biases of previous participants, as she 
found her seeking similar experiences with subsequent participants.  Again, the researcher found 
herself impressed when, yet again, these adopted notions and biases were challenged by the latest 
participant.  Upon further reflection, even though the researcher was initially concerned that her 
biases may have inadvertently influenced the participants, she was also pleased that participants 
felt comfortable enough with her and the interview process to immediately correct any inaccurate 
or biased statements that did not align with their lived experience.  This demonstrated to the 
researcher that participants accepted their responsibility to honestly and accurately convey their 
true experiences, rather than simply to accept and confirm those presented to them.  Next, the 
researcher reflects on the key insights and takeaways from the research process. 
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Overwhelmed? Not so much.  The responses from participants were not in line with what 
the researcher initially expected to receive.  For instance, the researcher expected that more 
participants would share feelings of overwhelm and overwork in relation to their ability to 
address social engineering attacks in additional to the other takes they were juggling daily.  Of 
the six participants, only one expressed these types of feelings, but he also fully admitted that his 
experience could easily stem from the constant changes experienced by an IS professionals 
working for a rapidly growing startup.  A few participants expressed a sincere appreciation for 
their company and the people they work with.  Most appeared invested and content, rather than 
overworked and overwhelmed. 
Menace, indeed.  The researcher also initially believed, after reading the alarming 
portrayal of social engineering and cyber-attacks in the literature, that participants would be 
more disturbed by social engineering attacks and the risks they posed to their organization.  
Given the terrifying portrayal of this menace in the body of research, the investigator was 
completely taken aback by the unruffled responses indicating they had accepted social 
engineering attacks were simply a fact of life.  But then, after further reflection, perhaps it should 
not have been so surprising that none of the participants had time to sit around and worry about 
social engineering attacks, given the varied roles and the significant amount of responsibility 
each juggled regularly.   
Unexpected need.  The need for a dedicated IS staff person to be designated with the 
responsibility of building the security culture for an organization was not the researcher’s radar 
as important until she spoke with a participant who worked for an organization that did not have 
someone designated with this responsibility.  In fact, it was the stark contrast between how 
participants without a dedicated team member responded to interview questions as compared to 
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those who worked for organization with dedicated IS security personnel that enabled the 
researcher to identify this significant insight.  Those participants with dedicated security 
personnel appeared better prepared to defend against social engineering attacks than those 
without.  Had the study failed to include an industry like higher education, this key finding might 
have gone unnoticed, because each participant working for businesses with a dedicated IS 
security person approached this type of position as an implied expectation for their organization.  
Only those participants from higher education could offer the salient insight and perspective of 
what organizations experience when no one is assigned to this role. 
More policies and procedures? Oh my.  Prior to conducting the current study, the 
researcher fully acknowledges having negative biases about the role of policies and procedures 
in the workplace.  She was also unaware that this bias would be challenged by the majority 
participants in terms of being relevant to the prevention of social engineering attacks on U.S. 
businesses.  In fact, this bias was excluded from any of the thoughts and beliefs the researcher 
wrote about as she bracketed out her experiences, simply because she was unconscious of the 
significance of policies and procedures to the security culture and posture of a company.  After 
hearing the unified chorus of participant voices, the researcher is now able to fully appreciate 
how well-constructed and implemented policies and procedures help protect the organization, 
including its assets, employees, and stakeholders. 
Biblical principles.  In reflecting on the implications for biblical practice previously 
discussed in Section 1, the researcher concedes that the research process, specifically engaging 
with the participants, allowed her to expand her original perspective beyond the need to simply 
highlight the efforts of IS professionals.  To conclude this section is a quote shared by a 
participant about the meaning he found in his work to protect his company from social 
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engineering attacks.  The quote is a reminder of how people are image bearers of God (Keller & 
Alsdorf, 2012).  The analogy reveals a beautiful illustration of how God is reflected in the work 
of IS professionals. 
There's an episode of Futurama.  Where Bender gets lost and he meets God--or what we 
expect was God, right?  The quote is, ‘When you do everything right, people won't be 
sure you've done anything at all.’  So that's very pertinent to security and IT.  When 
everything is working the way it should.  They’ll start to question why they're even 
paying you.  Which is a battle you're gonna fight.  But that's--that's the meaning you have 
to get out of it.  I can sit back and have a beer and it’s all just working.  And no one 
knows what it took. 
Summary and Study Conclusions 
 In conclusion, the current study investigated the problem that U.S. businesses remain 
vulnerable to costly social engineering attacks.  The specific problem addressed by this study 
was the deficient understanding about how IS professionals make sense of their lives and 
experiences as they address and prevent weaknesses related to social engineering attacks while 
working in businesses within the healthcare, financial services, and higher education industries 
across central and northwest regions of Louisiana.  The study sought to understand how IS 
professionals working in U.S. businesses make sense of their lives and experiences as they 
address and prevent vulnerabilities to social engineering attacks.   
Because establishing a strong posture against social engineering attacks involves a 
complex interaction of factors, understanding this phenomenon is important for all stakeholders 
attempting to strengthen their defenses against social engineering threats.  The study offers 
recommendations to IS professionals, business leadership, HR professionals, educators, 
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consultants, vendors, and researchers in addressing issues related to designating a dedicated IS 
security team member, continuing to focus on incremental improvements, establishing training 
partnerships, spreading awareness, requiring minimum social engineering training expectations, 
sharing and communicating about vulnerabilities, and installing stronger policies and procedures.  
Also presented are areas recommended for further study, including additional qualitative 
phenomenological inquiries, mixed method investigations into differences between the beliefs 
and attitudes of IS professionals and businesses professionals about social engineering, closer 
examinations of the available social engineering prevention research, and studies investigating 
the experience of IS professionals as they transition from an insecure culture to a security-
minded culture. 
 The topic of social engineering has achieved academic significance, as seen in the 
increased interest in the number of social engineering research papers published in recent years 
(Zheng, Wu, Wang, Wu, & Wu, 2019).  By adhering to a qualitative research approach, the 
current study bridged a gap in the social engineering literature, which was primarily comprised 
of studies that utilized a quantitative methodology.  The present study adds to the body of 
literature through its use of a phenomenological research design.  Prior to this investigation, the 
body of literature did not include a phenomenological study that focused on capturing the 
essence of the lived experience of IS professionals as they protect their company from social 
engineering attacks.  Lastly, the literature lacked information about the shared attitudes, beliefs, 
and motivations of IS professionals as they experienced this phenomenon.  The use of a 
qualitative approach allowed participants to give voice to their beliefs, thoughts, and motivations 
about the work they do in this regard.   
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 The inquiry involved six participants who identified themselves as IS professionals 
working in businesses in central and northwest Louisiana.  Each participant had experiences 
addressing and preventing social engineering vulnerabilities at their workplace.  The results of 
the study consisted of ten themes and two subthemes, which were derived from the transcription, 
analysis, and coding of the in-depth interviews with the six participants.  Together, these themes 
and subthemes capture the overall essence of the lived experiences of the phenomenon.  The 
themes include Theme 1: Security Cultivation, Theme 2: Train, Test, Repeat, Theme 3: Layers, 
Not Just for Hair, Theme 4: Camping 101, Theme 5: Worker Bees, Theme 6: An Invisible 
Impact, Theme 7: To Protect and Serve, Theme 8: Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger, Theme 9: 
Risky Business, and Theme 10: It’s Not That Simple.  The two subthemes of Theme 1 included 
Subtheme 1: Find a Partner, Dosey Doe and Subtheme 2: Tag!  You’re It.   
 The findings revealed that the lived experience of protecting an organization from social 
engineering attacks involves the unification of people across the enterprise to develop a strong 
security-minded culture.  This is accomplished by establishing open communication with the IS 
professionals and other employees of the business, continuously engaging employees in social 
engineering education and training.  The culture is also supported by strong, clear policies and 
procedures and layers of technology and electronic controls.  Participants shared two primary 
beliefs (a) that social engineering attacks would never be eradicated and (b) IS professionals 
depend on everyone in the organization to protect the organization from social engineering 
attacks.  They cannot do it alone.   
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Appendix A: Interview Script 
Hello, thank you for taking the time to meet with me today.  As you may recall, I am Lily 
Pharris, a doctoral student in the School of Business at Liberty University, and I am conducting 
research as part of the requirements for a Doctor of Business Administration degree.  The 
purpose of my research is to investigate how IS professionals make sense of their lives and 
experiences as they deal with social engineering attacks at their company.  
[Hand Participant Copy of Previously Signed/Submitted Informed Consent] 
Before we begin, I want to remind you that participation in this study is voluntary, and 
your decision to participate will not affect your current or future relationship with Liberty 
University.  If you decide to participate, you are free not to answer any question or withdraw at 
any time without affecting those relationships.   
Additionally, I want to make sure you know that the records of this study will be kept 
confidential.  Data and recordings will be stored securely on a password protected zip drive for 
three years following the study, and only I will have access to retrieve those files.  In any sort of 
report I might publish, I will not include any information that will make it possible to identify 
you or your employer.  While it is possible that I may share the data I collect from you with other 
researchers or in other studies, if I share anything, I will remove any information that could 
identify you or your employer before sharing.  After three years, all electronic records will be 
deleted.   
You have already reviewed, signed, and submitted the informed consent policy.  At this 
point, do you have any questions you would like to ask me before we begin the interview? 
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Again, thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview today.  As we begin, please 
take a moment to focus on your experiences as an IS professional as they relate to preventing 
social engineering vulnerabilities at your workplace.   
1. Try to remember one of the last times you had to deal with a social engineering 
vulnerability at your work.  Tell me about the situation, including how you felt and 
responded.  Who was involved and what was said as you were addressing the situation?    
a. What was going on or what were you doing just before you learned about a social 
engineering attack or vulnerability at your workplace?  
b. How did the experience affect you?  What changes do you associate with the 
experience?  
c. What feelings do you recall were generated when you realized a social 
engineering vulnerability had been exploited?  
d. What thoughts stand out in your memory as you attempted to address or prevent 
the vulnerability? 
e. Were you aware of any physical reactions or changes in your state of mind at the 
time?  
f. What other elements, incidents, and people closely connected to the experience 
stand out to you from this experience?  
g. Besides preventing social engineering vulnerabilities, what other job functions 
and duties are you responsible for at your place of employment?  
h. When considering all the activities you engage in, including addressing social 
engineering vulnerabilities, how does everything get accomplished?  
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i. What resources do you have at your disposal to prevent social engineering across 
your organization?  
j. How adequate are these resources to accomplish the task of preventing, if not 
eliminating, social engineering attacks on your organization?  
k. Have you shared all that is significant with reference to this personal experience 
of preventing social engineering vulnerabilities at your workplace?  
2. Social engineering attacks typically target and exploit the people of an organization—
preying on a person’s natural curiosities or inclination to trust and help others.  Other 
times social engineers use fear or pressure to compel people to respond.  To what extent 
do you believe the vulnerabilities related to the “human element” can be eliminated?  
a. How does this belief influence how you address social engineering attacks at your 
organization?  
b. What risks do social engineering attacks pose to your company?  
c. How is the responsibility of addressing and preventing social engineering 
vulnerabilities at your company designated or assigned at your organization?  
Single individual?  IS team?  Everyone?  
d. How much time and effort do you (or your team/department) devote to the 
prevention of social engineering vulnerabilities at your organization?  
e. Given your current level of resources (including manpower, training, budget, etc.) 
and your understanding of the level of risk social engineering attacks pose toward 
your organization, please describe the extent you believe the amount of time and 
effort devoted toward preventing social engineering across your organization is 
appropriate.  
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3. What conditions, situational or environmental, have influenced, or are currently 
influencing, how your organization has chosen to address security vulnerabilities related 
to human manipulation, as is often targeted in social engineering attacks?  
4. Describe what steps or improvements, if any, you (inclusive of the IS team and 
organization) have taken to move the company from being vulnerable to social 
engineering attacks to protected against social engineering attacks.  
a. Please explain to what extent you are pleased with this transformation.  
b. Please explain to what extent you believe more needs to be done.  
c. Please explain to what extent you believe more will be done to improve your 
defenses against social engineering attacks.  
5. Are you aware of any tactics that have been used to successfully reduce social 
engineering attacks in other businesses or industries?  Please describe an example that 
comes to mind.   
a. To what extent do you believe tactics that have been successful in other industries 
are applicable in your current industry?  Why or why not?   
b. What differences do you believe exist between your industry and those industries 
that make them more or less successful than you have experienced at your 
organization? 
6. What meaning, if any, do you ascribe to the work you do to prevent social engineering 
vulnerabilities at your company?  
a. How does the work that you do to address social engineering attacks at your 
organization impact your company?  
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b. To what extent would you consider the work that you do to prevent social 
engineering vulnerabilities as meaningful?  Why?  
c. To what extent do social engineering attacks on your organization bother you?  
Why?  
7. Have you shared all that is significant with reference to your personal experiences 
preventing social engineering vulnerabilities at your workplace?  
8. For my final question, would you be willing to recommend another IS professional from 
the region who works in your company or industry who has experiences with preventing 
social engineering vulnerabilities as part of their professional job duties?   
I truly appreciate you taking the time to meet with me and answer these questions today.  
My next step is to transcribe the interview, and once the transcription is complete, I will share a 
copy with you to review and check for accuracy.  You will have the opportunity at that time to 
address any points you feel are unclear or could benefit from additional clarification.  If you 
think of anything else that should be considered, feel free to call me at 318-229-3643, or email 
me at [redacted].  Do you have any questions, comments, or concerns at this time?   
Thanks again for helping me with my study. 
 
 
 
